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This study examines the relation between Hume’s justice and his 
moral theory in regard to the role of a virtuous body of 
citizenry in politics. It is often argued that classical 
liberals detached the connection between virtue and politics and 
relied on enlightened interest and the state to establish and 
maintain social order. Yet, Humean liberalism reveals that this 
is a misleading generalization. In this study, I argue that 
Hume’s politics has two fundamental components: the state 
(institutions) and a virtuous body of citizenry. Hume’s 
developmental view of human nature allows him to argue that in 
parallel to the development of human society and because of 
private training and education, our moral sense improves. The 
improvement of moral sense creates new motives in individuals 
which cannot be reduced to self-interest. Hume relies on the 
improvement of moral sense to facilitate social cooperation in 
large modern society in addition to the state and self-interest. 
This study reveals that liberal thought cannot be reduced to its 
Hobbesian version. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
There has been a resurgence of scholarly interest in the 
characters of citizens in regard, among other things, to social 
cooperation since the publication of Putnam’s Making Democracy 
Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy (1993)1. Question of how a 
liberal system should and can respond to the collective action 
and free-rider problem has gained new insights. In particular, 
the role of the qualities of individuals in dealing with the 
collective action problem has questioned the adequacy of 
rational choice theory and the institutional solution. Social 
capital asserts that some actual conduct of individuals violates 
the logic of the collective action. In other words, predictions 
of rational choice theory do not always hold (Putnam 1993; Boix 
and Posner 1998). Social capital provides an approach to account 
for this type of individual conduct by introducing the role of 
certain qualities, skills, and a sense of duty in social 
cooperation. In accordance with this conviction and to 
facilitate cooperation, social capital advocates the development 
                                                 
1 This subject is broader than social capital implies. Indeed, neo-republicans and communitarians criticize liberals as 
ignoring the connection between politics and virtue. Social capital is related, at least indirectly, to this discussion, 
yet its specific aim is to analyze the relation between character of citizens and the collective action in particular and 
the quality of social life in general in liberal systems (For the broader connection between virtue and politics, see 
Wallach 1992; Callan 2003; Kymlicka and Norman 1994). 
1 
 of certain qualities in individuals in addition to institutional 
design. 
The difference between rational choice and social capital 
goes back to their concepts of human nature and individual 
motive in essence. The former assumes that the individual is a 
rational agent who seeks to maximize his utility.  It uses an 
abstract notion of individual whose only motive is self-
interest. Rational choice theory analyses the question of social 
cooperation as an interaction of such abstract agents by “market 
metaphor" (Monroe 1995). Both the character of analysis and the 
unit of analysis are abstract (Zuckert 1995; Rosenberg 1995). 
Social capital assumes that the self-interested individual is 
capable of developing motives in an appropriate environment 
which cannot be reduced to self-interest. The development of new 
motives and qualitative changes in individual preferences are 
features of human nature in social capital (Boix and Posner 
1998). Social capital locates individual conduct in actual daily 
life.2  Theorizing about individual conduct in an abstract model 
with a narrow concept of self-interest leaves out some factors 
which have significant impacts on individual conduct (Zuckert 
1995). As a result two different assumptions about human nature 
                                                 
2 Social capital locates the individual in his cultural, institutional, as well as historical context. Not just institutional 
but also cultural and historical environments are significant in social capital. According to Monroe (1995) and 
Rosenberg (1995), rational choice theory’s analytical situation in which individuals interact with each other is “the 
market place” in which self-interest determines individual conduct.  
2 
 lead to two different methods of theorizing about individual 
conduct. 
Although social capital has a short history as a concept, 
its core idea that assumes a close link between the qualities of 
citizens and politics has a long history in political thought. 
The role of a virtuous body of citizenry in politics goes back 
to classical political theory (Burtt 1993; Wallach 1992). 
Classical republican thought assumes this connection between 
politics and the quality of citizens. Although it has a wide 
currency among contemporary scholars that classical liberals 
detached this connection between virtue and politics and relied 
on institutional design to establish and secure cooperation, 
this is a misleading generalization which ignores the existence 
of different traditions in liberalism since its beginning 
(Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Galston 1988). It is usually accepted 
that Mill and Tocqueville recognized the significance of the 
qualities of individuals in politics, yet Hume is seen as 
similar to Hobbes who is credited with using rational choice 
assumptions in his theory.3 Some scholars (Gauthier 1990&1992; 
Taylor 1987) argue that, in spite of his moral theory, Hume uses 
contractarian logic and basic assumptions of the rational choice 
model in his theory of justice and the state. He relies on 
manipulation of self-interested agents by creating an 
                                                 
3 Moss argues that central insights of Hume about social cooperation show a clear influence of Hobbes (1991). 
3 
 appropriate structural environment and incentives to establish 
and perpetuate social order. They deny that there can be a 
connection between his theories of justice and the state and his 
moral theory which is “non-contractarian” in essence (Gauthier 
1990a, 57). In parallel to this interpretation, some scholars 
argue that Humean politics has not been touched by any idea of 
virtue. His politics relies on well-designed institutions and 
good laws (Forbes 1975; Frey 1995; Cohen 2000). 
The application of the rational choice to Hume is not 
completely unreasonable, for Hume recognizes the collective 
action and free-rider problem in society and his analysis 
contains significant elements of the rational choice as his 
analytical tools.  For example, in the following example known 
as the Farmer’s Dilemma, Hume argues that in case of 
uncertainty, individuals chose to defect; 
Your corn is ripe today; mine will be to-morrow. ‘Tis 
profitable for us both, that I shou’d labour with you 
to-day, and that you shou’d aid me to-morrow. I have no 
kindness for you, and know you have as little for me. I 
will not, therefore, take any pains upon your account; 
and shou’d I labour with you upon your account, in 
expectation of a return, I know I shou’d be 
disappointed, and that I shou’d in vain depend upon you 
gratitude. Here then I leave you to labour alone: You 
treat me in the same manner. The seasons change; and 
both of us lose our harvest for want of mutual 
confidence and security. (T 334)4
 
                                                 
4 In this study, I refer to Hume’s works in the following way: A Treatise of Human Nature (T), An Enquiry 
Concerning the Principles of Morals (En), and Essays (Es).  
4 
 In this example, Hume formulates the coordination problem as a 
one-shot prisoners’ dilemma game (Valls 1995; Vanderschraaf 
1998). The absence of adequate information about each other 
among individuals leads them to defect. Hume thinks that the 
solution for this type of coordination problem is to place 
individuals in a repeated game situation. Indeed, as 
Vanderscraft (1998, 225) argues Hume considers coordination 
problems as more “repeated games” rather than one-shot game. In 
such repeated games individuals chose to cooperate as a rational 
strategy in order to prevent exclusion from future cooperation. 
As Taylor (1987, 161) argues Hume turns one-shot games into 
repeated games by recognizing the role of “time” in social 
cooperation. 
Hence I learn to do a service to another, without 
bearing him any real kindness; because I foresee, that, 
he will return my service, in expectation of another of 
the same kind, and in order to maintain the same 
correspondence of good offices with me or with others. 
And accordingly, after I have serv’d him, and he is in 
possession of the advantage arising from my action, he 
is induc’d to perform his part as foreseeing the 
consequences of his refusal. (T 335) 
 
Hume also recognizes the role of size factor in cooperation. He 
thinks that in small society where individuals have adequate 
information about each other and social sanctions function 
effectively against defectors, individuals cooperate as a 
rational strategy. On the other hand, in a large society 
5 
 individuals do not have adequate information about each other 
and thus have the opportunity to be free-riders. Hume explains 
these two different situations as follows: 
Two neighbours may agree to drain a meadow, which they 
possess in common; because ‘tis easy for them to know 
each others mind; and each must perceive, that the 
immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, 
the abandoning the whole project. But ‘tis very 
difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand 
persons shou’d agree in any such action; it being 
difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, 
and still more difficult for them to execute it; while 
each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and 
expense, wou’d lay the whole burden on others. (T 345) 
 
In this example, Hume sees two particular problems of the 
cooperation question: First, the increase of the number of 
agents leads to the absence of adequate information among 
agents. This refers to the coordination problem in a large 
society. The larger the number of agents, the more difficult to 
cooperate.  Individual defection is a rational strategy in this 
situation. The second problem is that increase of society 
creates an appropriate environment for those who choose to 
benefit from cooperation without contributing. This refers to 
the free-rider problem. Hume argues that in a small society the 
coordination problem can be solved without the government, 
whereas in larger society individuals need the government to 
overcome uncertainty and coordination problem (T 346). 
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 These examples show that Hume is aware of the complexity of 
the coordination problem and also his analysis contains 
significant aspects of the rational choice model (Bruni and 
Sugden 2000, 28). 
Based on these examples some scholars argue that Hume’s 
justice and the government depend on a contractual logic. Among 
these authors, Gauthier derives the most damning conclusion for 
Hume. According to Gauthier, in spite of his criticism of the 
contractual model, Hume’s theory of justice and the state relies 
on a contractual logic. He argues that the only reason that 
Humean agents cooperate and obey the state is to serve their 
private interest: 
Hume [assumes] our consent binds us, only because of 
our interest in being thereby bound, consent 
obligates, because the stability of society requires 
that it should, and our interests  
require the stability of society… Nothing in this 
argument is incompatible with hypothetical 
contractarianism. (1990a, 56) 
 
He maintains that Humean agents curb their interest to 
serve their interests: “Hume is sensibly aware of men’s 
interest curbing interest. It is this awareness which makes 
his thought contractarian, for the essence of the social 
contract is found in the mutual advantage of restraining 
the pursuit of advantage” (1990a, 75). 
According to Gauthier, although self-interest as a motive 
leads to cooperation, it also creates a particular problem for 
7 
 Hume. Individuals recognize the general utility of a stable 
society, yet they also as self-interested agents recognize “the 
particular advantages of injustice” for their private interest 
(1990b, 141). This refers to the sensible knave in Hume. The 
sensible knave is someone who obeys the rule in general, yet 
takes advantage of those cases where he can get away with unjust 
conduct. 
In the case of justice, where a man, taking things in 
certain light, may often seem to be a loser by his 
integrity … a sensible knave, in particular incidents, 
may think that an act of ingenuity or infidelity will 
make a considerable addition to his fortune, without 
causing any considerable breach in the social union 
and confederacy. That honesty is the best policy, may 
be a good general rule, but it is liable to many 
exceptions; and he, it may be thought, conducts 
himself with most wisdom, who observes the general 
rule, and takes advantage of all the exceptions. (En 
122) 
 
Here Hume refers to the free-rider problem. Thus, although 
he thinks that self-interest is the origin of justice, in the 
final analysis, it is not a sufficient motive for a complete 
compliance of individuals with the rules. Gauthier asserts that 
“Hume’s sensible knave, like Hobbes’s Foole, perceives the 
fundamental instability included in justice”, for “both the 
obligation and the inclination, it should be noted, rest on 
interest” (1990, 65). 
According to Gauthier, Hume presents two different 
arguments to the sensible knave’s challenge: In the Treatise 
8 
 Hume thinks that the failure of self-interest is related to our 
“short-sightedness” which leads individuals to forget their 
enlightened interest, yet “the real interest remains” 
(Gauthier,1992 417). He sees “the interested obligation to 
justice … as unproblematic” (Gauthier 419). On the other hand, 
in the second Enquiry, Hume thinks that the sensible knave is 
not a short-sighted agent at all. Rather, Hume recognizes the 
real problem is that self-interest requires that type of 
injustice (Gauthier 418).  Yet, Hume thinks that he could 
provide an answer to the sensible knave. He argues that the 
sensible knave sacrifices “the invaluable enjoyment of a 
character … for the acquisition of worthless toys and gewgaws” 
(En, 122). 
Gauthier argues that Hume “appeals to the heart” as a 
response. Yet, this is not a real response, rather a rhetorical 
one (418), for the sensible knave does not see such a loss in 
his act. Given that the sensible knave is not interested in 
Hume’s moral sense, even though some people find it attractive 
and reasonable, maintains Gauthier, “the sensible knave’s 
message is that human society … lacks any moral foundation” 
(422). As a result, for Gauthier, Hume’s appeal to our moral 
sense cannot overcome the free-rider problem in society. 
In parallel to this contractual reading of Humean theory, 
some scholars argue that Hume’s politics is untouched by any 
9 
 idea of virtue. Rather Hume relies on well-designed institutions 
and good laws to perpetuate cooperation. This interpretation 
also relies on Hume’s notion of the “sensible knave” (Forbes 
1975; Frey 1995, Cohen 2000). As a result, both contractual and 
institutionalist interpretations detach Humean justice and the 
state form his moral theory. 
However, this detachment cannot explain certain components 
of Humean justice and the state (Bagolini 1981; Ponko 1983; 
Baier 1991&1992; Miller 1981& 1997; Taylor 1998; Gill 2000; 
Hursthouse 1999). Hume thinks that though the original motive of 
the individual is self-interest, in time, individuals see 
justice as virtue and injustice as vice. Gauthier’s 
interpretation cannot explain how such self-interested agents 
come to see individual acts as the subject of moral evaluation 
at all. Yet, Hume thinks that  individuals develop this moral 
outlook over time as a result of many different factors, such as 
training and education in the family, increase of interpersonal 
relations and sociability, the practice of rule following, and 
commerce and industry. Here he relies on the evolutionary 
character of the rules of justice in particular and the 
development of civilized society in general. According to Hume, 
the rules of justice develop over time as an unintended 
consequence of individual choices. In a contractual model, 
individuals invent the rules as a result of bargaining and 
10 
 consent among themselves at a hypothetical situation and certain 
time (Valls 1995, 229). 
Another issue ignored by Gauthier is Hume’s understanding 
of human nature and the nature of individual motives and 
preferences. Hume has a developmental or “progressive” concept 
of human nature. Gill  (2000, 99-100) asserts that Hume’s notion 
of human nature is a “dynamic or progressive view” which 
discards the Hobbesian “static” view which assumes that “the 
basic elements of human motivations are fixed” and “we could 
change human behavior only by changing the circumstances in 
which those original motives” operate. Hume, On the other hand, 
assumes that “original motives can evolve into other motives of 
different kinds. He believes we can develop new motives, ones 
that were not part of our original endowment”. This progressive 
quality of Humean human nature has significant implications for 
his theory of justice in particular and politics in general. 
Bagolini argues that (1981, 88) the process of the development 
of justice in particular and of civilized society in general is 
the process of “a modification and alteration of individual 
self-interest”.  This modification refers to the development of 
non-instrumental motives and thus the changing nature of 
individual preferences. Taylor (1998, 7) calls this process as 
“the cultural transformation of instinct”. Similarly, Hursthouse 
11 
 (1999, 70) argues that this process is the process of the 
development of “a second nature” in the individual: 
We human beings can develop, through education and 
reflection, a second nature such that we take a 
particular pleasure and pride in certain things, and 
come to regard certain things as worth pursuing and 
having”. Relying on his dynamic view of human nature, 
Hume assumes that “humans are typically able to act 
from significantly different motives. (Norton 1999, 
160) 
 
In Hume, how a society responds to the collective action problem 
is a function of the interaction of the level of the development 
of human nature and its institutional as well as cultural and 
moral environment. Gauthier takes both Humean human nature and 
environment as static concepts. Yet, both are dynamic concepts 
in Hume. Hume’s account of justice at its origin can be captured 
by Gauthier’s interpretation, yet it cannot explain the 
development of moral sense as well as the impact of cultural 
environment on individual conduct. This brings us to another 
significant issue ignored by Gauthier. Hume criticizes precisely 
the Gauthierian-style abstraction in theorizing about individual 
conduct. He argues that “the love of simplicity [parsimony]” 
leads to errors in our understanding of human nature and 
individual motives in many philosophers (En 141). A proper 
understanding of individual conduct requires observation of the 
individual in his actual daily life rather than using an 
abstract model. He thinks that we observe many individual 
12 
 actions in our daily life that cannot be explained by abstract 
self-interest-oriented models (En 143). According to McIntyre 
(2001, 458), “his view of human nature is empirical … 
regularities [about human nature] revealed through careful 
observation. It is history, not reason that reveals regularities 
of human nature in society”. 
Another issue is that Hume tells different stories in 
different places in his works. In the Treatise, he explains the 
origin of justice and the state by self-interest and his 
analysis is more abstract and theoretical. In the second Enquiry 
and Essays, he is interested in explaining the moral sense we 
observe in our daily life. He recognizes the failure of 
enlightened interest in motivating individuals in certain cases, 
yet he wants to explain why many people in their daily life 
violate this expectation and rather obey the rules or cooperate.  
This observation about individual conduct in its daily context 
is the starting point of Hume’s criticism of those who reduce 
individual motive to self-interest. 
Thus, Hume’s appeal is not a simple escape from reality or 
just a rhetorical answer. Rather it is a necessary part of his 
theory. His appeal to a moral sense as a response to the 
sensible knave is a reasonable one within this larger framework. 
Hume does not think that the free-rider is typical of every 
member of society. Rather, he is someone who lacks any moral 
13 
 sense. As Baier puts it (1992, 431), there are two different 
perspectives from which we could evaluate the sensible knave 
problem. First, the sensible knave perspective which values 
“material gains” over integrity of character. Second, “the 
sensible non-knave” perspective which “dismisses the material 
rewards of judicious injustice as ‘worthless toys and gewgaws’”. 
As a result, “there is not Archimedean ‘rational point of view’ 
from which judgment could be made between the knave’s version 
and the non-knave’s version of self-interest”. That’s why Hume’s 
appeal to moral sense is “a perfectly satisfactory reply” not 
for the sensible knave but for “the virtuous dues-paying member 
of the party of humankind”. 
As a result, Hume’s dynamic notion of human nature and 
individual motive, the evolutionary quality of justice, and the 
complexity of moral theory and its role in his larger theory 
cannot be captured by rational choice theory. In this study, I 
analyze these factors ignored by institutionalist and rational 
choice interpretations to show the close connection between 
Hume’s politics and his moral theory. 
In order to make my case, I utilize Putnam’s idea of social 
capital. But, before I justify my usage, I present some 
criticisms of social capital. Although social capital has gained 
a wide currency in many branches of social sciences and policy 
recommendations of national and international institutions, 
14 
 there have been also significant criticisms since the 
publication of Putnam’s Making Democracy Work. 
It is argued that empirical evidence is inadequate for the 
causal relation among different components of social capital. 
His causal mechanism among different components of social 
capital and between social capital and efficiency of cooperation 
has been subject to criticism. Jackman and Miller (1998) argue 
that he conflates associations, trust, and generalized 
reciprocity. They maintain that he selectively uses data and 
appeals to theoretical explanation where he cannot support his 
views with empirical data. Similarly, Boix and Posner (1998) 
argue that social capital suffers from an inadequate explanation 
about its origin and the mechanisms. Putnam’s account of how 
social capital develops in certain places is problematic. 
Putnam’s assumption that repeated interactions of individuals 
increase social capital and the high level of social capital 
facilitates cooperation is a circular explanation. It cannot 
explain the origin of social capital. Woolcock (1998) criticizes 
Putnam as ignoring the role of the state in developing social 
capital. Putnam sees social capital as a bottom-up process which 
needs to be supported by a top-down perspective. 
Mouritsen (2003) and Levi (1996) argue that Putnam attaches 
equal value to membership in a bird-watching group and 
membership in a political or civic association. Mouritsen claims 
15 
 that we need a more politics-oriented notion of associations to 
develop civic virtues. On the other hand, Portes (1998) reduces 
social capital to the development of enlightened interest and 
denies its moral aspects, in spite of Putnam’s appeal to the 
idea of “better citizens” or the development of “sense of duty” 
as individual motive. Putnam thinks that social capital is 
“moral resource” which transform individuals into “better 
citizens” whose motives involve “sense of duty” as well as self-
interest (1993). 
Chambers and Kopstein (2001) and Stolle and Rochon (1998) 
criticize Putnam as not providing adequate argument about how 
social capital created in one group could be extended to non-
members. 
Although these criticisms show many problems in social 
capital, it still provides a useful perspective to approach 
Hume’s theory for several reasons. First, as Boix and Posner put 
it, 
The concept’s [rational choice] widespread acceptance 
as a descriptive and diagnostic tool, however, cannot 
obscure the fact that its predictions do not always 
hold. Co-operation sometimes does take place in 
contexts where, according to the theory, actors should 
have little incentives to engage in it. 
 
They maintain that to explain this type of individual conduct, 
theorists have developed social capital. Putnam also makes the 
very same point to justify his search for an alternative 
16 
 approach to rational choice (1993). Hume also criticizes the 
abstract-static model presented by Hobbes as inadequate to 
explain individual conduct in some cases. To explain this type 
of behavior social capital introduces moral sense. The 
development of motives that develop within associations and 
cannot be reduced to self-interest provides a useful perspective 
to approach Hume’s moral theory. 
Second, Hume presents a comprehensive account of how moral 
sense develops. Family, politicians, practice of cooperation and 
rule following, liberal arts and sciences, increase of 
interpersonal relations, and the general improvement of material 
and cultural development of human society are all related to 
moral development. In his moral theory, sociability and increase 
of interpersonal relations play a significant role in the 
development of moral sense. In that respect Putnam’s social 
capital provides a useful analytical tool to make this component 
of Humean moral theory explicit. The values of associations 
advocated by social capital could be classified into two groups: 
Instrumental values and intrinsic values. The former refers to 
certain skills and the development of enlightened interest 
necessary for more efficient cooperation. In associations 
individuals develop necessary skills and recognize that all 
benefit form cooperation. The latter refers to social 
connectedness and the development of public spiritedness. 
17 
 Neither social connectedness nor sense of duty is related to 
self-interest. Rather, in regard to the free-rider problem, 
these two factors create a tendency in individuals contrary to 
their interest. Putnam sees social connectedness as creating the 
sort of ties among individuals which cannot be reduced to self-
interest or expectation of utility in the future. Social 
connectedness seems to be an intrinsic human need in social 
capital. Public spiritedness or sense of duty becomes possible 
on the basis of social connectedness as an intrinsic value for 
individuals. This aspect of social capital is significant for my 
purpose; it can explain Hume’s ideas on the relation between the 
increase of interpersonal relations especially in modern 
commercial cities and the increase of our moral sense. Social 
connectedness is one of the major sources of the development of 
moral sense in Humean theory. Although we cannot find voluntary 
associations in Hume, he talks about “clubs and societies” in 
newly emerging commercial cities as A medium in which 
sociability and moral sense (sense of humanity) are enhanced. 
Third, closely related to the second reason is that as Boix 
and Posner (1998) put it, social capital can affect the “nature 
of citizens’ preferences”. A shift of focus from material to 
non-material values is one of the components of social capital. 
For instance, a sense of duty opposes one’s own regard to his 
personality to his interest. We see a similar shift of focus in 
18 
 individual preference in Hume’s moral theory. This shift is 
related to a dynamic view of human nature both in Hume and 
social capital. While Gauthier simply rejects Hume’s appeal to 
our moral sense as an “appeal to heart”, it is not that simple. 
It becomes a reasonable appeal on the basis of a complex moral 
theory which relies on his a “progressive view” of human nature. 
Fourth, social capital helps us to clarify a common 
confusion in the Hume literature which argues that Hume’s 
politics is untouched by any idea of virtue and depends on well-
designed institutions. This conviction is based on Hume’s 
criticism of classical republican virtues as inhumane and 
obsolete. Yet, Hume advocates a set of qualities as functional 
equivalent of republican virtues for modern commercial 
societies. Social capital helps us to have a better grasp of 
Humean qualities as virtues and their function in politics. For 
instance, social capital sees any sort of association as 
significant rather than only political ones, which can provide 
some insights why Hume attaches so much value to sociability, 
conversation, and increase of interpersonal relations as sources 
of a moral sense. 
 
 
 
 
19 
 Scholarly Contribution of the Study: 
 
This study attempts to contribute to Humean literature by 
showing that it is not possible to detach Hume’s moral theory 
from his theory of justice and the state in regard to the 
cooperation problem in society. Hume’s moral theory facilitates 
cooperation by introducing a moral sense. The success of this 
depends on the creation of a moral environment in society. 
Otherwise, Humean politics has to rely solely on institutions. 
Humean understanding of the development of civilized society 
provides the general framework for such an environment. I 
attempt to show that rational choice and institutionalist 
interpretations distort Humean theory by providing a more 
comprehensive interpretation of his theory which attempts to 
show links between different components of his thought. His 
response to the free-rider becomes reasonable within this larger 
framework. 
In addition to this major contribution, this study also 
contributes to the contemporary discussion of social capital by 
revealing that the core idea of social capital is not a new one. 
Hume can provide some useful insights for contemporary 
discussion, for he is one of the early theorists who uses basic 
assumptions and tools of game theory yet he also has a moral 
theory. In particular, Hume provides some insights that can fill 
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 some theoretical gaps in Putnam’s social capital. Our awareness 
of the historical roots of contemporary concepts can enrich our 
understanding and broaden our perspective. 
 
 
 
 
Outline of the Study: 
 
In the first chapter, I present and analyze Hume’s theory of 
justice. Hume discards the contractarian idea of justice and 
endorses a historical approach. He thinks that justice develops 
as a convention over time in society. Although Hume thinks that 
the origin of justice is self-interest, self-interest cannot 
provide an adequate motive for cooperation. For this reason, 
Hume endorses the state to force individuals to cooperate. Yet, 
he thinks that even the state faces an enforcement problem with 
individuals because of the increasing size of society and its 
wealth. In the first chapter, my analysis is limited to show 
that although Hume considers the state as an external party to 
force individuals to cooperate, he does not consider it an 
adequate solution to the collective action problem. 
In the second chapter, I analyze Putnam’s theory of social 
capital. First, I analyze the central themes of social capital 
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 such as networks, social trust, and generalized reciprocity and 
the causal relation between social capital and an effective 
response to the social cooperation problem. In addition, I 
analyze and criticize Putnam’s appeal to the republican notion 
of virtue to describe social capital to show that qualities that 
develop in networks are liberal rather than republican. In the 
second chapter, I limit my comparison of Hume and Putnam to 
their understanding of the state. In particular, I argue that 
Putnam’s understanding of the state as a solution to the 
collective action problem is similar to Hume’s in respect to its 
limits on social cooperation. 
In chapter three, I introduce Hume’s moral theory. In 
particular, I argue that there is a close link between his moral 
theory and his theory of justice. His theory of justice reveals 
the limits of the state as a solution to social cooperation, 
which allows us to argue that Hume’s theory has two components 
to deal with the collective action problem: institutions and a 
virtuous body of citizenry. In this chapter, I criticize the 
common institutionalist interpretation of Hume’s theory and 
compare his catalog of virtues to Putnam’s to show the 
similarities between them. 
In chapter four, I introduce Hume’s politics. Hume 
advocates moderation as a primary virtue of political life in 
dealing with conflicts. I argue that his idea of politics relies 
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 on both institutional design and a particular notion of virtue 
(moderation) which reveals that Hume’s way of doing politics is 
very similar to Putnam’s “new way of doing politics” in 
overcoming political deadlocks and destructive conflict. In 
particular, both Putnam and Hume rely on moderation, for both 
argue that political questions are very complex and solutions 
lie in the middle. Also, both discourage ideological and 
partisan politics. 
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1.0 HUME’S THEORY OF JUSTICE 
 
 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, I introduce and analyze Hume’s theory of 
justice. He presents two different accounts of justice; 
theoretical and historical. In the former account, he utilizes 
the idea of a “golden age” to determine features of human 
condition that leads to the development of justice. In 
particular, the idea of “golden age” refers to a counterfactual 
situation in which individuals do not face the scarcity of goods 
and thus the collective action problem. In the latter account, 
he sees justice as a convention developing gradually over time.  
Hume discards the contractarian account of justice which 
conditions his ideas on social cooperation. In particular, Hume 
denies that development of enlightened self-interest and 
establishment of the state secure efficient cooperation among 
individuals. Although Hume endorses both enlightened interest 
and the state in his theoretical account, he thinks both factors 
fall short in motivating individuals for cooperation in final 
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 analysis. Therefore, he argues that besides enlightened interest 
and the state, an efficient response to the collective action 
problem requires improvement of morality among individuals. His 
historical account of justice ties efficient cooperation to 
development of morality in society.  
 Hume’s two separate responses to the collective action 
problem can be seen in his two different accounts of the origins 
of justice and the role of government in social cooperation. In 
this chapter, I introduce Hume’s theory of justice and 
government to show these two different solutions. This 
distinction is significant for several reasons: First, it allows 
us to determine the proper place of rational choice in Hume’s 
theory; his theoretical account endorses a notion of justice 
primarily as a “one-shot game”. And Hume’s solution to the 
collective action problem in this account is the establishment 
of the state. This account endorses the classical Hobbesian 
solution in general, which relies on institutions and legal 
punishment to prevent defection. Both the development and the 
execution of the rules of justice are formulated as games in 
Hume's theoretical account.  
Second, this line of argument is not the whole story Hume 
tells about the origin of justice and the collective action 
problem. His historical account endorses an evolutionary concept 
of justice that develops through a series of repeated games that 
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 sees the development of the rules of justice as more convention 
building than a “one-shot game” among individuals. The gradual 
development of the rules of justice in time creates a habit of 
rule following in individuals. Individuals develop the rules 
over time by a process of trial and error rather than 
formulation as a one-shot game among them.  
In respect to the collective action problem, the historical 
account also endorses the state. In this account, the state 
develops as a response to wars among different tribes rather 
than as a response to the collective action problem in society 
in the first place. In time, the state comes to play a role in 
dealing with this problem. This account advocates an additional 
solution to the collective action problem that relies on 
improvement of the moral sense among people rather than solely 
on the state as a classical Hobbesian solution (institutions and 
legal force). In his historical account of justice Hume claims 
that once the rules of justice develop, individuals come, in 
time, to see compliance with those rules as a moral duty not 
just an issue of self-interest. Although the initial purpose of 
individuals in developing the rules of justice is to serve their 
interests better, in time they come to consider rule following 
as a moral duty.  
This moral sense is the starting point of Hume’s moral theory 
and he then goes on to present many different factors that lead 
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 to its further development. As a result, besides self-interest, 
individuals come to have an improved moral sense as the motive 
for their conduct in society.  
Third, Hume’s historical account that relies on improvement 
of the moral sense shows clearly the close connection between 
his theory of justice and moral theory. This is significant for 
my larger concern that I argue when we follow Hume’s historical 
account of justice and the solution to the collective action 
problem that relies on improvement of the moral sense in society 
shows that Hume presents an early liberal formulation of the 
idea of social capital to deal more effectively with the 
collective action problem and to increase the quality of social 
life.  
In this chapter, my concern is limited presenting these two 
accounts of the origin of justice and introducing the particular 
solutions to the collective action problem each account 
endorses. I do not reach to definitive conclusions in this 
chapter in respect to these solutions; especially for the moral 
solution we need to see Hume’s moral theory that I present in 
chapter 3.  
 The plan of the chapter is as follows; First, I present 
Hume’s theoretical account of the origin of justice and the role 
of government in social cooperation. Although Hume’s main 
account of justice is a historical one, he also presents an 
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 abstract account of justice which I call theoretical account. He 
sees the development of the rules of justice as product of the 
interaction of selfishness of human nature and the scarcity of 
goods in this account. It is underlined by Hobbesian logic in 
terms of its understanding of individual conduct. I argue that 
Hume’s theoretical account of justice endorses a notion of 
justice as a game in contemporary sense. And Hume’s response to 
the collective action problem is also structured by his 
perception of justice as a game among self-interested agents in 
this account. The function of this theoretical account in Hume 
is, I argue, limited to its supportive role for rather than 
being an alternative one to his historical account. Second, I 
introduce Hume’s historical account of the origin of justice and 
the role of government in social cooperation. In this section, I 
argue that Hume sees the development of the rules of justice as 
a convention building in society. The development of the rules 
provides a set of shared rules in respect to property relations 
to regulate individual conduct and thus provide regularity and 
certainty in interpersonal relations in society.  I analyze how 
Hume thinks that social cooperation is realized without a 
central authority in a small tribal society and that once 
society becomes larger individuals appeal to the state to assure 
cooperation. The primary characteristic of Hume’s argument is 
evolutionary in this part.  
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1.2 JUSTICE: THEORETICAL ACCOUNT 
 
In addition to his historical account of the origins of justice 
and government, Hume presents a theoretical account of these two 
issues. His purpose in this account is to show that his 
historical account is a reasonable one. Hume utilizes the idea 
of a “golden age” for this purpose, even though he thinks that 
it is just philosophical fiction.  
In this account, Hume emphasizes the acquisitive faculty of 
man as the source of conflict among individuals and sees self-
interest as the origin of justice. The acquisitive faculty and 
limited benevolence of human nature are the two basic factors 
whose interaction with scarcity of the goods creates conflict 
among individuals in regard to property issues. The instinctive 
interest of the individual requires him to defect.  
Hume thinks that there is no remedy for this “natural 
infirmity” of individual in human nature on which we can rely. 
As a solution, he endorses the state as an external authority to 
regulate individual conduct in society. Individuals agree to 
establish the state in order to serve their enlightened, true, 
or long-term interest.  
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 In this account, Hume seems to endorse a notion of justice 
that formulates the collective action problem as a game among 
self-interested strategic agents. Justice as a game conditions 
his analysis of the collective action problem and the solution 
he proposes for it. I present his theoretical account of justice 
in this section. In the next section I analyze how he sees the 
conflict among individuals as a game and endorses the state a 
solution to the collective action problem. 
Hume argues that there are two basic qualities of human 
nature that are relevant to the question of the origin of 
justice: First, self-interest or the avidity of man. Second, 
limited benevolence. According to Hume, “‘tis only from the 
selfishness and confin’d generosity of man, along with the 
scanty provision nature has made for his wants, that justice 
derives its origin” (T 318). The idea of self-interest does not 
refer to interest of an isolated agent in Hume. Rather, it 
refers to an agent located in a web of family members, friends, 
and relatives. An agent’s interest includes that of himself, his 
family, relatives, and friends. The idea of limited benevolence 
refers to one’s limited concern for strangers; one is concerned 
most for his family, friends, and relatives as well as for 
himself. Strangers are the competitors for this agent. And the 
conflict that happens in society is among such strangers rather 
than among isolated Hobbesian individuals.  
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 According to Hume, the acquisitiveness of man is the object 
of the rules of justice: 
This avidity alone, of acquiring goods and possessions 
for ourselves and our nearest friends, is insatiable, 
perpetual, universal … There scarce is anyone, who is 
not actuated by it; and there is no one, who has not 
reason to far from it, when it acts without any 
restraint, and gives way to its first and most natural 
movements. (T 316)  
 
The natural or instinctive course of man’s avidity rejects the 
needs of strangers; Strangers are not recognized as fellow human 
beings with the same needs as one’s family and friends. Hume 
thinks that the natural course of avidity is destructive for 
social life. In order to have a society, the avidity of man must 
be regulated by common rules: 
No one can doubt, that the convention for the 
distinction of property, and or the stability of 
possession, is of all circumstances the most necessary 
to the establishment of human society, and that after 
the agreement for the fixing and observing of this rule, 
there remains little or nothing to be done towards 
settling a perfect harmony and concord. All the other 
passions, beside this of interest, are either easily 
restrain’d, or are not of such pernicious consequence, 
when indulg’d. (T 316) 
 
Hume thinks that no other passion in human nature can 
control or prevent avidity from its instinctive conduct. Rather 
he argues that avidity can provide the solution for itself by 
redirecting its functioning in accordance with an idea of 
enlightened interest. Limited benevolence reinforces the avidity 
of man rather than regulating or controlling of avidity, for the 
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 role of limited benevolence in Hume is to broaden the scope of 
avidity to include the interests of one’s close circle in one’s 
own interest.  
There is no passion … capable of controuling the 
interested affection, but the very affection itself, by 
an alteration of its direction. Now this alteration must 
necessarily take place upon the least reflection; since 
‘tis evident, that by preserving society, we make much 
greater advances in the acquiring possessions, than by 
running into the solitary and forlorn condition, which 
must follow upon violence and universal license. (T 316) 
 
The redirection of avidity refers to the role of understanding 
in regulating the conduct of avidity. Understanding refers to 
the development of enlightened self-interest among individuals. 
Individuals recognize that the natural or instinctive conduct of 
avidity is destructive of society.  
Human nature being compos’d of two principal parts, 
which are requisite in all its actions, the affections 
and understanding; ‘tis certain, that the blind motions 
of the former, without the direction of the latter, 
incapacitates men for society. (T 317) 
 
Hume discusses the idea of a “golden age” to show that the 
common situation of man requires the rules of justice to 
establish and perpetuate society. The common situation of man 
refers to the scarcity of goods and two basic qualities of human 
nature (limited benevolence and self-interest). He clearly 
states that the idea of a state of nature is “a mere 
philosophical fiction” and in their savage condition individuals 
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 are incapable of undertaking a social contract such as presented 
by Locke or Hobbes. However, the idea of a “golden age” as a 
philosophical fiction is useful to reveal basic principles of 
human nature and external circumstances of individuals. A 
theoretical abstraction is realized by this model to add further 
plausibility and delineate the relevant principles of human 
nature as well as outer circumstances of individuals (T 317).  
Hume discusses the idea of a "golden age” to show that his 
conjectural account is plausible. Golden age refers to a 
situation in which either individuals have a tender regard for 
strangers or nature provides abundantly all their needs. Thus, a 
change in human nature that obliterates selfishness and limited 
generosity and establishes universal benevolence instead, or a 
change in outer circumstances that obliterates scarcity of goods 
and establishes abundance of goods would put individuals in a 
different position towards each other than the present situation 
of scarcity and selfishness. Universal benevolence would turn 
human society into a big family in which all goods would be 
common and there would be no private property. The absence of 
scarcity of goods would also make the rules of justice useless, 
for abundance of goods would meet all individuals’ needs. Hume 
mentions marriage and “cordial affections” among friends as real 
life cases that come very close to such extensive benevolence 
and water and air as examples of goods not subject to conflict 
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 among individuals even though they are vital for everybody (T 
317-18). Hume, thus, maintains that “the common situation of 
society is a medium amidst all these extremes. We are naturally 
partial to ourselves, and to our friends; but are capable of 
learning the advantage resulting from a more equitable conduct” 
(En 21). As J. Moore puts it “the theoretical relevance of the 
golden age model … for Hume was that [it] assisted him in 
clarifying the conditions in which justice and society would be 
unnecessary and unattainable” (482).  
As a result, individuals perform their parts of duties 
without bearing “any real kindness” to each other: “Hence I 
learn to do a service to another, without bearing him any real 
kindness; because I foresee, that he will return my service, in 
expectation of another of the same kind, and in order to 
maintain the same correspondence of good offices with me or with 
others” (T 334-35). Mutual expectation of cooperation is the 
reason individuals perform their parts. Individuals are 
strategic actors seeking to protect and promote their interest 
without any intrinsic regard or benevolence to strangers. 
Neither a sense of duty nor public interest but self interest is 
the motive of individuals. Interpersonal relations are 
instrumental in essence.  
Yet, individuals fail to act in accordance with their 
enlightened interest even if they have the necessary rules for 
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 that purpose. The reason for this breach of the rules is that 
“he is seduced from his great and important, but distant 
interest, by the allurement of present, though often very 
frivolous temptations. This great weakness is incurable in human 
nature” (En 38). Individuals are short-sighted and they prefer 
short-term interest over long-term ones. Short-term interest 
refers to the instinctive conduct of individuals, which leads 
them to defect rather than cooperate. That’s why individuals act 
contrary to their real or true interest and prefer trivial or 
short-term ones. They think that the consequence of violation of 
the rules is remote and benefits are close: 
And as all men are, in some degree, subject to the 
same weakness, it necessarily happens, that the 
violations of equity must become very frequent in 
society, and the commerce of men, by that means, be 
render’d very dangerous and uncertain. You have the 
same propension, that I have, in favor of what is 
contigious above what is remote. You are, therefore, 
naturally carry’d to commit acts of injustice as well 
as I. Your example both pushes me forward in this way 
by initiation, and also affords me a new reason for 
any breach of equity, by showing me, that I shou’d be 
the cully of my integrity, if I alone shou’d impose on 
myself a severe restraint amidst the licentiousness of 
others. (T 343)  
 
Thus, recognition of the necessity of cooperation is not 
sufficient; short-sightedness leads man to defect even if he 
understands that social cooperation is necessary for social 
existence. Hume emphasizes that execution of the rules poses a 
problem for individuals. Those who cooperate first become the 
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 prey of the rest. In response to the coordination problem and 
shortsightedness Hume endorses the state as solution.  
 
 
1.3 SOCIAL COOPERATION AND GOVERNMENT: THEORETICAL ACCOUNT 
 
In this section I present Hume’s theoretical account of 
government and its role in social cooperation. In this account 
Hume endorses a Hobbesian notion of government in the sense that 
government appears as an external authority to achieve 
cooperation in society. Individuals appear more potent in regard 
to reason and judgment by which they establish a government 
which forces individuals to cooperate.  
According to Hume, as we saw above, one of the fundamental 
features of human nature is its shortsightedness. The remedy for 
this “infirmity of human nature” comes from reflection or 
reason; when individuals reflect on any action in the distance, 
they prefer “the greater good”. They are able to see the 
destructive results of breaching the rules (i.e., preferring the 
short-term interest over the long-term). But when they act, they 
choose the immediate interest over the distant ones. Hume 
believes it is not possible to change any fundamental quality of 
human nature. Yet it is possible to change one’s environment in 
such a way that the distant interest becomes one’s immediate 
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 interest: “the utmost we can do is to change our circumstances 
and situation, and render the observance of the laws of justice 
our nearest interest and their violation our most remote” (T 
344).  
Hume’s solution refers to the rulers (the government) whose 
immediate interest, argues Hume, is to maintain their power by 
executing the rules of justice: 
They must institute some persons, under the appellation 
of magistrates, whose peculiar office it is, to point 
out the decrees of equity, to punish transgressors, to 
correct fraud and violence, and oblige men however 
reluctant, to consult their own real and permanent 
interest”. (Es 38) 
 
Hume asks what makes the governors execute the rules of justice 
rather than use their power and authority to further their short 
term interests. “The love of dominion” is his answer:  
The love of dominion is so strong in the breast of man, 
that many, not only submit to, but court all the 
dangers, and fatigues, and cares of government; and men, 
once raised to that station, though often led stray by 
private passions, find, in ordinary cases, a visible 
interest in the impartial administration of justice. (Es 
39)   
 
The governors are the few whose circumstances change in such 
a way that their concern for protecting their own interests 
creates a mechanism to execute the rules of justice in society.  
Men are not able radically to cure, either in themselves 
or others, that narrowness of soul, which makes them 
prefer to the remote. They cannot change their natures. 
All they can do is to change their situation, and render 
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 the observance of justice the immediate interest of some 
particular persons, and its violation their remote. (Es 
344) 
 
In other words, the state uses legal punishment to force 
individuals to comply with the rules. Thus the state appears as 
an external authority that forces individuals to comply with the 
rules. Interest of the rulers is to perpetuate their power, 
which depends on the execution of the rules or social order. The 
state creates a new structural environment in which individuals 
feel forced to choose their remote yet true interest in order to 
prevent punishment. Thus, the rulers’ environment is different 
than ordinary citizens. Each group has different interests. Yet, 
the existence of the legal punishment changes ordinary citizens’ 
environment also. And compliance with the rules by the ruled 
becomes the immediate interest of both groups. In addition, in a 
sense the state becomes an institutionalized rationality in 
society whose members instinctively forget to act rationally and 
follow their passions in their conduct. The state forces 
individuals to act in accordance with their reasoned judgment 
and understanding or enlightened self-interests rather than 
instinctive self-interests.  
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 1.4 JUSTICE: HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
 
In this section, I present Hume’s historical account of the 
origin of justice. In this account Hume’s notion of justice 
refers to development of the rules of justice as the creation of 
a convention in society that makes social cooperation possible 
among individuals. The rules of justice are the product of a 
long trial and error process in regard to property relations 
among individuals. They are not the product of a social contract 
as described by Hobbes or Locke. The idea of social contract 
presents a timeless concept; once justice develops, it is 
permanent. For Hume, individuals in their savage state are not 
capable of such a contract. Rather in parallel to the 
development of human society, individuals gradually develop some 
common rules to regulate property relations in society. The 
rules gradually develop in response to the inconvenience of the 
absence of any rules that regulate property relations among 
individuals.  
The notion of justice as convention is significant for 
several reasons: First, the idea of social contract endorses “a 
one-shot game” among self-interested agents. Once the rules of 
the game are established, individuals follow their enlightened 
interest. On the other hand, the notion of justice as convention 
endorses a different type of game, given that we see it as a 
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 game; it is almost an infinitely repeated game rather than a 
one-shot game. However, there are certain elements in this 
account that cannot be captured by even the idea of repeated 
games. In addition, the long process of development of the rules 
as convention is also the process through which many faculties 
of human nature have been developed in such a way that 
individuals are in a better position to achieve cooperation more 
efficiently than they are at the beginning of the process.  
Second, at the beginning, individual agents’ concern is to 
serve their interests better in developing the rules. Yet, 
Hume’s interest in justice is not limited to the development of 
rules that makes social cooperation possible. He is also 
interested in development of a sense of duty to compliance with 
the rules of justice. The notion of justice as convention and 
the development of sense of duty are closely linked to each 
other and have significant results for the collective action 
problem. While individuals cooperate to serve their interests 
better at the beginning, which leads to the development of 
rules, in time they develop a moral motive for cooperation.  
The development of the moral motive for social cooperation is 
significant for my larger concern; Hume relies more and more on 
improvement of a moral sense among individuals for social 
cooperation, especially in large modern society. This moral 
development refers to the transformation of self-interested 
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 agents into moral beings, which I argue has significant results 
for social cooperation in society in general and politics in 
particular. I follow this line of Hume’s theory in chapters 3 
(Hume’s Moral Theory) and 4 (Hume’s Politics) to show that Hume 
endorses a particular solution based on this moral development 
that is similar to Putnam’s concept of social capital in dealing 
with the collective action problem.  
 Hume’s notion of justice primarily refers to individuals’ 
"abstinence from the possession of others" (T 315) and has three 
rules: stability of possession (T 322), its transference by 
consent (T 330), and promise-keeping (T 331). 
Hume’s historical account overlaps with his account of the 
origin and development of society. The earliest stages of human 
society are the medium in which the rules of justice gradually 
develop.  
Hume’s historical account starts with an observation about 
the human condition at its earliest stage, which is the "savage 
condition". Human condition refers to human nature and its 
natural environment at that specific stage. In other words, the 
earliest stage of human society is the natural-original setting 
in which the rules of justice start to develop gradually. The 
idea of the savage condition indicates that we see human nature 
with its original-primitive features, that is, without any 
culture and institution that we see in the latter stages of 
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 societal development. The significance of this is that Hume 
works with the natural features of human nature in its most 
natural condition. As J. King puts it “in defining his first 
task, that of accounting for the origin of justice, Hume has his 
reader imagine a condition of human existence from which all the 
familiar institutions of justice are absent” (188-89).  
Hume argues that man has "numberless wants and necessities" 
such as food, clothes, and protection from injuries from both 
other creatures and nature. Yet man has "slender means" in his 
natural capacity to meet these needs alone; “he is provided 
neither with arms, nor force, nor other natural abilities, which 
are in any degree answerable to so many necessities” (T 312). 
Unlike other creatures whose natural abilities endow them with 
adequate means to meet their relatively fewer needs, man has to 
form a society to overcome his weakness. In particular, man 
faces three inconveniences in his savage condition: man’s labor 
is not adequate to meet all his needs, given that he labors 
alone. He can not excel in all the arts and skills necessary to 
meet his needs, and failure in meeting those needs can lead to 
his ruin and misery. Society provides solutions to these 
inconveniences: "By the conjunction of forces, our power is 
augmented: By the partition of employments, our ability 
increases: And by mutual succour we are less exposed to fortune 
and accident" (T 312). Thus, according to Hume, individuals by 
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 nature cannot live alone or without a society. The division of 
labor, mutual help, and collective power of individuals provide 
material necessities and protect them from fortune and accident. 
“’Tis by society alone he is able to supply his defects, and 
raise himself up to an equality with his fellow-creatures, and 
even acquire a superiority above them” (T 312). 
However, Hume maintains that in order to form it, 
individuals must recognize both the necessity and the benefits 
of society, yet “’tis impossible, in their wild and uncultivated 
state, that by study and reflection alone, they shou’d ever be 
able to attain this knowledge” (T 312). Without observation and 
experience of the benefits of society, reason alone is not 
sufficient for this task, contrary to the claim endorsed by the 
social contract model.  
On the other hand, according to Hume, even in their savage 
condition, in the earliest stage of human life, individuals are 
not isolated strangers. The first form of human society is 
family and it comes into existence due to "natural appetite 
betwixt the sexes". This "natural appetite" is "the first and 
original principle of human society". Children create an 
additional bond ("natural affection") between parents and 
children and turn family into "a more numerous society".  
Parents have authority over their offspring in regulating issues 
among them within the family. Thus, "natural appetite", "natural 
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 affection" and parental authority are natural principles that 
create and perpetuate the original human society. This original 
form of society makes children sensible to the advantages of 
cooperation as well as the necessity of some rules for living in 
a society (T 312).  
The family as the original human society does not confront 
the question of justice, for Hume’s notion of justice as the 
rules regulating property relations among strangers has no place 
in the family. Natural principles, such as benevolence, parental 
authority, sharing, and parental affection are adequate 
principles to create and perpetuate the family. “The bare 
minimum of social life, the family, is held together by sexual 
and parental feelings” (Haakonssen 13).  
On the other hand, “harmonious relations between different 
families do not arise from such natural appetites and 
affections” (Buckle and Castiglione 460). According to Hume, "… 
there are other particular in our natural temper, and in our 
outward circumstances, which are very incommodious, and are even 
contrary to the requisite conjunction" (T 313). "Natural temper" 
refers to "selfishness" and “limited benevolence” in human 
nature, while "outward circumstances" refers to the scarcity of 
goods and the instability of their possession. The benevolent 
individual in the family turns out to be a self-interested actor 
in his relations with strangers or members of other families. 
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 Scarcity of goods creates conflict among self-interested 
individuals, which is "the chief impediment" before development 
of the newly formed original human society (T 313).  
At this stage, argues Hume, individuals have no idea of 
justice in the sense individuals have in modern societies: “That 
virtue, as it is now understood, wou’d never have been dream’d 
of among rude and savage men” (T 314) Thus, we reach a situation 
in the growth of human society where the rules of justice are 
necessary for the its functioning, yet individuals have no idea 
of justice. The reason for this is that at this stage 
individuals are uncultivated and savage creatures, although they 
are not amoral beings; "in uncultivated nature" and the "savage 
condition" individuals’ notions of vice and virtue follow "the 
original frame" of their minds: 
in the original frame of our mind, our strongest 
attention is confin’d to ourselves; our next is extended 
to our relations and acquaintance; and ‘tis only the 
weakest which reaches to strangers and indifferent 
persons. This partiality, then, and unequal affection, 
must not only have an influence on our behavior and 
conduct in society, but even on our ideas of vice and 
virtue; so as to make us regard any remarkable 
transgression of such a degree of partiality, either by 
too great an enlargement, or contraction of the 
affections, as vicious and immoral … From all which it 
follows, that our natural uncultivated ideas of 
morality, instead of providing a remedy for the 
partiality of our affections, do rather conform 
themselves to that partiality and give it an additional 
force and influence. (T 314) 
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 Interfamily relations refer to relations among strangers in 
the sense that individuals’ limited benevolence has no role in 
regulating property relations among them. Rather, Hume “points 
out that families naturally develop a tribal morality, which 
includes a strong partiality against other such societies (all 
men are governed by self-love and a confined generosity – 
confined to the family)” (Haakonssen 13).  
Scarcity of goods and possibility of seizure of goods by 
force among individuals form circumstances of families in this 
stage. In addition, individuals’ uncultivated/natural 
perceptions of vice and virtue or morality foster their partial 
and harmful conduct to social coexistence. Hume does not see a 
social contract as a viable option for such individuals, for 
neither their intellectual capacity nor their moral 
understanding is adequate for a social contract at this stage. 
Rather, Hume endorses a different and evolutionary solution that 
relies on the improvement of individual sensitivity to and 
understanding of the necessity of some shared rules regulating 
property relations in society based on their experience.  
In order to overcome this obstacle, argues Hume, individuals 
appeal to their experience and observation: due to their “early 
education” in the family, individuals have come to recognize the 
advantages of society and rule-following and also have developed 
“a new affection to company and conversation” (T 316). Although 
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 the rules of justice primarily refer to property relations among 
strangers, Hume claims that “first rudiments of justice” appear 
in the family: “In order to preserve peace among children” 
parents apply some rules and their subsequent development occurs 
“as the society enlarges” (T 316).  
Thus, Hume thinks that individuals are already familiar with 
some rules in the family. This familiarity provides a notion of 
the necessity for rule following in interpersonal relations in 
the larger society as well. This is significant, for when 
individuals interact with others outside of the family, they 
are, unlike Hobbesian agents, in a better condition to recognize 
the necessity for some rules that can regulate their relations 
with each other.  
On the other hand, natural or instinctual individual conduct 
tends to disregard the needs of others due to the tendency of 
natural conduct and original notion of vice and virtue. However, 
even though this tendency leads to the conflict among 
individuals, it also provides valuable experience and 
observation about the necessity for some sort of rules to 
regulate their conduct. This is a learning process in Hume, 
which makes individuals better equipped with sensitivity and 
understanding to develop such rules. Vandershcraaf asserts that 
the rules of justice are a product of “repeated games” or “a 
sequence of trial and error practice” (107). In other words, it 
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 is “not just a one-shot change, from nature to civilized 
cooperation and culture, but a series of changes, and that each 
convention alters the conditions, both by its success and by its 
limitations” (235).  
And, argues Hume, the knowledge necessary to recognize the 
necessity of some rules is not beyond the reach of individuals 
even in their savage state. What is needed is that “a very 
little practice of the world” and “vulgar sense and slight 
experience are sufficient for this purpose” (En 28). As a 
result, individuals recognize that  
 
Instead of departing from our own interest, or from 
that of our nearest friends, by abstaining from the 
possessions of others, we cannot better consult both 
these interests, than by such a convention; because it 
is by that means we maintain society, which is so 
necessary to their well-being and subsistence, as well 
as to our own. (T 314)  
 
This learning process leads to the development of enlightened 
self-interest which sees social life as a common good. As J. Day 
puts it “men accept the laws of justice from intelligent self-
interest. Instinctive self-interest may direct a man to seize 
his neighbor’s possessions” (163).  
Once individuals recognize that “without justice, society 
must immediately dissolve, and every one must fall into that 
savage and solitary condition, which is infinitely worse than 
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 the worst situation that can possibly be suppos’d in society” (T 
319), 
Every one expresses this sense to his fellows, along 
with the resolution he has taken of squaring his actions 
by it, on condition that others will do the same. No 
more is requisite to induce any one of them to perform 
an act of justice, who has the first opportunity. This 
becomes an example to others. And thus justice 
establishes itself by a kind of convention or agreement; 
that is, by a sense of interest, suppos’d to be common 
to all, and where every single act is perform’d in 
expectation that others are to perform the like. (T 319-
20) 
 
Here it is clear that Hume thinks justice as convention 
relies on mutual expectation of cooperation among individuals. 
Yet agents do not enter into a contract; rather, they develop a 
sensitivity that it is in everyone’s interest that each 
cooperates. In other words, “human society and its necessary 
rules arise … as the result of human interaction, but … not from 
promises” (Buckle and Castiglione 460). Agents are ready to 
cooperate rather than defect and take advantage of those who 
first cooperate. This reasoning is contrary to the logic of game 
theory which assumes that those who first cooperate would be 
victims of the rest. In other words, game theory assumes that 
the dominant tendency in individual behavior is to take 
advantage of opportunities rather than to cooperate. Hume’s 
notion of justice as convention discards this reasoning and also 
shows that justice as the convention has a different logic than 
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 that of game theory. Hume describes this process as formation of 
a convention among individuals to regulate property relations: 
“a convention enter’d into by all the members of the society to 
bestow stability on the possession of those external goods, and 
leave every one in the peaceable enjoyment of what he may 
acquire by his fortune and industry” (T 314).  
That’s why Hume considers the transition from recognizing the 
necessity for the rules to compliance with the rules as almost a 
spontaneous one. Individuals become sensible to the advantages 
of the rules of justice due to their repeated experience of 
inconveniences in the absence of them in their relations with 
strangers and their education and training in the family. As 
Baier puts it, for Hume there is not a  
’natural’ general problem of aggression or 
bloodthirstiness, parallel to the problem of 
dispossession or thirst for gain. Like Rousseau’s more 
solitary savages, Hume’s pre-civilized persons are 
perfectly tolerant of each other’s presence, unless and 
until squabbles over possessions break the peace. Not 
only is their condition not ‘the Warre of every man 
against every man’: it is not a condition of war at all, 
even against unfamiliar strangers. It is more a 
condition of intermittent scuffles over possessions. 
(222-23)  
 
Rather, argues Baier, “Hume’s justice initiators face and solve 
a much milder problem, that of insecurity of possession of 
transferable goods” (212). As a result, the task is not “to 
eliminate a climate of violence against persons, but a climate 
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 of incommodious insecurity of possession of material goods” 
(Baier 223). 
Hume compares the rise of convention to the development of 
language and the use of gold and silver as mediums of exchange. 
All are products of human experience; they develop gradually as 
a result of repeated experience of the disadvantages of their 
absence, not as the result of abstract reasoning and a contract 
among individuals (T 315). “The long-term effect of individual 
men’s ‘selfish’ actions is thus something very far removed 
indeed from what they did have, could have, in mind. The idea of 
justice ‘wou’d never have been dreamed of among rude and savage 
men’” (Haakonssen 19). In the social contract model, individuals 
are assumed to know what they are doing at the outset: They are 
about to invent the rules of justice and establish the state.5  
 
 
1.5 SOCIAL COOPERATION AND GOVERNMENT: HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 
 
In this section, I analyze Hume’s notion of social cooperation 
and the role of government in social cooperation presented in 
his historical account. The Humean agent confronts the 
collective action problem in two subsequent forms of society, 
                                                 
5 Although Hume claims that justice is a convention here, as we will see in chapter 3, he accepts that justice is not a 
true convention, for in a true convention such as language it is not possible to be a free-rider and benefit from the 
convention. In justice, one can benefit and become a free-rider also.  
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 both of which naturally develop beyond the family. The first 
form of society is the small-tribal society. The second form of 
society is the larger society that develops beyond tribal 
society. These two forms are natural stages in the development 
of human society. Crucial factor that conditions the particular 
responses to collective action that Hume formulates for each 
society is size.  
Individuals do not need a central authority for cooperation 
in a small tribal society in which they rely on the 
effectiveness of social sanctions made possible by the 
availability of adequate information about each other due to the 
smallness of the society, even though this form of society 
establishes a temporary central authority for its defense 
against other tribes. In the larger society, Hume endorses the 
state as a solution for the collective action problem. The 
former society relies on traditional form of trust, “thick 
trust” (Putnam, 1993, 71), whereas the latter has to establish 
legal trust by the state. Yet Hume thinks that the state 
provides just a partial response in this larger society, for 
enlightened self-interest fails in motivating individuals due to 
their shortsightedness where they can avoid the legal 
punishment.  
For Hume, society in the sociological sense is prior to 
government. Contrary to the Hobbesian state of nature in which 
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 individuals are isolated agents who invent the state, for Hume 
there is not such state of nature in human history. Rather, 
individuals are, from the beginning, members of a family which 
is the original form of human society. Also contrary to the 
Hobbesian model which sees society coming into existence after 
establishment of the state by a social contract, Hume believes 
that tribal society, composed of many families having blood ties 
among them, is the next natural stage of human society and 
develops without any social contract beyond the family. This 
tribal society is neither an invention of isolated individuals 
nor made possible by a central authority. Hume asserts that this 
form of small tribal society without government is what we could 
expect as a particular stage in the development of human 
society: “the state of society without government is one of the 
most natural states of men, and may subsist with the conjunction 
of many families, and long after the first generation” (T 346).  
Humean individuals confront the collective action problem 
for the first time in this tribal society which has no constant 
central authority. However, individuals establish a temporary 
central authority for defensive reasons against other tribal 
societies. For Hume, the first and original role that government 
plays in society is related to its defense rather than to social 
cooperation. Hume relies on certain features of tribal society 
in dealing with the collective action problem. There are two 
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 problems Humean agents confront at this stage: First, the 
absence of a common set of rules to regulate property relations. 
Second, the absence of a central authority to execute such rules 
once they develop.  
As explained in the previous section, Hume thinks that 
development of the rules of justice creates a convention which 
provides a set of shared rules to regulate property relations in 
society. The rules provide a shared guide for individuals in 
pursuing their interests. Solution of the second problem is 
conditioned by two factors: Size of the society and the 
simplicity of individuals’ needs at that stage of human societal 
development. In the small society individuals would have enough 
information about each other because of the small number of 
agents. Interpersonal relations are much more personalized in 
this society. The availability of such information about 
individuals would make defectors known in society, thus creating 
an appropriate environment for the effectiveness of social 
sanctions. As Miller puts it “size is important because an act 
of rule-breaking is likely to have greater visible repercussions 
in a small group and so men feel a more immediate interest in 
acting justly” (87). In such an environment, defectors would 
face non-cooperation in the future. In other words, individuals 
face the collective action problem without having a central 
authority to force them to cooperate.  
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 The second feature of the small society is the nature of 
the needs individuals have at that stage of human societal 
development; Individual needs are few and mostly related to 
basic material living conditions and individuals are in a 
relatively equal position to each other in obtaining these 
needs. Hume explains this state of the needs as follows:  
Men, ‘tis true, are always much inclin’d to prefer 
present interest to distant and remote … But still this 
weakness is less conspicuous, where the possessions, and 
the pleasures of life are few, and of little value, as 
they always are in the infancy of society. An Indian is 
but little tempted to dispossess another of his hut, or 
to steal his bow, as being already provided of the same 
advantages; and as to any superior fortune, which may 
attend one another above in hunting and fishing, ‘tis 
only casual and temporary, and will have but small 
tendency to disturb society. (T 345-46) 
 
Thus simplicity of needs or absence of riches in society 
would facilitate social cooperation among individuals. In a 
sense, individuals do not face the collective action problem in 
this society, for   they seem to not to face the problem of the 
scarcity of goods. Everyone could attain his basic needs 
relatively easily. Hume asserts that individuals would be 
tempted not to cooperate when riches appear. He sees this 
temptation as a natural weakness of the individual.  
As a result, due to the personalized quality of interpersonal 
relations and the effectiveness of social sanctions, social 
cooperation becomes possible even without a centralized 
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 institutional authority in such a society. The collective action 
problem, thus, is solved at that stage by the effectiveness of 
social sanctions and the availability of adequate information 
about agents. This is facilitated also by simplicity of needs. 
Hume does not offer the classical Hobbesian solution (the state) 
for social cooperation for such a small society at that 
particular stage of development. This form of cooperation 
creates “thick trust” which does not need the state; rather, it 
depends on the effectiveness of social sanctions. According to 
Baier, “the role of the first convention is to extend trust 
beyond the confines of friendship and family” (230).  
According to Hume, this form of society and social 
cooperation last for many years. At this stage or in “a small 
uncultivated society”, “nothing but an encrease of riches and 
possessions cou’d oblige men to quit it” but “so barbarous and 
uninstructed are all societies on their first formation, that 
many years must elapse before these cou’d encrease to such a 
degree, as to disturb men in the enjoyment of peace and concord” 
(T 346).  
There are two particular factors that lead to the collapse of 
social cooperation in this society: Increase of size and riches. 
These two developments change the structural environment of 
individuals in a way that they do not have adequate information 
about each other, and this leads to the collapse of social 
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 sanctions. In another words, the two decisive factors (small 
size and simplicity of needs) that make social cooperation 
possible without government in a small society would be 
obliterated. As a result, the traditional form of trust would 
decline in the larger society. Hume explains these two different 
environments and their subsequent results for cooperation as 
follows: 
Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they 
possess in common; because ‘tis easy for them to know 
each other’s mind; and each must perceive, that the 
immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, 
the abandoning the whole project. But ‘tis very 
difficult, and indeed impossible, that a thousand 
persons shou’d agree in any such action; it being 
difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, 
and still more difficult for them to execute it; while 
each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble 
and expence, and wou’d lay the whole burden on others. 
(T 345)  
 
Although individuals develop the rules of justice and 
cooperate to seek more effectively their interest, increase of 
society and the riches create two particular problems that lead 
to the collapse of social cooperation. The first problem refers 
to coordination problem among individuals. Increase of society 
leads to uncertainty among individuals by leading to absence of 
adequate information about agents. The reason for individual 
defection is not their irrationality; rather, they are uncertain 
whether once they perform their parts others would do the same 
or take advantage of them.  In order to protect their interest, 
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 individuals choose to defect as a rational strategy. As we saw 
above in small society, those who first cooperate are sure that 
others would follow. Yet, on the other hand, the increase of 
society provides an appropriate environment for individuals to 
be free-riders, for they can benefit from cooperation without 
contributing to it. Thus, the larger society faces both 
coordination problem and free-rider problem. 
Second factor refers to rise of the riches which increase 
opportunities and tempt individuals to defect. This problem is 
related to shortsightedness of individuals. In other words, 
defection caused by the riches is not a rational strategy to 
protect one’s interest. It is a result of temptation created by 
increasing wealth.6  
Since every individual is subject to the same short-
sightedness, the result would be non-cooperation and destruction 
of society. Once more Humean agents confront the collective 
action problem. According to Hume, if every individual had 
enough “sagacity” and “strength of mind” to seek his enlightened 
self-interest “in opposition to the allurements of present 
pleasure and advantage”, there would be no need for a government 
(En 39). Thus,  
the reciprocally sanctioning acceptance of the rules 
of justice breaks down. We have come back practically 
                                                 
6 Hume seems to think that defection caused by temptation is not a rational conduct.  This type of defection is not 
product of rational calculation. 
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 to Hobbes’s position after all; everyone could 
rationally obey the laws of nature as a means to his 
own welfare, if he could trust others to do so too, 
but no one can trust anyone else without some further 
sanction. (Mackie 107) 
 
Hume’s solution to the collective action problem in this 
large and somewhat wealthy society is the establishment of 
government. Yet Hume does not think that individuals invent 
government solely to solve the collective action problem they 
face at this stage. Rather, Hume argues that even tribal society 
from time to time establishes a central authority to defend 
itself against other tribal societies. The origin of government 
is not conflict among individuals in society but conflict among 
different tribal societies. Hume asserts that “the first 
rudiments of government to arise from quarrels, not among men of 
the same society, but among those of different societies. A less 
degree of riches will suffice to this latter effect, than is 
requisite for the former” (T 346). Thus, tribes not individuals 
fight over scarce goods and when faced such conflicts, tribal 
societies choose a leader to execute the war. They defend their 
goods against other tribes. After the war the chiefs lose their 
power. Yet the practice of even a primitive central authority 
makes individuals recognize the advantages of such an authority 
in other disputes among themselves:  
This authority, however, instructs them in the 
advantages of government, and teaches them to have 
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 recourse to it, when either by pillage of war, by 
commerce, or by an fortuitous inventions, their riches 
and possessions have become so considerable as to make 
them forget, on every emergence, the interest they have 
in the preservation of peace and justice. (T 346) 
 
Thus, Hume endorses the state as a solution to the collective 
action problem individuals face due to increase of society and 
the riches. The state provides solution to defections stemming 
from rational strategy to protect one’s interest and 
shortsightedness. Hume, thus, endorses the classical Hobbesian 
solution for social cooperation. The state provides certainty 
and forces individuals to follow their enlightened interest. In 
other words, Hume sees peace and order as a collective good. 
 
 
1.6 CONCLUSION 
 
As we have seen in this chapter, the notion of justice as 
convention refers to the process of development of the rules of 
justice in which individuals are transformed in a way that they 
develop a tendency to cooperate rather than to defect in social 
life even though they are still self-interested strategic 
agents. In other words, Humean agents develop a form of 
individual conduct that tends to violate the logic of collective 
action in small society. On the other hand, Hume’s theoretical 
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 account in general and historical account about large society 
exemplify the logic of collective action; that is, individuals’ 
main tendency is to defect rather than cooperate. In order to 
cooperate, even though they recognize the necessity of the rules 
for social coexistence, they need a central authority to force 
them.  
 In particular, in several respects justice as convention 
can be differentiated from justice as game. First, justice as 
convention relies on a process. Second, a particular form of 
individual conduct appears. Third, justice as convention leads 
to the development of two different forms of trust, whereas 
justice as game creates just one form of trust in society. In 
other words, justice as convention cannot be captured even by 
the idea of repeated games.  
 Justice as convention relies on a process which has a 
developmental impact on human nature or narrow self-interest.7 In 
particular, this process is a learning process by trial and 
error. Individuals gradually become aware of the necessity for 
rules of social coexistence. The development of the rules is 
facilitated by the familiarity of individuals with some rules 
that regulate their conduct in the family. They recognize that 
if they simply follow their instinctive interest (or act 
                                                 
7 Although Hume argues that it is not possible to change any fundamental quality of human nature, his notion of 
human nature is a developmental one. In parallel with the development of the rules of justice and society, many 
faculties of human nature develop and become cultivated.  
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 naturally), they would destroy society. Thus, there are two 
particular sources individuals utilize to develop the rules of 
justice. First, their familiarity with the rules in the family. 
Second, experience and observation outside the family in regard 
to interpersonal relations. In other words, Humean agents, 
unlike Hobbesian agents, do not invent the rules at one point in 
time by theoretical reasoning.  
As a result of this trial and error process Hume assumes 
that individuals would develop a tendency to cooperate rather 
than defect. Individuals are ready to cooperate and once one of 
them performs his part, the rest see it as an example to 
cooperate rather than as an opportunity to take advantage of 
that particular person. This tendency in Humean agents seems to 
violate the logic of collective action. Yet, this tendency 
becomes possible in small tribal society. In other words, 
although Hume considers the process of the development of the 
rules of justice as a learning process that creates such a 
cooperative tendency in individuals, social cooperation is also 
facilitated by effectiveness of social sanctions. On the other 
hand, Hume’s theoretical account simply endorses the logic of 
the collective action in individuals; their dominant tendency is 
to defect rather than to cooperate. And in his historical 
account, once society becomes larger, Humean agents start acting 
similarly to those in his theoretical account. In other words, 
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 in both account, in large society, individual tendency is to 
defect for two reasons: Uncertainty about others’ intention 
(coordination problem) and individual shortsightedness.  
Hume endorses the state as a solution to overcome this 
particular problem in both accounts. Yet as we will see in 
chapter 3 (Hume’s Moral Theory), even after the establishment of 
the state, individuals tend to take advantage of those 
opportunities in which they can avoid punishment. In other 
words, for Hume enlightened interest which leads to the 
establishment of the state cannot maintain efficient cooperation 
in society. In response to the failure of enlightened interest 
to motivate individuals to cooperate, Hume this time endorses 
the moral improvement of the individual in order to recreate the 
cooperative tendency. In particular, as a response to the free-
rider problem after the establishment of the state, he appeals 
to the improvement of morality in society. The improvement of 
morality refers to self-restraint in individuals even they have 
the opportunity to be free-riders. In other words, Hume’s final 
answer to the free-rider would be the recreation of this 
cooperative tendency by moral improvement which would be 
possible due to the development of civilization for Hume.  
The third issue in justice as convention is the type of 
trust that appears in society. The first form of trust is 
traditional one which is commonly described as “thick” trust. 
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 This form of trust appears in the small tribal society which has 
no central authority. The second form of trust is legal trust 
that comes into existence with the establishment of the state. 
In his theoretical account, the only form of trust that appears 
is legal trust.  
 Justice as convention is different at least on these three 
issues from justice as game. The critical difference is the 
development of a cooperative tendency that appears in the small 
society. Education, training, experience and observation 
indicate a different line of thought in Hume in dealing with the 
collective action problem. These differences indicate that Hume 
is not a rational choice theorist, even though he uses Hobbesian 
logic in respect to the larger society; rather, he follows a 
different line of thought which will be clearer once we analyze 
his moral theory.  
 In the next chapter, I analyze Putnam’s notion of social 
capital. In Putnam, I argue, the role of social capital is to 
create a Humean cooperative tendency in individuals to 
facilitate collective action in society.  
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2.0 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND THE COLLECTIVE ACTION PROBLEM 
 
 
 
 
2.1  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
According to Putnam every society confronts the collective 
action problem. “In all societies … dilemmas of collective 
action hamper attempts to cooperate for mutual benefit, whether 
in politics or in economics” (1993, 177). In order to prevent 
the free-rider problem and secure social cooperation in a 
liberal democratic society two alternative approaches have 
appeared: First, the institutional solution. Second, an 
informal, moral-cultural solution. The institutional solution 
refers to a central authority (the state) which creates an 
appropriate institutional environment for self-interested agents 
to cooperate and uses legal punishment in case of defection. As 
Callan puts it this approach sees  
political institutions that operate as an invisible 
hand, producing valued collective outcomes by 
exploiting individual traits that entail no intention 
to contribute to such outcomes … citizens will act 
politically – if they act politically at all – on the 
basis of narrow self-interest, and the genius of 
democratic institutional design is to channel self-
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 interest in ways that predictably contribute to regime 
stability. (73-4) 
 
Putnam sees this approach as the classical solution to the free-
rider problem. Putnam asserts that this classical solution faces 
two particular problems in modern society: First, the state 
enforcement is expensive. Second, this classical solution 
ignores the role of voluntary associations in regard to the 
collective action problem (1993, 65). Putnam then proposes his 
idea of social capital by claiming that in addition to the 
institutional solution a liberal society needs an informal, 
moral-cultural solution to deal more effectively with the 
collective action problem and increase the quality of social 
life (1993, 11). Putnam sees these two solutions as 
complementary rather than competing approaches. In particular 
social capital both facilitates the role of the state and beyond 
that contributes to the quality of social life. While the state 
relies on the enlightened self-interest of individuals, social 
capital aims at turning self-interested agents into better 
citizens in dealing with the collective action problem by 
utilizing moral sources. As Callan puts it “Moral sources of 
citizenship” are also necessary for social cooperation besides 
self-interest (74). 
 I argue that Putnam’s critique of the institutionalist 
solution to the collective action problem and his informal-moral 
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 solution as a more adequate approach have striking similarities 
with Hume’s understanding of the role of the state and its 
limits in dealing with the collective action problem and Hume’s 
informal solution that relies on improvement of morality in 
society. In this chapter my aim is limited to an analysis of 
Putnam’s idea of social capital and the similarity between 
Putnam and Hume in respect to their understanding of the role of 
the state in social cooperation. I leave the analysis of the 
second similarity between Putnam and Hume, the necessity of an 
informal, moral-cultural solution that relies on the 
transformation of individuals from being simply self-interested 
agents into better citizens to chapter three in which I present 
Hume’s moral theory.  
The plan of this chapter is as follows; in the first 
section, I introduce Putnam’s idea of social capital as 
presented in Making Democracy Work (1993) and Democracies in 
Flux (2000) and analyze different components of social capital 
such as trust, networks, generalized reciprocity, solidarity, 
and sociability and the causal relation among these concepts. 
Then I analyze how Putnam thinks that social capital provides a 
more adequate solution to the social cooperation problem and 
prevents the free rider-problem by turning individuals into 
better citizens. In the second section, I compare Putnam’s 
analysis of the shortcomings of the state as an institutional 
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 solution to the free-rider problem to Hume’s understanding of 
the role of the state in social cooperation. In the third 
section, I analyze Putnam’s claim that his idea of social 
capital endorses a republican-civic community. I criticize 
Putnam’s appeal to a republican idea of civic community to 
describe social capital. In particular, I argue that his idea of 
social capital endorses a more liberal concept of community or 
voluntary associations as well as virtues, skills, and 
understanding rather than a republican community and virtues, 
skills, and understanding. Yet, my critique is limited to his 
conceptual confusion. I argue that once we clear this conceptual 
confusion we could determine more appropriately the features of 
Putnam’s notion of community and virtues necessary to turn 
individuals into better citizens in a liberal society. In the 
fourth section, I present Putnam’s notion of “a new way of doing 
politics” based on the existence of social capital in society. 
According to Putnam, the existence of social capital has 
positive impacts on the political conduct of individuals in 
politics. In particular, such individuals do not see political 
conflict as a zero-sum game; rather, they value tolerance, 
compromise, technical knowledge, and pragmatism as valuable 
qualities in dealing with conflict in politics. I argue that 
Hume also endorses a particular notion of politics that relies 
on similar principles in order to perpetuate a liberal system. 
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 Yet I analyze this similarity between Putnam and Hume in chapter 
four in which I present Hume’s politics. In the final section, I 
analyze Putnam’s distinction of good social capital vs. bad 
social capital.   
 
 
2.2 SOCIAL CAPITAL: DEFINITION, COMPONENTS, AND CAUSAL 
MECHANISM 
 
Putnam defines social capital as “features of social 
organization, such as trust, norms, and networks, which can 
improve the efficiency of society by facilitating coordinated 
actions” (1993, 167) or “social networks and the norms of 
reciprocity associated with them” (2000, 3). “The idea at the 
core of the theory of social capital is extremely simple: Social 
networks matter” (Putnam, 2000, 6).  
“Social networks matter” on several different levels; 
First, they create sociability or social connectedness among 
individuals. Second, networks create generalized reciprocity and 
trust among individuals. Third, networks improve individual 
judgment and lead to the development of certain skills and 
habits among people. Putnam sees generalized reciprocity as the 
core of social capital.  
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 Although he does not analyze social connectedness 
adequately, I argue that at the root of generalized reciprocity 
lies social connectedness as an intrinsic value for individuals. 
To see social connectedness as the underlying factor of social 
capital is significant for two reasons; first, it clarifies why 
any sort of association rather than just political associations 
is significant for social capital. Second, it makes possible to 
argue that sociability as an intrinsic value for individuals 
provides us a new perspective to analyze the role and the place 
of self-interest in social cooperation. In other words, 
sociability has a regulative impact on individual self interest 
by creating generalized reciprocity and bringing “moral sources 
of citizenship” into social cooperation. This aspect of social 
capital refers to the social-moral transformation of self-
interested agent. 
Social networks refer to many different types of 
associations for Putnam. They are not necessarily political 
ones. For example, bird-watching groups, recreational groups, 
even nodding acquaintances in a local market are networks for 
Putnam. The basic underlying assumption in any sort of network 
is the idea of sociability that appears among individuals. When 
people come together in an association or acquire acquaintances 
in a market or an elevator, social connectedness is created 
among them. According to Putnam, “the nodding acquaintance you 
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 have with the person you occasionally see waiting in line at the 
supermarket, or even a chance encounter with another person in 
an elevator“ creates social connectedness and “(e)ven these very 
casual forms of social connection have been shown experimentally 
to induce a certain form of reciprocity” (2000, 10). Any sort of 
association, thus, not just political ones is important for 
social capital. That’s why Putnam’s notion of networks includes 
non-political and  even socially-politically trivial ones such 
as bird-watching groups or acquaintance acquired in a local 
market rather than just political associations established for 
political reasons. Togetherness of individuals for any reason is 
assumed to have a transformative impact on individuals in such a 
way that they come to have ties among them for non-instrumental 
reasons. In other words, togetherness of individuals by itself 
aside from explicit reason of togetherness (for example, bird-
watching) is significant for Putnam. Social connectedness 
creates good will, sympathy, honesty, and friendship among 
individuals. These values or sentiments are by-products of 
togetherness and also it is reasonable to assume that people 
expect these values and sentiments from each other when they 
engage in any sort of activity together. These values and 
sentiments are more likely to develop among individuals in non-
profit or less formal, spontaneous, recreational activities. 
This feature of associations indicates that the individual is a 
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 social being and seeks company for the sake of togetherness or 
friendship. This feature of Putnam’s associations does not 
require us to discard explicitly issue-oriented networks. 
Rather, it requires us to see that even, at their most basic 
level, issue-oriented associations rely on social connectedness 
among their members. We could see this quality of associations 
as their non-instrumental value for individuals. The link that 
Putnam sees between associations and their positive impact on 
the collective action problem relies on this intrinsic value of 
networks at a deeper level.   
Networks create generalized reciprocity. Putnam sees 
generalized reciprocity and trust as the product of social 
connectedness. Once social connection develops among 
individuals, it leads to generalized reciprocity among them. 
According to Putnam, the idea of generalized reciprocity is the 
core idea of the social capital theory. The idea of generalized 
reciprocity refers to trustworthy conduct of individuals toward 
each other: “I’ll do this for you now without expecting anything 
immediately in return, because down the road you (or someone 
else) will reciprocate my goodwill” (2000, 7). Thus generalized 
reciprocity sees others ready to cooperate rather than to 
defect. One’s cooperation does not lead the rest to take 
advantage of him. Rather they take that individual’s conduct as 
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 a sign of his trustworthiness. In other words, networks create a 
cooperative tendency (disposition) in individuals. 
As Mouritsen puts it “the basic idea of social capital is 
that synergy effects arise when individuals do certain things 
together in local associations or other less formal contexts. As 
a by-product, interpersonal relations … improve, turning people 
into better citizens in the process” (651).  
Generalized reciprocity leads to the development of a 
particular form of trust among individuals. In Putnam there are 
three forms of trust that facilitate social cooperation in 
society: Traditional trust, legal trust, and moral trust. 
 Traditional trust refers to a form of trust that develops 
in a small society. In this form of society, individuals have 
adequate information about each other due to the small number of 
agents. The availability of adequate information creates 
effective social sanctions for free-riders. “In small, highly 
personalized community … the threat of ostracism from the 
socioeconomic system is a powerful, credible sanction” (Putnam, 
1993, 168). The development of a reputation for honesty is a 
rational strategic choice that allows one benefit from social 
cooperation (Bruni and Sugden 25). This form of trust is known 
as “thick trust” (Putnam, 1993, 171). In modern society this 
form of trust tends to disappear, for society increases, which 
makes adequate information about individuals less and less 
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 available and in turn social sanctions loose their 
effectiveness.  
In order to respond to this problem, modern society creates 
legal trust by the state. The state establishes “the rules of 
the game” and enforces individuals to cooperate. Legal 
punishment fills the gap created by the collapse of social 
sanctions. Legal trust sees individuals as primarily narrowly 
self-interested agents whose dominant tendency is to defect 
rather than cooperate. According to Putnam legal trust forms the 
core of the classical solution that sees the state as “third 
party” to the collective action problem. “Hobbes, one of the 
first great social theorists to confront this perplexity, 
offered the classic solution; third-party enforcement … The 
state enables its subjects to do what they cannot do on their 
own – trust one another” (1993, 165). The state creates a 
structural environment by institutional design and incentives to 
lead individuals to cooperate.  
Putnam asserts that legal trust falls short in motivating 
individuals to cooperate. In particular, it faces two particular 
problems: First, the increase of society makes legal enforcement 
a very expensive attempt. According to Putnam, game theorists 
agree that cooperation would be easier in “indefinitely repeated 
games” and in those games where a small number of players 
engaged in cooperation who have adequate information about each 
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 other’s past behavior (1993, 165). The increase of society poses 
a problem to game theory, for it primarily obliterates the 
availability of such information about individuals. And given 
that self-interested agents would take advantage of 
opportunities where they can avoid punishment, the state cannot 
provide an adequate solution to social cooperation problem. As a 
result, Putnam asserts that the increased size of society and 
the assumption of self-interest that underlies legal trust 
create a vicious circle in society.  If individuals have the 
opportunity to defect and prevent punishment, it is rational for 
them to defect. Also, their compliance is conditional; they 
watch each other as strategic actors and defect if others 
defect. Thus, the dominant strategy will be “never cooperate” in 
society (Putnam, 1993, 165). 
The second problem is the actual state of social 
cooperation in modern societies. Contrary to the expectation of 
game theory, argues Putnam, defection is not endemic in large 
modern societies. This is a pathological situation from the 
standpoint of game theory. Game theorists’ reasoning implies 
that “impersonal cooperation should be rare, whereas it seems to 
be common in much of the modern world. How come?” (Putnam, 1993, 
168).  
As a result, Putnam argues that “sadly the solution is too 
neat … this theory proves too much, for it underpredicts 
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 voluntary cooperation … ‘We should ask why uncooperative 
behavior does not emerge as often as game theory predicts’” 
(1993, 165). Putnam presents the rotating credit associations 
found in many societies as examples that violate the expectation 
of game theory: “Rotating credit associations clearly violate 
the logic of collective action: Why shouldn’t a participant drop 
out once he has received the pot?” (1993, 167). 
According to Putnam, we can explain this cooperation by 
another factor:  
Success in overcoming dilemmas of collective action 
and the self-defeating opportunitism that they spawn 
depends on the broader social context within which any 
particular game is played. Voluntary cooperation is 
easier in a community that has inherited a substantial 
stock of social capital, in the form of norms of 
reciprocity and networks of civic engagement. (1993, 
167)  
 
As a response to this problem formal or legal trust faces 
in modern society Putnam advocates informal-moral trust created 
by social capital. In modern society informal-moral trust has 
two sources; “norms of reciprocity and networks of civic 
engagement”. Norms are not legal rules. They are informal rules 
developed among individuals: “Norms are inculcated and sustained 
by modeling and socialization (including civic education) and by 
sanctions” (Putnam, 1993, 171). Networks create small groups 
that personalize relations among their members within 
impersonalized large modern society. Individuals could have 
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 adequate information about each other and sanction is immediate 
for defectors. And a society which has many such networks could 
deal more effectively with the collective action problem, for 
they “reduce incentives to defect, reduce uncertainty, and 
provide models for future cooperation” (Putnam, 1993, 177). He 
defines trust created in networks as a “moral contract” among 
individuals (1993, 183).  
This form of trust does not rely just on self-interest. 
Rather it takes into account the possibility of moral 
improvement of self-interested agents. In other words, moral 
trust sees individuals capable of developing moral motives which 
regulates one’s conduct in accordance with a notion of morally 
right or wrong conduct. Even one has the opportunity to defect, 
which is rational in rational choice model; he would not defect 
for moral reasons. This form of trust stems from the voluntary 
conduct of individuals in networks. It does not rely on legal 
force. Callan argues that this approach assumes that “the nature 
of citizenship and the education suited to its realization” is a 
significant subject to be considered in relation to the 
collective action problem rather than see individuals as 
narrowly self-interested agents and manipulate their interest to 
assure cooperation in society (71). Networks provide such a 
moral education in Putnam.  
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 Networks create certain skills, habits, and understanding 
among individuals. Besides social connectedness and reciprocity, 
networks "instill habits of cooperation, solidarity, and public 
spiritedness” (Putnam, 1993, 189). Putnam appeals to 
Tocqueville’s terms to explain the impact of networks on 
individual judgment and feeling:  “‘Feelings and ideas are 
renewed, the heart enlarged, and the understanding developed 
only by the reciprocal action of men one upon another’” (1993, 
190). 
These impacts of networks on individuals depend on social 
connectedness as well as increased interpersonal relations among 
individuals. As explained before, friendship, good-will, and 
fellow-feeling develop among individuals in networks. In 
addition, individual judgment improves in respect to social 
cooperation. Putnam’s notion of the development of public-
spiritedness is product of both the improvement of feeling and 
judgment among individuals. The improvement of judgment refers 
to development of awareness about social order as public good 
among individuals. Public-spiritedness does not mean the 
sacrifice of private ends to public ends in Putnam.  
Citizens … are not required to be altruists … However, 
citizens pursue what Tocqueville termed ‘self-interest 
properly understood’, that is, self-interest defined 
in the context of broader public-needs, self-interest 
that is ‘enlightened’ rather than ‘myopic’ self-
interest that is alive to the interests of others. 
(Putnam, 1993, 87) 
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On the other side, there is the opposite concept of self-
interest: maximize your own advantage without any regard to the 
interests of others. According to Putnam, the idea of public-
spiritedness advocates a form of conduct between two extremes, 
that is, between altruism and narrow self-interest. It is more 
demanding than narrow self-interest yet less demanding than 
altruism (1993, 88). “Even seemingly ‘self-interested’ 
transactions take on a different character when they are 
embedded in social networks that foster mutual trust” (Putnam, 
1993, 89). As a result, “fabrics of trust enable the civic 
community more easily to surmount what economist call 
‘opportunism’, in which shared interests are unrealized because 
each individual, acting in wary isolation, has an incentive to 
defect from collective action” (Putnam, 1993, 89).  
According to Putnam social capital has “a self-enforcing 
and cumulative” quality and creates “virtuous circles” in 
society: “trust, reciprocity, civic engagement” increase and 
spread as they are used. In the absence of social capital, 
“vicious circles” develop in society: individuals choose to 
defect and it also becomes self-enforcing. In this situation, 
legal force is the only available instrument individuals could 
appeal. If the state functions properly it could provide order 
in general: This Hobbesian [solution] has at least the virtue 
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 that it is attainable by individuals who are unable to trust 
their neighbors”, yet “society is worse off than in a 
cooperative outcome” (Putnam, 1993, 178). If the state does not 
function properly, then “privatized Leviathans” (mafia) would 
appear. “Although a coercive state and mafia are inferior to 
civic community, they are still preferable to anarchy” (Putnam, 
1993, 177).  
In regard to causal relation among the components of social 
capital, Putnam assumes that networks provide a medium in which 
individuals come together. Togetherness creates social 
connections among individuals, which in turn leads to the 
development of generalized reciprocity and trust. Once trust and 
generalized reciprocity develop among individuals they cooperate 
much more easily and effectively, which in turn increases the 
stock of social capital by reinforcing norms and trust. The more 
individuals use it, the more it increases. This causal model 
primarily explains the reciprocity among members of networks. In 
regard to non-members individuals face same uncertainty created 
by the absence of information about past behavior of non-
members.  
As a response to this problem, Putnam asserts that trust 
created in a network can be used in the larger society: ”Social 
networks allow trust to become transitive and spread: I trust 
you, because I trust her and she assures me that she trust you” 
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 (1993, 69). Networks provide “connections among individuals to 
help circumvent problems of imperfect information and 
enforceability” (Putnam, 1993, 69). In other words, networks 
allow “reputations to be transmitted” in society (Putnam, 1993, 
74). Yet this transitive model is limited in use, for it is 
limited to those who can have information about others. It 
cannot explain those cases in which there is neither such 
transmission of reputation for honesty nor common membership.  
Although Putnam does not analyze this question, I argue 
that individuals develop a tendency to cooperate in networks and 
a dense networks of associations create a moral environment in 
society in a way that individuals tend to cooperate in larger 
society without having information about others’ past behavior 
in general. In other words, the general environment has changed 
in a way that individuals tend to trust each other until they 
face defection or cheating from others. Indeed, Putnam seems to 
endorse this by claiming that”in communities where people can be 
confident that trusting will be requited, not exploited, 
exchange is more likely to ensue” (1993, 172). Cooperation, both 
in networks and the larger society, is “eased by the expectation 
that others will probably follow the rules. Knowing that others 
will, you are more likely to go along, too, thus fulfilling 
their expectations” (Putnam, 1993, 111).  
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 Putnam asserts that a particular form of reasoning that 
develops in networks is indeed contrary to the logic of 
collective action. Collective action assumes that individuals as 
rational strategic players would take advantage of any 
opportunity to further their interest. Yet, according to Putnam, 
social capital leads individuals to act in a very different 
manner; individuals would cooperate without expecting immediate 
return from the others. And the rest would also cooperate 
instead of taking advantage of those who put themselves in a 
disadvantageous position by performing first in society. Putnam 
argues that both individual conducts violate the logic of 
collective action. Putnam asserts that we observe often this 
type of behavior in everyday life, which poses a problem for 
game theory. Putnam endorses social capital theory to explain 
precisely this type of individual conduct.  
Thus, networks would change structural environment of 
individuals or create an informal-moral environment: 
Dense networks of social interaction appear to foster sturdy norms 
of generalized reciprocity –“I’ll do this for you now without 
expecting anything immediately in return, because down the road 
you (or someone else) will reciprocate my goodwill”. Social 
interaction, in other words, helps to resolve dilemmas of collective 
action, encouraging people to act in a trustworthy way when they 
might not otherwise do so. When economic and political dealing is 
embedded in dense networks of social interaction, incentives for 
opportunities and malfeasance are reduced. A society characterized 
by generalized reciprocity is more efficient than a distrustful 
society, for the same reason that money is more efficient than 
barter. Trustworthiness lubricates social life. If we don’t have to 
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 balance every exchange instantly, we can get a lot more 
accomplished”. (Putnam, 2000 7)  
 
According to Putnam, individuals do not act in this way because 
they are selfless saints. Rather they still seek their interest; 
yet they consider their interest in a broader context of social 
life rather than see it without any regard for the interests of 
the rest.   
 
 
2.3 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND HUME 
 
In this section I compare Hume and Putnam in regard to the 
limits of the institutionalist solution to the collective action 
problem.  
Both theorists endorse a similar argument in regard to the 
social cooperation problem in both small and large societies. In 
particular, both think that in a small society, social sanctions 
are effective and prevent defection, which becomes possible 
because of the availability of adequate information about 
individuals. Both also think that the state is a “third-party” 
solution to the social cooperation problem in a large society. 
Finally, both think that the state cannot provide an adequate 
solution to the collective action problem in a large society.  
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 In Hume, as we have seen in chapter one, in tribal society 
there are two different factors that facilitate cooperation: 
First, training and education in the family and observation and 
experience outside the family. Second, small number of agents 
who face the collective action problem. In this small society, 
the primary source of defection is instinctive interest or 
“limited benevolence” or natural partiality of individuals. Hume 
endorses training and education in the family and observation 
and experience outside the family to overcome natural partiality 
to ourselves, family, and friends. The availability of adequate 
information about individual’s past behavior and the simplicity 
of individual needs facilitate their cooperation. In other 
words, this society does not face the collective action problem 
as a coordination problem.  
Hume’s solution that depends on training and education in 
the family and observation and experience outside the family is 
underlined by a learning process that leads individuals to 
develop enlightened interest. Although Hume relies on the 
effectiveness of social sanctions in this society, he also 
endorses the education of individuals to overcome their natural 
partiality.  
In the larger society, there are two sources of defection 
for Hume: Individual shortsightedness or “natural infirmity” and 
increase of society. Shortsightedness of individual reveals that 
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 enlightened interest fails in motivating individuals to 
cooperate. In other words, this individual shortsightedness is 
not a rational strategy, for it leads individuals to act 
contrary to their long-term interest. On the other hand, 
increase of society refers to coordination problem; in 
coordination problem individuals act rationally when they 
defect; that is 
 because of uncertainty about others intention, they choose to 
defect in order to protect their interest. The state forces 
individuals to choose their long-term interest and provides 
certainty among individuals who have inadequate information 
about each other.   
 In Putnam, the primary source of defection is individual 
shortsightedness in a small society. The effectiveness of social 
sanctions forces individuals to cooperate. Unlike Hume, Putnam 
does not mention a learning process in one’s family to overcome 
individual shortsightedness. On the other hand, Putnam, like 
Hume, thinks that there are two sources of defection in a large 
society: Individual shortsightedness and increase of society. 
The former refers to the failure of enlightened interest in 
motivating individuals to cooperate where individuals can cheat. 
The latter factor refers to coordination problem because of the 
increase of agents in society. Putnam also endorses the state to 
overcome both problems to achieve cooperation.  
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  Both see the state as a partial response to the collective 
action problem. Especially individual shortsightedness persists 
as a source of defection among individuals after the 
establishment of the state. This is the source of the free-rider 
problem in society. As a result, Putnam endorses social capital 
to overcome the inadequacy of enlightened interest. As we will 
see in chapter three, Hume’s final response to the shortcomings 
of enlightened interest relies on development of a moral sense 
among individuals.  
 
 
2.4 SOCIAL CAPITAL, HUMAN NATURE, AND MORAL SENSE 
 
Social capital theory relies on a more benign and complex notion 
of human nature than that of game theory.  In institutional 
design, self-interest is the only fundamental quality of 
individuals considered as relevant to the collective action 
problem. This gives neatness to game theory. Yet, it also limits 
the resources that we can use for social cooperation.  
Contrary to this somewhat static concept of the agent 
institutional design assumes, social capital theory assumes a 
developmental concept of the agent. In both institutional design 
and social capital theory, the individual is a self-interested 
agent, yet he stays self-interested in the former, whereas he 
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 develops moral sense in time in the latter. Putnam sees social 
capital as a “moral resource” of society. It provides moral 
motives for individuals in their conduct. In other words, the 
role of social capital is not simply enforcing enlightened 
interest; rather, social capital leads individuals to develop a 
new motive. Thus, the individual in social capital theory comes 
to acquire some critical additional qualities to his 
selfishness, which becomes decisive for collective action 
problem. 
The development of a moral sense creates a self-control 
mechanism in the individual. He considers defection as immoral 
even though it enhances his private interests. Moral sense has a 
different character than enlightened self-interest which 
determines individual conduct in accordance with incentives and 
others’ conduct. Moral sense requires one to watch his conduct. 
Putnam’s claim that social capital turns individuals into better 
citizens relies on the possibility of the moral improvement of 
individuals, which, in the final analysis, relies on his 
developmental concept of human nature. 
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 2.5 SOCIAL CAPITAL AS CIVIC VIRTUE 
 
In this section, I criticize Putnam’s claim that social capital 
creates a civic or republican community and individual qualities 
that develop as a result of social capital are civic or 
republican virtues. In particular, I argue that social capital 
creates certain skills, virtues, and understanding among 
individuals and also leads to the development of a community, 
yet these qualities and community are not republican in 
character at all. Rather Putnam’s social capital creates a 
liberal civil society as well as liberal virtues and 
understanding in society. Once we clarify the character of 
social capital and see that it is a liberal concept rather than 
a republican concept, we could determine more adequately how 
social capital as a liberal concept performs the role Putnam 
expects from it in regard to the collective action problem and 
political life. Also this conceptual clarification would help us 
to see the similarity between Putnam’s social capital and its 
role in social cooperation and Hume’s virtues and informal-moral 
solution to the collective action problem. As we will see in 
chapter 3, Hume presents a set of virtues against the republican 
virtues for the newly emerging commercial society. 
Putnam asserts that the quality of a society and how this 
society deals with the collective action problem depends on “the 
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 character of the citizens, or the ‘civic virtue’” (1993, 86-7). 
Putnam presents several factors as features of civic community: 
civic engagement, political equality, solidarity, trust, 
tolerance, sense of duty, and voluntary associations. Civic 
engagement refers to the interest of individuals in public 
issues and understanding of their interest in the broader 
context of public needs: “Citizens in a civic community though 
not selfless saints, regard the public domain as more than a 
battle ground for pursuing personal interest”. In a civic 
community citizens are in an equal position to each other in 
respect to rights and liberties: “Citizens interact as equals, 
neither as patrons and clients nor as governors and petitioners” 
(Putnam, 1993, 88). They are “helpful, respectful, and trustful 
toward one another”. They are tolerant to each other in respect 
to conflictual issues in political life (Putnam, 1993, 89). The 
existence of voluntary associations instills in citizens “habits 
of cooperation, solidarity, and public spiritedness”. The 
interaction of individuals with each other in voluntary 
endeavors for common goods develops their feelings, 
understanding, intellectual sophistications, and shared 
responsibility for public issues. They abhor being free riders 
even they have the opportunity (Putnam, 1993, 86-91). Civic 
community is not a conflict-free society. Rather, civic 
attitudes, equality, and political participation enable citizens 
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 to reach constructive conclusions rather than deadlocks among 
opposing groups in political life (Putnam, 1993, 118).  
Putnam’s notion of civic-republican community refers to 
voluntary associations. And his notion of civic-republican 
virtues refers to qualities that develop in associations. These 
qualities, as we saw above, are tolerance, honesty, compromise, 
public spiritedness, sense of duty, social connectedness or 
sociability, and improved judgment and understanding. Also, 
social, economic, and political conditions must be conducive to 
egalitarian interpersonal relations.  
 According to Mouritsen, Putnam’s notion of civic community 
and civic virtues do not reflect republican ideals in several 
respects: First, Putnam’s notion of community is “a grass-roots 
phenomenon” and “voluntaristic” that emerges naturally. “In 
traditional liberal fashion, civil society comes first, with 
private individuals voluntarily associating, civilizing politics 
from below”. Second, Putnam’s community is “local and society 
centered”, whereas republican community refers to “a society of 
citizens oriented towards (national) politics and institutions”. 
Third, Putnam’s community is primarily oriented to civility and 
tolerance; whereas a republican one advocates explicitly 
political virtues, especially the sacrifice of private ends to 
public ends (655). Mouritsen argues that Putnam’s civic 
community and virtues are not political enough to claim a 
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 republican character (653). Rather, his notion reflects the 
traditional liberal ideal of “polite society” (Mouritsen 655) in 
which individuals’ understanding and manners are civilized, 
refined, and improved and they follow their private ends. As a 
result, Mouritsen asserts that Putnam’s idea of “civicness is 
not enough” for the role Putnam expects from it in regard to 
“trust and cooperation” in society. Mouritsen thinks that a more 
robust republican set of virtues primarily political in nature 
is necessary to perform the functions that Putnam expects from 
social capital (664). Political participation rather than social 
participation is seen as more conducive to create public 
spiritedness and civic virtue among citizens. In other words, 
political participation refers to public activity of citizens, 
whereas social participation refers to their private activities. 
That’s why political activity has a central place in republican 
thought.  
 Mouritsen’s critique is helpful in clarifying the character 
of Putnam’s social capital in several respects, yet Mouritsen is 
wrong in his claim that Putnam’s social capital with its liberal 
notion of community and virtues cannot perform the functions 
Putnam expects. In particular, as Mouritsen asserts Putnam’s 
network is any sort of association that brings people together. 
As we saw above Putnam’s associations do not have to be 
political with explicit political purposes. For example, 
91 
 Putnam’s example of social capital that develops in a local 
market among customers or in a bird-watching group has nothing 
to do with the republican notion of civic community. What arises 
among customers is social connectedness and trust. It is a 
spontaneous and voluntaristic network and social connectedness 
that develops in it is also a by-product of togetherness or 
face-to-face relations without any explicit political purpose. 
Contrary to this view of essentially non-political associations, 
republican associations are organized for political purposes.  
Also, the republican ideal advocates explicitly political 
virtues such as public spiritedness (priority of public good 
over private ends) and a tighter solidarity among individuals 
than Putnam’s sociability and generalized reciprocity require. 
According to Burtt, “the [republican] qualities that make a 
citizen virtuous, while variously described, hinge on a mindset 
in which the goods of the public realm, the world of political 
action and deliberation, are given priority over private goods” 
(361). The republican citizen is a public figure with a strong 
political identity whose main interest is political. In other 
words, political participation in Putnam does not amount to an 
almost cardinal virtue unlike in the republican view. According 
to Kymlicka and Norman “the feature that distinguishes civic 
republicans from other participationist … is their emphasis on 
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 the intrinsic value of political participation for the 
participants themselves” (362).  
In Putnam, social capital develops independently from 
politics in any sort of association and it facilitates 
cooperation in the larger society as well as in politics. 
Politics has not a special status in social capital. Putnam’s 
notion of virtue reflects, indeed, the understanding of virtue 
held by some classical liberals. As Pocock argues the process of 
the rise of liberal politics was also the process of the decline 
of republican politics:  
As the individual moved from the farmer-warrior world 
of ancient citizenship or Gothic libertas, he entered 
an increasingly transactional universe of ‘commerce 
and the arts’ … Since these relationships were social 
and not political in character, the capacities which 
they led the individual to develop were called not 
‘virtues’ but ‘manners’. (48-9)  
 
Besides these differences between republican and liberal 
notions of networks and citizenship, Putnam’s virtues such as 
tolerance, compromise, sense of duty, public spiritedness, 
solidarity, and enlargement of mind are also liberal in 
character. In particular, tolerance is a liberal virtue that 
makes the individual accept differences in regard to not just 
technical questions in politics but also, more importantly, the 
plurality of substantial ways of life as a fact of modern 
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 society8. Another such virtue is compromise. It refers to 
recognition of the complexity of political questions and thus 
necessity of negotiation among different groups and parties. It 
requires technical knowledge as well as a pragmatic approach to 
political conflict to prevent destructive conflicts among 
groups. Even republican citizens need compromise in dealing with 
conflict in politics; it does not make Putnam’s social capital a 
republican concept. It is an instrumental value that can find a 
place in both republican and liberal politics. Yet, it would fit 
more easily to liberal politics, for liberal society could 
recognize and accommodate differences, especially moral 
differences among people, more than a republican model could. In 
other words, the liberal system could accommodate a much greater 
variety of differences than a republican system could. 
Especially, republican community tends to enforce more 
homogeneity on its citizens in regard to substantial values than 
liberal society.   
I think Putnam’s appeal to the republican model relies on 
an assumption that since republican model assumes that the 
health of society depends on the character and qualities of its 
citizens, he thinks that social capital is also a republican 
concept, for it also assumes this connection. It is a common 
                                                 
8  According to Gutmann, the republican notion of virtue requires a “more conservative” mindset in individuals, 
which would create a less tolerant society which cannot accommodate substantial moral differences that are just a 
fact of life for liberals (309, 319).  The plurality of comprehensive worldviews is one of the fundamental premises of 
Rawls’ liberalism (1999). 
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 misconception in contemporary political thought that liberals 
are not interested in the character of individuals; rather they 
rely on an institutional structure such as a constitution with a 
balance and check system and separation of powers to assure 
peace and order in society.9 In other words, it is assumed that 
the liberal individual tends to stay as an isolated agent who 
sees society as an instrument for his private ends. Such 
individuals are not good candidates to form a coherent body of 
citizenry with shared ideals and practices in society (Sandel 
87). On the other hand, the primary character of the republican 
agent is that he is a citizen of the republic. As Wallach puts 
it republicans think that “virtue could only be fully realized 
in a rightly constituted political community” (616). The 
republican notion of citizenship requires certain qualities that 
turn the individual into a citizen and those qualities are not 
the qualities that are valued in liberal thought. I think Putnam 
follows this line of thought in his appeal to the republican 
ideal in describing his notion of civil society that stems from 
social capital. Yet this is not a correct assumption, for 
although some liberals advocate an instrumentalist notion of 
                                                 
9  Galston succinctly puts the common, yet mistaken, conviction about the relation between virtue and politics in 
liberalism: “For two generations, scholarly inquiry has been dominated by the belief that liberal polity does not rest 
on individual virtue. On the theoretical plane, liberalism has been understood as the articles of a peace treaty among 
individuals with diverse conceptions of the good but common interests in preservation and prosperity. On the level 
of basic institutions, the liberal constitution has been understood as an artful contrivance of countervailing powers 
and counterbalancing passions. In the arena of liberal society, individual behavior has been analyzed through the 
prism, and public policy guided by the precepts, of neoclassical economics” (1277). 
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 society which relies on manipulation of self-interested agents 
to assure cooperation and ignore qualities of individuals, this 
is not the case for all liberals. The classical example of 
individualistic liberalism is Hobbes, and Putnam mentions Hobbes 
in his critique of the rational choice model. On the other hand, 
as we will see in chapter four and five Hume represents another 
tradition in liberalism which tries to bring both interest and 
virtues together in both social and political life. In addition 
to these two different liberal traditions, liberalism endorses a 
different set of virtues than the republicans do. As Galston 
puts it,  
the liberal citizen is not the same as the civic-
republican citizen. In a liberal polity there is no 
duty to participate actively in politics, no 
requirement to place the public above the private and 
to subordinate personal interest to the common good 
systematically, and no commitment to accept collective 
determination of personal choices. But neither is 
liberal citizenship simply the pursuit of self-
interest, individually or in factional collusion with 
others of like-minded. Liberal citizenship has its own 
distinctive restrains – virtues that circumscribe and 
check, without wholly nullifying, the promptings of 
self-aggrandizement. (1284) 
 
Putnam’s appeal to the republican model downgrades the 
significance of his model and prevents him from recognizing its 
liberal character.  
Mouritsen’s claim that Putnam’s virtues cannot achieve the 
ends that Putnam expects from them in regard to the collective 
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 action problem since they are not republican enough misses the 
point also. Mouritsen assumes that the health of social life can 
be achieved by a rigorous set of republican values that takes 
politics more seriously than social capital. In order to achieve 
a republican society it is reasonable to argue that we need a 
body of citizenry with a set of republican virtues, yet this 
does not mean that liberal virtues advocated by Putnam’s social 
capital fail. Rather we need to see that each tradition 
advocates different forms of society based on different sets of 
virtues. As I will argue in chapter 3, Hume is a case in point 
that he advocates a form of liberal society which considers that 
the health and quality of society have a close tie to the 
character of individuals.   
 
 
2.6 TYPES OF SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
Putnam’s theory of social capital has been criticized for its 
optimistic appraisal of networks. In particular some scholars 
argue that Putnam ignores that many associations do not create 
social capital that is good for a liberal system. Indeed, some 
associations breed hatred, factionalism, racism towards certain 
groups in society. Yet the very same associations also develop 
those virtues (the generalized reciprocity, trust, solidarity) 
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 among their members. These scholars argue that we cannot simply 
rely on the existence of dense networks of associations; rather 
we need to know how the virtues necessary for a liberal system 
can be created in associations without leading precisely those 
qualities that are bad for liberal society.  
Chambers and Kopstein argue that the question is not 
between participation and isolation; rather “the more important 
question facing us is what type of civil society promotes 
democracy. In other words, the choice is not really between 
isolation and participation but rather between different types 
of participation” (838). They argue that both bad and good civil 
societies create the same values (reciprocity, trust, 
solidarity). Yet “bad civil society” leads to “particularist 
civility” which limits the use of social capital to its members 
and “often encourages the opposite sort of attitude to members 
outside of the group”. On the other hand, good social capital 
creates “democratic civility” which “extends the goods learned 
in participation to all citizens regardless of group membership” 
(841). They criticize Putnam by claiming that Putnam does not 
take up these kinds of questions in his analysis. Yet, bad 
social capital is “worse than the disease” (isolation of 
individuals). In order to differentiate bad social capital from 
good, they argue, we need to look at “the ideological content 
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 and substantive messages that members receive” in an association 
(842)10.  
Stolle and Rochon also criticize Putnam as ignoring bad 
social capital. In order to differentiate bad social capital 
from good, they look at whether social capital created in 
networks is extended to non-members. They argue that networks 
that create social capital yet fail to extend it to people 
outside the group create “private or personalized civicness”. On 
the other hand, networks which create social capital and extend 
it to non-members create “public civicness” (48). They argue 
that the Mafia, religious fundamentalist groups, even the 
terrorist groups create social capital among their members. 
That’s why “we do not automatically see virtue in an association 
that establishes trust, cooperation, and norms of reciprocity 
among its members if it does not also do so in a more 
generalized sense” (49). 
As a response to his critics Putnam has attempted to 
differentiate bad social capital from good. Putnam presents two 
different classifications of social capital: The first 
classification is about a fourfold distinction of different 
forms of capital. These are as follows: Formal versus informal, 
thick versus thin, inward-looking versus outward looking, and 
                                                 
10 Chambers and Kopstein argue that the Weimar Republic had very dense and vibrant networks which led to the 
Nazi movement (842). 
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 bridging versus bonding social capitals. Some voluntary 
organizations are formal such as labor unions which have regular 
meetings, officers, dues, and membership requirements. On the 
other hand, some organizations are informal such as “people who 
gather at the same pub”. Some organizations are “closely 
interwoven and multistranded, such as a group of steelworkers 
who work together everyday at the factory, go out for drinks on 
Saturday, and go to mass every Sunday” (2000, 10). On the other 
hand, “the nodding acquaintance you have with the person you 
occasionally see waiting in line at the supermarket, or even a 
chance encounter with another person in an elevator” refers to 
thin social capital (2000, 10). Some associations promote the 
interest of their members such as labor organizations. Some 
other associations can promote the interest of non-participants 
such as charitable groups. Bonding social capital includes 
people similar to each other in significant respects such as 
race, ethnicity, or social class. Bridging networks include 
people who are unlike each other. Putnam asserts that in real 
life we find all or some of these forms of social capital in 
associations in most cases, yet there might be some associations 
that represent just one form of these social capitals. Among 
these types of social capital, argues Putnam, bonding social 
capital could create bad social capital due to its homogenous 
membership. On the other hand, bridging social capital is suited 
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 especially to extend trust and reciprocity among diverse people 
(2000, 9) 
The second classification is about bad versus good social 
capital. Putnam asserts that not all associations create social 
capital that is good for liberal politics, rather bad social 
capital subverts “the rules and traditions of liberal democracy” 
(2000, 9). Bad social capital refers to norms of reciprocity and 
trust as well as solidarity and social connectedness that 
develop in particular groups such as the Ku Klux Klan. This 
association also develops social capital, yet it is internally 
oriented in such a way that creates group solidarity against 
supposed enemies. Good social capital refers to values and norms 
that are not created for “self-defensive” reasons against 
enemies; rather good social capital leads individuals to use 
their habits, trust, skills, and norms of reciprocity in larger 
society to facilitate social cooperation.  
Putnam’s distinction of bad vs. good social capital 
indicates that networks are instrumental in the sense that they 
can serve liberal as well as non-liberal systems. Networks do 
not have a transformative impact on people’s ideological 
identity; rather they simply provide a medium in which liberals 
as well as fundamentalists can develop social capital to endorse 
their causes. The critical factor that determines whether 
associations would develop good or bad social capital is, as 
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 Chambers and Kopstein argue, the content of the messages 
individual take in associations. This indicates that a dense 
network of associations which endorse illiberal or anti-liberal 
visions of society would turn society into a cluster of 
antagonist groups. In order to have a dense network of good 
associations, society must be liberalized culturally to a large 
extent. Associations that target the fundamental tenets of 
liberalism simply would pose a threat to the system rather than 
contribute social cooperation. Indeed, Putnam’s notion of bad 
social capital that subverts “the rules and traditions of 
liberal democracy” refers to this requirement. Effective social 
cooperation, in the final analysis, relies on the liberalization 
of society.  
 
 
2.7 SOCIAL CAPITAL AND “A NEW WAY OF DOING POLITICS” 
 
In this section I analyze how social capital influences 
individuals’ political conduct in a way that leads to 
development of a particular way of doing politics. Although 
Putnam’s social capital is social in essence, it has a positive 
impact in politics.  
In Making Democracy Work, Putnam seeks to explain 
differences between north and south Italy as well as differences 
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 within each region in terms of effectiveness of governmental 
institutions introduced in the 1970s. He analyzes how and to 
what extent institutions as independent variables change 
political behavior by changing the structural environment or 
incentive structure in which individuals act. Putnam also 
analyzes the role of socioeconomic modernity as an independent 
variable by taking institutions as dependent variables in 
individual political behavior. He argues that both factors come 
short in explaining the differences. He then uses social capital 
as a more adequate explanatory model to explain the differences. 
He introduces “the social context within which they 
[institutions] operate”: “Just as the same individual may define 
and pursue his and her interests differently in different 
institutional contexts, so the same formal institution may 
operate differently in different context” (1993, 8).  
In Italy a massive institutional reform was initiated in 
1970, which established 15 regional governments. Later in 1976-
77, 5 more regional governments were established and in time 
these governments had gained authority over a wide array of 
issues such as “urban affairs, agriculture, housing, hospitals, 
and health services, public works, vocational education, and 
economic development” (Putnam, 1993,6). Although the same types 
of institutions were established in all these regions, these 
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 regions had different socioeconomic development levels and 
political traditions (Putnam, 1993, 7).  
As expected by reformers, argues Putnam, “institutional 
socialization” taught the politicians “the virtues of patience 
and practicality and reasonableness. Just as its advocates had 
hoped, the regional reform nurtured ‘a new way of doing 
politics’” (1993, 38). In particular, the establishment of the 
regional governments with authority over a broad array of issues 
had led some changes in “elite political culture” (Putnam, 1993, 
28). Before the reforms, Italian politics had been polarized and 
ideological. “A conception of politics and social relations as 
essentially zero-sum, revolving about conflicts that were 
ultimately irreconcilable” was the dominant behavior of the 
political elite. They approached political issues in terms of 
“ultimate goals” with “theoretical and utopian” overtones 
(Putnam, 1993, 34). This traditional political culture started 
to decline after the reforms:  
the accumulation of evidence is overwhelming: The first 
two decades of the regional experiment witnessed a 
dramatic change in political climate and culture, a 
trend away from ideological conflict toward 
collaboration, from extremis toward moderation, from 
dogmatism toward tolerance, from abstract doctrine 
toward practical management, from interest articulation 
toward interest aggregation, from radical social reform 
toward ‘good government’. (Putnam, 1993, 6)  
 
104 
 Yet, in terms of governmental performance the north and the 
south had different results: almost in all the northern regions 
citizens were satisfied by governmental performance, whereas the 
southern governments had not realized this result (Putnam, 1993, 
54). Some of the regional governments were consistently more 
successful than others in spite of the existence of “identical 
structures and equivalent legal and financial resources” 
(Putnam, 1993, 82). The northern governments as a group were 
more successful than the southern ones.  
In particular there were differences in two points between 
the regions: First, there were different types of participation 
in different regions. Second, some regions had social capital, 
whereas others had not. Both the north and the south had 
participatory political life, yet “it is not so much the 
quantity of participation as the quality that differs between 
them. The character of participation varies because the nature 
of politics is quite different in the two areas.” In some 
regions politics refers to “collective deliberation on public 
issues”, whereas in some other regions it refers to 
hierarchically organized activity that narrowly focused on 
personal gain (Putnam, 1993, 96). In the former regions, 
individuals are policy-oriented in their political conduct and 
try to influence political outcome, whereas in the latter 
regions individuals seek private interest via “patron-client 
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 networks”. In other words, the former individuals see politics 
as a medium of reaching decisions among opposing groups, while 
the latter groups see politics as a means for personal gain 
without any regard to public life. The first group has more 
information about policy issues than the latter group; they try 
to obtain information about political issues (Putnam, 1993, 97). 
“Authority relations in these regions mirror authority relations 
in the wider social setting” (Putnam, 1993, 101). In some 
regions, political leaders had less sympathy for political 
equality than politicians in other regions. Rather than 
political participation, leaders in the former regions value 
leadership and elitism. They have skepticism about “the wisdom 
of the ordinary citizen” (Putnam, 1993, 102). And, citizens of 
these regions feel “exploited, alienated, and powerless” 
(Putnam, 1993, 109). 
Expectation of fairness in interpersonal relations shows a 
stark difference between different regions: In some regions, 
political corruption is the highest and citizens appeal to the 
police or the legal force as the only available source “to solve 
the fundamental Hobbesian dilemma of public order, for they lack 
the horizontal bonds of collective reciprocity that work more 
efficiently in the civic regions. In the absence of solidarity 
and self-discipline, hierarchy and force provide the only 
alternative to anarchy” (Putnam, 1993, 112).In other regions 
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 citizens have greater confidence and trust in their fellow 
citizens (Putnam, 1993, 111).  
 According to Putnam, these differences among regions reveal 
a deeper difference:  
These remarkably consistent differences go to the heart 
of the distinction between civic and uncivic 
communities. Collective life in civic regions is eased 
by the expectation that others will probably follow the 
rules. Knowing that others will, you are likely to go 
along, too, thus fulfilling their expectations. In the 
less civic regions nearly everyone expects everyone else 
to violate the rules. It seems foolish to obey the 
traffic laws or the tax code or the welfare rules, if 
you expect everyone else to cheat. (1993, 111)  
 
He also argues that citizens in civic regions are more 
satisfied with their political life and “happier with life in 
general” than those in less civic regions: “Happiness is living 
in a civic region”. Individual happiness is closely related to 
the type of one’s community (1993, 113-4). 
Putnam evaluates socioeconomic modernization to account for 
the differences. This model sees effective government as a 
product of the “social and economic transformation” of society; 
economic prosperity, education of citizens, and formation of the 
middle-class are preconditions of a well-functioning democratic 
system. When the reforms were introduced the north was more 
modernized than the south. This approach, argues Putnam, 
explains the differences between advanced northern regions and 
underdeveloped southern ones. Yet, it cannot explain the 
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 differences within each region; in addition to the differences 
between the north and the south, there were intra-regional 
differences in terms of governmental performance. In both 
regions some less developed regions were more effectively 
governed. Putnam’s conclusion is that “wealth and economic 
development cannot be the entire story” (1993, 86). According to 
Putnam, the relation observed between socioeconomic development 
and effective governance disappears when civic community is 
taken into account as an independent variable: “economically 
advanced regions appear to have more successful regional 
governments merely because they happen to be more civic” (1993, 
98-9).  
As a result, Putnam argues that the existence of social 
capital creates “a new way of doing politics” by creating 
certain qualities among political agents. In other words, 
certain qualities are necessary in political life to deal more 
effectively with the collective action problem. As we have seen 
in this chapter, these qualities are tolerance to one’s 
opponents, compromise in decision making, a pragmatic approach 
to political issues, public spiritedness in the sense that one 
sees social order as a common good. In short, Putnam advocates 
moderation in political life.  
Putnam advocates these virtues by relying on two 
assumptions: The complexity of political questions and existence 
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 of some sort of consensus on liberal system among different 
groups. According to Putnam, in political conflicts, “one should 
avoid extreme positions because the proper solution usually lies 
in the middle” (1993, 33). Recognition of the complexity of 
political questions necessarily leads one to seek compromise 
with his opponents. It is assumed that, each group can provide 
some insight for political problems. As a result, moderation 
appears to be primary virtue social capital creates in society 
in Putnam.  
Putnam considers ideological conflict as another factor 
that leads to destructive conflict in political life. 
Ideological principles lead individuals to have uncompromising 
positions in conflict, for they think that they represent the 
truth. They see compromise as “betrayal of one’s position” 
(1993, 33).  
 Putnam’s claim that social capital leads to the development 
of “a new way of doing politics” rests on an unstated 
assumption; parties or groups agree, at least on a minimal 
basis, on the fundamentals of the system. In other words, 
individuals must have some sort of agreement on the legitimacy 
of liberalism as their political system or accept liberalism as 
providing “the rules of the game” in politics. Otherwise, people 
would have conflict on the fundamentals of the system. In some 
regions of Italy, according to Putnam, politicians had utopian 
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 visions with messianic expectations. This refers to conflict on 
the fundamentals of the system. The role of social capital is 
limited in such fundamental issues. That’s why individuals must 
have some agreement on the fundamental tenets of the system to 
be able to utilize social capital.  
 
2.8 CONCLUSION 
 
For Putnam, the transformation of individuals into better 
citizens is the function of social capital. Social capital 
activates and utilizes “moral sources” of society. Although 
social capital endorses enlightened interest in general, its 
function is not limited to this. Rather, the development of a 
moral sense or a sense of right and wrong is primary character 
of social capital, for enlightened interest requires one to 
defect when his interest is in conflict with public good, given 
that he could avoid punishment. That’s why social capital can 
create a tendency to cooperate in individuals which can override 
self-interest. 
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3.0 HUME’S MORAL THEORY 
 
 
 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
As we have seen in chapter two, Putnam thinks that in order to 
overcome the free-rider problem and achieve efficient 
cooperation in modern society we have to have both the state and 
a virtuous body of citizenry. Putnam’s works on social capital 
have reintroduced one of the classical questions of normative 
political theory into contemporary political discussions: “The 
nature of citizenship and the education suited to its 
realization have traditionally figured among the basic questions 
of normative political theory” (Callan 71). Hume is one of those 
philosophers who see a close link between the efficient response 
of society to the collective action problem and the character of 
citizens.   
 In this chapter, I introduce and analyze Hume’s moral 
theory to show two things: First, there is a close link between 
Hume’s theory of justice and moral theory in the sense that Hume 
considers both institutions and a virtuous body of citizenry as 
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 necessary to overcome the free-rider problem and thus achieve 
efficient cooperation in society. Second, Hume’s moral theory 
advocates a set of virtues, skills, and understanding that are 
strikingly similar to Putnam’s social capital, both in their 
essentially social character and the role they play in respect 
to the collective action problem in society. In other words, 
Hume’s moral theory represents an early liberal theory of social 
capital. While we can appreciate the value of Hume’s moral 
theory by using Putnam’s idea of social capital, on the one 
hand, we can also provide some further plausibility to show that 
Putnam’s virtues are liberal in essence rather than republican, 
on the other.  
 The plan of this chapter is as follows: First, I analyze 
how Humean agents whose primary motive for cooperation is self-
interest come, in time, to see cooperation as a moral duty. Hume 
presents two different principles to explain this transition: 
First, the sympathy principle in the Treatise; second, fellow-
feeling or sense of humanity in the second Enquiry. These two 
principles are used to explain the initial development of a 
moral sense in society.  
Then, I present how Hume thinks historically human society 
morally develops. Hume’s moral theory is an historical one which 
assumes that human race develops a shared moral sense as a 
result of many different factors such as the practice of 
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 cooperation, education and training, and the overall development 
of human society. I argue that the process of the development of 
a common moral sense is also the process of the development of a 
virtuous body of citizenry or the development of social capital 
in Hume.  
 Then, I analyze how Hume thinks that the improvement of 
morality would facilitate social cooperation in society. In 
particular, I argue that “the sensible knave” represents the 
logic of collective action for Hume. As a response to “the 
sensible knave”, Hume relies on a particular form of individual 
conduct that develops as a result of moral improvement and 
violates the logic of collective action.  
Finally, I compare Hume’s moral theory with Putnam’s theory 
of social capital to show the similarities in several respects: 
First, I argue that Hume’s moral theory also relies on social 
connectedness or sociability at its most basic level among 
individuals. Second, both assume that individuals can be better 
citizens as a result of moral improvement. Both theorists think 
the self-interested individual could develop a disposition to 
cooperate, which violates the logic of collective action. For 
both theorists, the efficiency of social cooperation depends on 
the possibility and realization of this assumption. Third, the 
particular virtues, skills, and understanding Hume advocates for 
moral improvement are similar in character and function in 
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 respect to social cooperation to Putnam’s virtues, skills, and 
understanding.  
 
 
 
3.2 HUME’S NOTION OF MORALITY 
 
According to Hume, morality as an objective set of rules to 
regulate interpersonal relations is not an innate idea inherit 
in human nature or in the essence of nature. And such moral 
rules cannot be discovered by reason (T 294). Rather, Hume 
presents an historical account of the development of morality as 
an objective set of rules. In general, he thinks that moral 
principles develop in parallel with the development of human 
society. This does not mean, however, that the Humean agent is 
an amoral being in his savage state.  
According to Hume, “the chief spring or actuating principle 
of the human mind is pleasure or pain” and “moral distinctions 
depend entirely on certain peculiar sentiments of pain and 
pleasure, and that whatever mental quality in ourselves or 
others gives us satisfaction, by the survey or reflection, is of 
course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives 
uneasiness, is vicious” (T 367). Hume’s understanding of 
morality is sentiment oriented and the source of moral 
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 distinctions is neither education nor abstract reasoning. 
Rather, he asserts that human nature is the source of moral 
feeling and judgment: “The hypothesis which we embrace is plain. 
It maintains that morality is determined by sentiment. It 
defines virtue to be whatever mental action or quality gives to 
a spectator the pleasing sentiment of appropriation; and vice 
the contrary” (En 127). 
As presented in the first chapter, the Humean individual in 
a pre-just society is not an amoral agent. He has a moral sense, 
yet at this savage stage morality follows one’s natural 
tendencies of judgment and passions. Individual is benevolent, 
yet his benevolence is limited to his family and friends. Hume 
sees the moral sense at this stage as uncultivated and natural. 
This natural morality does not provide a set of objective rules 
among individuals to regulate their interpersonal relations in 
an impartial manner. That is why Hume considers it an obstacle 
to enforce the natural partiality of humans before the 
development of the objective or impartial rules of justice. 
Rather than to prevent or regulate natural selfish tendencies of 
individual, it endorses and justifies them at the pre-just 
stage. As Taylor puts it “the natural operations of both 
sympathy and our uncultivated evaluative attitudes reinforce 
partiality in a way that makes it difficult for people to 
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 recognize that others not of their immediate circle have similar 
interest” (11). 
The development of a common moral sense in society depends 
on the development of human society in general and starts with 
the development of the rules of justice in particular. It is a 
product of many different forces associated with the process of 
the development of civilization. In Hume, the development of a 
common moral sense among people has two stages: the first stage 
refers to the initial development of such morality, which stems 
from certain features of human nature. Hume presents two 
different principles to explain this initial stage; In the 
Treatise he talks about the principle of sympathy. In the second 
Enquiry, he talks about the principle of humanity. The second 
stage refers to the development of human society in general.  
In the Treatise, Hume asserts that although a common moral 
sense is not an innate idea in human nature or in the essence of 
nature, certain features of human nature make men receptive to 
moral improvement; in particular the principle of sympathy and 
our natural tendency to generalize or formulate general 
principles based on limited experience and observation are two 
relevant features of human nature that lead to the initial 
improvement of morality for Hume. 
According to Hume, an impartial moral sense starts to 
develop after the establishment of the rules of justice. He asks 
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 “why we annex the idea of virtue to justice and of vice to 
injustice?”, even though the origin of justice is self-interest 
(T 320). According to Taylor, Hume’s “real interest in his 
account of the establishment of justice lies in his further 
explanation of how those conventions transform our moral 
psychology” (5).  
For Hume, at the beginning individuals comply with the 
rules of justice to promote their interest:  
They are at first mov’d only by regard to interest; 
and this motive, on the first formation of society, is 
sufficiently strong and forcible”.  As we saw in 
chapter one, as society becomes larger over time, 
individuals fail to comply with the rules due to their 
shortsightedness. (T 320) 
 
Yet even though individuals prefer their immediate interest, and 
thus breach the rules, they differentiate an unjust act from a 
just one and feel an uneasiness to see the violation of the 
rules by others. The reason for this paradoxical situation, 
according to Hume, is that when individuals’ interest is not 
involved in such a case, they observe a violation from an 
impartial position: When their interest is not involved they are 
not “either blinded by passion, or byass’d by any contrary 
temptation” (T 320). They are in a position to recognize 
objectively a breach of the rules and its destructive impact on 
social order. They observe that an injustice was done to an 
individual. Since their interest is not involved, that is 
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 promoted or prevented; they are able to see the unjust act from 
an objective position. Thus, they become impartial observers or 
“spectators” in Hume’s term. Besides this impartial observation, 
they also feel an uneasiness to see that an injustice is done to 
someone. It displeases them. They feel the uneasiness of the 
individual to whom injustice is done. Why do they feel 
uneasiness even though the injustice is not done to them and 
their interest is not involved? According to Hume, people feel 
the same uneasiness even when they read about such cases in 
history also. This is an awkward situation indeed.  
The second factor, the feeling of uneasiness, introduces a 
moral sense to our objective observation: “We partake of their 
uneasiness by sympathy; and as every thing, which gives 
uneasiness in human actions, upon the general survey, is call’d 
vice” (T 320). Thus, he explains why self-interested individual 
feels this uneasiness by his principle of sympathy. Sympathy 
principle refers to a psychological process: when we observe an 
unjust or just act done to someone, we feel or sense its 
negative or positive impact on the relevant person. Although we 
do not experience the impact as intensively as that person does 
still we have a sense of the impact on that person. This process 
works also in our feeling and judgment of beauty. For example, 
when we see a beautiful house we feel a sort of satisfaction 
knowing that it pleases its owner:  
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 [T]he conveniency of a house, the fertility of a 
field, the strength of a horse, the capacity, 
security, and swift-sailing of a vessel, form the 
principal beauty of these several objects. Here the 
object, which is denominated beautiful, pleases only 
by its tendency to produce a certain effect. That 
effect is the pleasure or advantage of some other 
person. Now the pleasure of a stranger, for whom we 
have no friendship, pleases us only by sympathy.(T 
368) 
 
According to Hume, the very same principle produces a 
feeling of satisfaction when we observe a virtuous quality in 
others: “The same principle produces, in many instances, our 
sentiments of morals, as well as those of beauty” (T 369). For 
Hume, this sympathy principle is a part of human nature: “The 
minds of all men are similar in their feelings and operations; 
nor can anyone be actuated by any affection, of which all others 
are not, in some degree, susceptible” (T 368). Thus, the 
impartial observer has a pleasing sentiment in observing that 
others comply with the rules of justice due to sympathy with the 
relevant individuals on whom just act has impact. “This 
principle is not to be confused with the sentiments of 
compassion, which is merely one of its products. The principle 
is the one that enables us to participate in the emotional life, 
and the pleasures and pains, of others” (Penelhum 134). Thus, 
our impartial judgment is accompanied by our feelings: “Each of 
us is able, through sympathy, to be conscious of the unpleasant 
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 results of unjust actions for those who suffer from them” 
(Penelhum 136). 
However, the impartial observer fails to feel uneasiness 
when he himself breaches the rules. It is in time that the 
impartial observer comes to see his own unjust act as vice and 
feel dissatisfaction about it:  
And tho’ this sense, in the present case, be deriv’d 
only from contemplating the actions of others, yet we 
fail not to extend it even to our own actions. The 
general rule reaches beyond those instances, from which 
it arose; while at the same time we naturally sympathize 
with others in the sentiments they entertain of us. (T 
320) 
 
Our natural tendency to generalize refers to a particular 
quality of mind. According to Hume, the human mind has a natural 
tendency to formulate general rules applicable to similar cases 
based on limited experience and observation. Due to this 
tendency, individuals extend the notion of just and unjust to 
their own conduct once they make such judgments about others’ 
behavior.  As a result of the practice of the convention, “we 
both redirect natural motivational propensities (interest and 
partiality) and extend natural evaluative sentiments beyond 
their original narrow bounds”, although the practice of the 
rules was at first adopted for “prudential reasons” (Taylor 9, 
24). Hume defines this process of the development of a moral 
sense as the natural “progress of the sentiments” (T 321).  
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  In the second Enquiry, Hume explains this initial 
development of morality by another principle, the principle of 
humanity. Indeed Hume uses sympathy interchangeably with 
humanity and he also refers to the same feeling of satisfaction 
or dissatisfaction we have when we observe a virtuous or vicious 
act. He asserts that that same feeling operates in our 
approbation of beautiful things, such as houses or animals. He 
defines the principle of humanity as follows: “All mankind so 
far resemble the good principle, that, where interest or revenge 
or envy perverts not our disposition, we are always inclined, 
from our natural philanthropy, to give the preference to the 
happiness of society, and consequently to virtue above its 
opposite” (En 62). Hume thinks that the source of moral feeling 
and judgment is inherent in our nature.  
In regard to extending moral judgment to one’s own conduct, 
Hume endorses increase of interpersonal relations in society. He 
argues that this original moral feeling needs to be corrected in 
such a way that it overcomes individual natural partiality. He 
thinks that “the more we converse with mankind, and the greater 
social intercourse we maintain, the more shall we be 
familiarized to these general preferences and distinctions” (En 
63), and we would form “some general unalterable standard, by 
which we may approve or disapprove of characters and manners” 
(En 64). Social life seems to be the medium in which individuals 
121 
 recognize, in time, what sort of rules they need to have to 
perpetuate society. In a sense, increase of interpersonal 
relations refers to the social-moral transformation of self-
interested agents in a way that they are in a better condition 
to perpetuate society. 
Besides this natural progress of morality, Hume presents 
some other factors that promote further development of morality 
historically. These factors are politicians, parents, one’s 
regard for his own integrity and character, and the general 
development of human society on every front.  
 
 
 
3.3 EDUCATION, TRAINING AND INTEGRITY 
 
According to Hume “the artifice of politicians”, “private 
education”, and “the interest of our reputation” strengthen 
individual morality.  
Politicians, by public praise of virtue and blame of vice, 
and role-modeling could “produce esteem for justice and an 
abhorrence of injustice” (T 321). Yet Hume cautions that the 
effect of politicians should not be exaggerated; “The utmost 
politicians can perform, is, to extend the natural sentiment 
beyond their original bounds; but still nature must furnish the 
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 materials, and give us some notion of moral distinction” (T 
321).  
Private education and training refer to education and 
instruction in the family. Parents observe that it is to the 
advantage of their offspring to follow the rules of justice in 
promoting their own interest. They would be useful both to 
themselves and to others if they have a moral sense. Parents 
teach their children that virtue is “worthy and honorable” and 
vice is “base and infamous”. Indeed, Hume argues that even in 
the pre-just state parents teach some rules to their offspring 
to regulate their relations with each other in the family. And 
he sees this education as inculcating a sense of rule-following 
in interpersonal relations and relates it to the development of 
the rules of justice (T 312).  
The idea of reputation, argues Hume, strengthens the moral 
sense. Once individuals see the unjust act as vice and the just 
act as virtue, one’s concern to his reputation for honesty 
becomes a significant motive that supports the rules of justice 
in society (T 321). 
There is nothing which touches us more nearly than our 
reputation, and nothing on which our reputation more 
depends than our conduct, with relation to the property 
of others. For this reason, every one, who has any 
regard to his character, or who intends to live on good 
terms with mankind, must fix an inviolable law to 
himself, never, by any temptation, to be induc’d to 
violate those principles, which are essential to a man 
of probity and honour. (T 321) 
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 3.4  HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF MORALITY 
 
Hume also sees a close and causal link between moral improvement 
and the development of civilization in general. In particular, 
the rule of law (peace and order) and personal liberty, 
commerce, the arts and sciences, learning and study, and the 
rise of the modern city are causes of moral improvement. 
 The rule of law, as Danford puts it, is “the critical 
factor” which provides security for private property and 
personal liberty (122). A peaceful social order starts with the 
development of the rules of law. According to Hume, “Avarice, or 
the desire of gain, is a universal passion, which operates at 
all times, in all places, and upon all persons” (Es 113). Yet in 
a peaceful environment, it exerts its power best and follows its 
natural course: “From Law arises security; From security 
curiosity: And from curiosity knowledge. The latter steps of 
this progress may be more accidental; but the former are 
altogether necessary” (Es 118).  Individuals seek their own 
interest to better their material conditions. Wealth is a 
product of the selfish economic activities of individuals.  
Individuals get acquainted with commodious living conditions. In 
Hume “the driving forces of human nature were self-love, a 
desire for action, and a natural desire to improve the material 
conditions of life” (Marshall 633). In the absence of personal 
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 liberty, argues Hume, the result is poverty: “The poverty of 
common people is a natural, if not an infallible effect of 
absolute monarchy” (Es 265). Thus, Hume thinks that “if one 
takes people as they are, given law and liberty, the natural 
course of improvement towards civilization will lead to a 
commercial society in the absence of distorting factors (like 
slavery or superstition)“ (Cohen 121). Their desire to obtain 
commodious living conditions is the crucial factor that further 
develops commerce: “In Hume’s account of the early stages of 
economic development, the key phenomenon is … a kind of 
expanding circle of consumer demand” (Davis 273). In such an 
environment, as Hundert puts it, “Engaged in the pursuit of 
their own interest, men better themselves materially and satisfy 
a desire for work and improvement common to the race” (42). The 
creativity of individuals is unleashed by economic activity; 
otherwise they produce just enough to live, which creates 
“indolence” (Brewer 80).  
Yet, Hume believes that the beneficial impacts of commerce 
are not limited to material abundance and commodious living 
conditions it creates: He recognizes “the important social 
changes brought about by the rise of commerce” (Davis 289). 
Hume’s interest in commerce has a philosophical dimension. As  
Schuler and Murray argue that “Hume was arguably the first great 
thinker to embrace commercial life as a point of philosophical 
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 principle … for Hume, commerce is a forceful cultivator of the 
human nature” (589). 
Commerce creates the necessary material conditions for more 
equal socio-economic relations among individuals which, 
according to Hume, are “most suitable to human nature”. The 
wealth must be widespread in society: 
 
A too great disproportion among the citizens weakens 
any state. Every person, if possible, ought to enjoy 
the fruits of his labour, in a full possession of all 
the necessaries, and many of the conveniences of life. 
No one can doubt, but such an equality is most 
suitable to human nature, and diminishes much less 
from the happiness of the rich than to that of the 
poor. (Es 265) 
 
The increase of wealth, argues Hume, frees traditionally 
oppressed groups such as farmers and workers and enlarges the 
middle-class which is “that middling rank of men, who are best 
and firmest basis of public liberty. They neither submit to 
slavery nor tyrannize over others. Rather they try to secure 
their property and support equal laws in society” (Es 277-78). 
Such individuals are more interested in their private interest, 
yet their conduct unintentionally serves the social order. Frey 
asserts that “pursuit of one’s own advantage or happiness 
fortunately, not as a matter of benevolent motivation but as an 
unintended by-product of self-interested motivation, furthers 
the advantage or happiness of others” (286). Hume maintains that 
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 middle-class’ life activities and station in society provide the 
best position for them to acquire necessary skills, habits, and 
judgment for the perpetuation of order and promotion of the 
quality of social life in society:  
These form the most numerous Rank of Men, that can be 
suppos’d susceptible of Philosophy; and therefore, all 
Discourses of Morality ought principally to be adress’d 
to them. The Great are too much immers’d in Pleasure; 
and the Poor too much occupy’d in providing for the 
Necessities of Life, to hearken to the calm Voice of 
Reason 
… The middle Station is here justly recommended, as 
affording the fullest Security for Virtue; and … it 
gives Opportunity for the most ample Exercise of it, and 
furnishes Employment for every good Quality, which we 
possibly be possest of … 
We may also remark of the middle Station of Life, 
that it is more favourable to the acquiring of Wisdom 
and Ability, as well as of Virtue, and that a Man so 
situated has a better Chance for attaining a Knowledge 
both of Men and Things, than those of a more elevated 
Station. He enters, with more Familiarity, into human 
Life: Every Thing appears in its natural Colours before 
him: He has more Leisure to form Observations; and has, 
beside, the Motive of Ambition to push him on in his 
Attainments; being certain, that he can never rise to 
any Distinction or Eminence in the World, without his 
own Industry … the middle Station shou’d be the most 
favourable to the improving our natural Abilities. (Es 
546-47)  
 
 
Thus, Hume thinks that “both individual and sociopolitical 
interests are best served when a large portion of the members of 
a society are also property holders” (Venning 146). 
Commerce awakens individuals’ creativity, improves their 
judgment, and satisfies their natural appetite for work: “The 
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 mind acquires new vigour; enlarges its powers and faculties; and 
by an assiduity in honest industry, both satisfies its natural 
appetites, and prevents the growth of unnatural ones, which 
commonly spring up, when nourished by ease and idleness” (Es 
270). Hume maintains that once individual mind is awakened, it 
leads to improvement in other areas:  
the minds of men, being once roused from their 
lethargy, and put into fermentation, turn themselves 
on all sides, and carry improvements into every art 
and science. Profound ignorance is totally banished, 
and men enjoy the privilege of rational creatures, to 
think as well as to act, to cultivate the pleasures of 
the mind as well as those of body. (Es 271) 
 
Industry and commerce, thus, lead to improvement in arts and 
sciences as well as individual rationality. Improvement of 
individual rationality is a product of its application to 
commercial activities and arts and sciences. The improvement of 
judgment, argues Hume, is closely linked to social order: “Laws, 
order, police, discipline; these can never be carried to any 
degree of perfection, before human reason has refined itself by 
exercise, and by an application to the more vulgar arts, at 
least, of commerce and manufacture” (Es 279).  
Livingston argues that Humean rationality in civilized 
society refers to the increase of “critical self-consciousness” 
of persons. Hume’s notion of the philosopher who has the 
appropriate perspective to see both “men and the things in their 
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 true colours” is, in a sense, democratized and made an attribute 
of ordinary, or rather of middle-class, persons by the rise of 
“critical self-consciousness”:  
Civilization, then, is a process whereby by the 
conventions of common life are raised to the level of 
critical self-consciousness. The difference between the 
barbarous man and the civilized man is not marked by a 
difference in political regimes, for any regime may be 
barbarous. The difference is a cognitive one. The 
barbarous man is lost in the conventions of common life; 
the civilized man has some critical understanding of 
them. The self-knowledge of the civilized man is 
identical to that of the philosopher since Hume holds 
that: ‘philosophical decisions are nothing but the 
reflections of common life, methodized and corrected’. 
Philosophical understanding, for Hume, is a social act. 
The more civilized a people become, the more 
philosophical they become. (128) 
 
Mechanical arts and commercial activities lead to 
improvement in more sophisticated and refined activities such as 
“the liberal” arts. This process of improvement starts in ruder 
activities and moves to more refined ones, whether intellectual, 
mechanical, and commercial activities or interpersonal 
relations. Hume believes that “Commercial life wrenches us out 
of what Marx unkindly calls ‘rural idiocy’ and habituates us to 
an enlarged, unbiased point of view” (Schuler and Murray 594). 
For Hume, material abundance is prerequisite to “intellectual 
and cultural refinements which distinguish a people of advanced 
civilization from those of more barbaric times and 
circumstances” (Venning 142). 
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 Other advantages commerce creates are increase of 
“sociability”, softening of tempers, refinement of interpersonal 
relations, and the rise of the modern commercial city. 
The more these refined arts advance, the more sociable 
men become; nor is it possible, that, when enriched with 
science, and possessed of a fund of conversation, they 
should be contented to remain in solitude, or live with 
their fellow-citizens in that distant manner, which is 
peculiar to ignorant and barbarous nations. They flock 
into cities; love to receive and communicate knowledge; 
to show their wit or their breeding; their taste in 
conversation or living, in clothes and furniture. 
Curiosity allures the wise; vanity the foolish; and 
pleasure both. Particular clubs and societies are 
everywhere formed: Both sexes meet in an easy and 
sociable manner: and the tempers of men, as well as 
their behavior, refine apace. So that, beside the 
improvements which they receive from knowledge and the 
liberal arts, it is impossible but they must feel an 
encrease of humanity, from the very habit of conversing 
together, and contributing to each other’s pleasure and 
entertainment. Thus industry, knowledge, and humanity, 
are linked together by an indissoluble chain, and are 
found, from experience as well as reason, to be peculiar 
to the more polished, and, what are commonly 
denominated, the more luxurious ages. (Es 271) 
 
According to Hume, activities associated with commerce have 
a transformative impact on individuals in many respects: 
Sociability develops, individual temper softens, fellow-feeling 
or sense of humanity increases, and individual rationality 
improves. In other words, individuals come to acquire certain 
qualities in a way that they are in a better condition both 
psychologically and rationally to live in peace and order with 
each others.  
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 The modern commercial city arises as the site of civilized 
life as a result of the process ushered in by the rise of 
commerce and activities associated with commerce. The modern 
commercial city is the medium in which the middle-class appears 
and most of the population is above and beyond bare minimum 
living conditions. The middle-class rises as the backbone of 
every sort of creativity and productivity from economic to 
intellectual activities; individuals’ taste for both material 
and literary goods as well as for philosophical understanding 
has improved; the place of rationality is larger now in 
individuals’ lives compared to earlier stages, especially to the 
savage condition; and also individuals sociability as well as 
moral sense or humanity increases. The city represents the ideal 
place for Hume’s civilized agent. As Robertson succinctly puts 
it “as wealth increases and extends through society, so, Hume 
suggested, more and more of its members would tend to acquire 
the material independence and moral attributes that, in civic 
terms, equip men to be citizens” (454).  
Although the initial factor that unleashes the development 
of civilized life is the love of gain or avidity which is self-
interested and directed to the betterment of one’s own economic 
conditions, the end result, civilized life, has created an agent 
whose judgment and taste are improved and refined and whose 
sense of humanity and sociability are increased. Improvement of 
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 judgment, rationality, refinement of taste, and increase of 
humanity or moral feeling and sociability, coupled with a more 
convenient and equal socio-economic situation, create a new 
structural environment for individuals in their relation with 
each other in society:  
When the tempers of men are softened as well as their 
knowledge improved, this humanity appears still more 
conspicuous, and is the chief characteristics which 
distinguishes a civilized age from times of barbarity 
and ignorance. Factions are then less inveterate, 
revolutions less tragical, authority less severe, and 
seditions less frequent. (Es 274) 
 
Hume maintains that the civilized society is in a better 
position to check the avidity of man which is the origin of the 
rules of justice as well as the driving force of development 
that ushered in the development of civilization: “Nor can any 
thing restrain or regulate the love of money, but a sense of 
honour, and virtue; which, if it be not nearly equal at all 
times, will naturally abound most in ages of knowledge and 
refinement” (Es 276). 
The improvement of morality means, for Hume, the formation 
of certain virtues in individuals or a virtuous body of 
citizenry. Hume advocates a set of virtues that he thinks would 
develop as a result of this moral improvement. I present and 
analyze the Humean catalog of virtues in the next section. 
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 3.5 HUMEAN VIRTUES 
 
The subject of moral sense and judgment, argues Hume, is human 
character or quality of mind:  
If any action be either virtuous or vicious, ‘tis only 
as a sign of some quality or character. It must depend 
upon durable principles of the mind, which extend over 
the whole conduct, and enter into the personal 
character. Actions themselves, not proceeding from any 
constant principle … are never consider’d in 
morality.(T 367) 
 
Thus, Hume’s moral theory takes individual personality or 
character as its subject.  
In Hume, individuals have certain durable qualities which 
form their personality and determine their conduct in private 
and public life. For example, generosity as a quality makes one 
generous or industriousness makes one industrious. One’s 
personality is composed of a set of many such qualities; one 
might be both lazy and smart or industrious and miserly. How one 
behaves depends on his qualities.  A public spirited 
individual’s approach to public issues would be different than 
that of selfish individuals.  
According to Hume, a character or quality becomes a part of 
one’s personality if it creates a disposition in that person. 
And this disposition or durable quality determines his conduct 
in society. According to McIntyre “the concept of character is 
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 central to Hume’s moral philosophy”. It makes “some actions more 
probable” and serves “as the basis of our moral evaluations” 
(450). In Hume’s usage every individual has a personality 
composed of his dispositions or durable qualities. Hume 
classifies such qualities as either virtuous or vicious. For 
example laziness is a vicious quality and moderation is a 
virtuous one. Whether an individual is a virtuous person thus 
depends on whether he has virtuous qualities as dispositions. 
One might perform a virtuous act without having that quality as 
a disposition in his personality: For example, compliance with 
the rules of justice is a virtuous act in Hume. Yet one can 
comply with the rules out of fear of legal punishment. This 
compliance is not a product of his disposition as a judicious 
person. “If any action be virtuous or vicious, ‘tis only as a 
sign of some quality or character. It must depend upon durable 
principles of the mind, which extend over the whole conduct, and 
enter into personal character” (T 367). These qualities acquire 
the status of virtues or our approbation because of their 
tendency to the good of mankind (T 369).  
How do such qualities become dispositions in individuals?  
Some qualities become durable principles or dispositions as a 
result of repetition, conscious choice, training, and education 
such as industriousness, moderation, and cleanliness. Some other 
qualities are natural to individuals such as parental affection 
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 towards offspring, benevolence to our family and friends, and 
wit and intellectual capability. Individuals receive training 
and education in the family, school, and society that teach or 
imply how to behave in social life. This training and education 
is not limited to formal schooling; it involves every practice 
and learning that leads to the acquisition of such qualities. 
Repetition of qualities, in time, turns them into dispositions 
(Flage 374). For example, by repetition we can become an 
industrious person; industriousness becomes a disposition in our 
personality. Indeed, the socialization process is a process of 
disposition forming in individuals. We come to have certain 
dispositions via our familial training and education.  Some 
other qualities are acquired more consciously; we deliberately 
choose to have moderation in our judgment and conduct due to 
personal experience. The same quality could be acquired 
unconsciously because of familial training. Natural qualities 
such as parental affection and benevolence to our friends are 
instinctual. These learned and natural qualities together form 
our personality. In this sense, personality formation is 
inevitable for every individual: every individual that lives in 
a society comes to have a personality.  
 In the Treatise Hume divides virtues into artificial and 
natural virtues. Artificial virtue develops as a result of 
social experience and observation; it is not an instinctive 
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 quality of human nature such as compliance with the rules of 
justice. Natural virtue refers to those qualities that we 
approve instinctively such as benevolence (T 369). In the second 
Enquiry he divides virtues into four groups: Virtues useful to 
oneself, virtues agreeable to oneself, virtues useful to others, 
and virtues agreeable to others. Usefulness refers to the 
utility it creates and agreeableness refers to its pleasing 
quality without utility or material benefit either to oneself or 
others. Virtuous qualities are those “advance a man’s fortune in 
the world [useful to oneself], render him a valuable member of 
society [useful to others], qualify him for the entertainment of 
company [agreeable to others], and increase his power of self-
enjoyment [agreeable to himself]” (En 108). Hume argues that 
“Personal Merit consists of altogether in the possession of 
mental qualities, useful or agreeable to the person himself or 
to others” (En 108). 
 Whether a quality is virtuous or vicious is determined by 
the impartial observer’s feelings about its impact on relevant 
persons. In other words, whether a quality is vicious or 
virtuous is not determined by the person who has that specific 
quality. For example, a free-rider can see cheating as useful 
and agreeable for him, for it advances his interest. Yet, if an 
impartial observer feels uneasiness because of the conduct of a 
free-rider due to its harmful impacts on the interest of those 
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 to whom injustice is done, it is a vice. “Virtues are 
‘character’ or character traits that are welcomed from the 
special point of view that we take when we make moral judgments” 
(Baier 193).  
Qualities useful to oneself are those that “advance a man’s 
fortune in the world”; that is, “their merit consists in their 
tendency to serve the person, possessed of them, without any 
magnificent claim to public and social desert” (En 78-9). Hume 
mentions following qualities as useful to oneself: discretion, 
honesty, fidelity, truth, caution, enterprise, industry, 
assiduity, frugality, economy, good sense, prudence, 
discernment, temperance, sobriety, patience, constancy, 
perseverance, forethought, considerateness, secrecy, order, 
insuniation, address, presence of mind, quickness of conception, 
and facility of expression. These and “a thousand more of the 
same kind…tend only to the utility of their possessor, without 
any reference to us, or to the community” (En 78-9). These 
qualities are necessary for success and happiness in private 
life. Absence of them would make one incapacitated for “business 
and action” and lead to “continues error and misconduct in 
life!” (En 76).  
 Hume defines qualities agreeable to oneself as follows 
“there is another set of mental qualities, which, without any 
utility or any tendency to further good, either of the community 
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 or of the possessor, diffuse a satisfaction on the beholders, 
and procure friendship and regard” (En 86-7). These qualities 
are greatness of mind or dignity of character, or a certain 
degree of generous pride or self-value, courage, philosophical 
tranquility, humanity, and clemency (En 90, 92).  
 Qualities useful to others are those virtues that provide 
benefit to others such as generosity and benevolence.  
 Qualities agreeable to others are the rules of good manners 
and politeness among individuals. They “render a man perfect 
good company” such as wit, ingenuity, cleanliness, modesty, 
decency, a proper regard to age, sex, and character, and station 
in the world. They regulate and soften or refine interpersonal 
relations by primarily checking one’s pride. They are qualities 
of well-bred people according to Hume (En 99).  
 Moderation is the underlying theme of Hume’s virtues as 
well as a virtue itself. Besides these qualities, he argues, one 
should not be “swayed by temper of any kind” (En 72). For 
example “a reasonable frugality” is a virtue, which prevents 
both avarice and prodigality. Or one should be both cautious and 
enterprising; excessive caution might kill enterprise or 
enterprise without caution would lead to disaster. Both would be 
vice rather than virtue. Thus a proper balance among virtuous 
qualities is virtue itself. (En 74). As Baier puts it, in 
Hume’s notion of virtue,  
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 Human happiness is the touchstone … Consistently with 
this test, he includes in his catalogue of virtues all 
and only the qualities of head, heart, and expressive 
body that he believes we will agree do make a person a 
welcome fellow, whether in ‘that narrow circle, in 
which any person moves’ or in the ‘greater society or 
confederacy of mankind’. (Baier 219) 
  
Hume compares his catalog of virtues with Christian virtues and 
the classical-republican or military virtues to show that his 
catalog is more humane and fitted to the newly emerging 
commercial society. He argues that the Christian virtues serve 
no purpose or incapacitate man in the world. On the other hand, 
military virtues are violent and somewhat contrary to human 
nature (T 382-83). Humean virtues are designed for ordinary man 
in his daily life. They promote individual happiness and comfort 
or a commodious and cultivated life in this world rather than a 
pious life or heroism. A due pride rather than humility or 
business and enterprise rather than martial virtues are 
necessary for the ordinary citizen to have a commodious and 
cultivated as well as humane and socialized life. According to 
Solomon, Hume’s virtues are “domesticated and democratized”, fit 
for ordinary persons in their daily life and they are “within 
reach of ordinary persons” (130-36) rather than the privilege of 
the few. 
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 3.6 HUMAN NATURE 
 
Hume’s moral theory is underlined by a developmental notion of 
human nature on which the development of a virtuous body of 
citizenry depends.  
According to Miller, Hume discards two rival concepts of 
human nature: Hobbes’ selfish human nature and the classical 
republican public-spirited human nature. Against these, Hume 
endorses a concept of human nature based on both self-interest 
and a moral sense. He rejects both “egoism as a hypothesis” and 
“pure altruism” about human motivations (Miller 106).  
In “Of Self-love”, Hume criticizes the selfish hypothesis 
which assumes that  
… whatever affection one may feel, or imagine he feels 
for others, no passion is, or can be disinterested; that 
the most generous friendship, however sincere, is a 
modification of self-love; and that, even unknown to 
ourselves, we seek only our own gratification, while we 
appear the most deeply engaged in schemes for the 
liberty and happiness of mankind. (En 138) 
 
Hume asserts that this hypothesis denies any disinterested or 
benevolent conduct either toward our closest friends or other 
people. He argues that this hypothesis is contrary to our 
observation and common feeling in our daily life: “To the most 
careless observer there appear to be such dispositions as 
benevolence and generosity; such affections as love, friendship, 
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 compassion, gratitude” (En 140). He maintains that some other 
regarding passions can even override self-interest. “What 
interest can a fond mother have in view, who loses her health by 
assiduous attendance on her sick child, and afterwards 
languishes and dies of grief, when freed, by its death, from the 
slavery of the attendance?”  Hume believes that “these and a 
thousand other instances are marks of a general benevolence in 
human nature, where no real interest binds us to the object” (En 
143). According to Hume, in spite of endorsing the selfish 
hypothesis, Hobbes and Locke both “lived irreproachable lives” 
(En 138).  
He maintains that the reason for endorsing the selfish 
hypothesis is “love of simplicity which has been the source of 
much false reasoning in philosophy” (En 141)11. Contrary to this 
reductionist hypothesis, Hume offers to observe human conduct in 
actual life to determine the basic qualities of human nature.  
… his view of human nature is empirical. Hume rejected 
the view that human beings had an essence, function, or 
purpose that could serve to define human excellence or 
virtue. But although there is no essence of human 
nature, there is human nature – regularities revealed 
through careful observation. It is history, not reason 
that reveals regularities of human nature in society. 
(McIntyre 458) 
 
                                                 
11 According to Monroe, rational choice view of agent limits “our conceptualization of the human potential” in terms 
of altruistic conduct. He claims that many people had rescued Jews during the World War II, which endangered their 
own lives (9). 
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 On the other hand, Hume also denies that individuals are 
capable, in a normal environment, of perfection in public-
spiritedness. Although human nature contains benevolent and 
disinterested motives, these motives are limited in determining 
human conduct.  
He sees each man as standing at the center of a web of 
social relationships, made up of family, friends, 
acquaintances, dependents, etc. and as proportioning his 
generosity to the strength of each tie … being thus 
acquainted with the nature of man, we expect not any 
impossibilities from him (Miller 106) 
 
Thus, Hume sees human nature as more complex than either the 
selfish or altruistic hypotheses assume. Neither of these 
approaches captures the complexity of human nature: One denies 
the generosity of human nature, while the other denigrates 
selfish sides.  
Besides seeing both self-interest and other-regarding as 
features of human nature, Hume also sees human nature as capable 
of improvement. According to Cohen, “the capacity of 
transcending one’s nature is indeed a part of human nature. The 
artifice does not create a new principle; it permits natural 
sympathy and passions to be realized, spread out, and liberated 
from primitive limits” (115). Hume’s account of the convention’s 
transformative impact as well as the development of civilization 
reveals that his notion of human nature is not a static one. 
Rather, depending on the current environment and the level of 
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 development human nature has been transformed. The direction of 
this transformation is from original-primitive principles to 
cultivated-civilized principles:  
 
In the sphere of civil relations, the room for change 
is great. As a person becomes civilized, his or her 
taste (or judgment) as to what is good or bad act in 
civil relations will improve” and “the historical 
context and the level of civilization reached by a 
society will condition the quality of people’s 
morality.(Cohen 120) 
 
Similarly, Gill compares Hume’s notion of human nature with 
the selfish theories of Hobbes and Mandeville. According to 
Gill, selfish theories are underlined by “a static or 
originalist view of human nature”, whereas Hume’s notion is “a 
dynamic or progressive one”.  The former assumes that “the basic 
elements of human motivation are fixed. Experience and 
socialization can alter the focus or direction of the original 
human motives, but they cannot create a new kind of motive 
altogether. The ultimate driving motive forces of human conduct 
stay the same” (Gill, 99). On the other hand, the progressive 
view allows that “original motives can evolve into other motives 
of different kinds. Hume believes we can develop new motives, 
ones that were not part of our original endowment” (Gill, 100) 
such as our moral commitment to the rules of justice which 
develops after establishment of the convention and has nothing 
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 to do with the origin of the convention. The motive that creates 
the convention is self-interest, but our regard to the 
convention is product of the practice of the convention and 
further development of our moral sense. Thus, as Ponko puts it, 
Hume believes “man’s ability to develop a sense of societal and 
public interest” (52). 
In civilized society, the primary qualities of Hume’s moral 
agent are enlightened self-interest, impartial moral sense, 
sympathy, improved judgment, refined taste and emotions, 
sociability, and a civilized culture. Self- interest is neither 
ignored nor sacrificed in that moral agent. Hume starts with an 
uncultivated human nature and reaches a cultivated or civilized 
human nature. Once these qualities develop they are as decisive 
as self-interest in individual conduct. And they cannot be 
ignored in theorizing about individual conduct in society.  
In institutional design, human nature is a static concept 
defined essentially as self-interested both in the pre-just 
state and the civilized stage. There is not any essential 
difference in human nature between these two qualitatively 
different situations. The crucial factor is to change the 
structural environment of individuals to change their behavior. 
As a result, institutional design ignores the possibility of 
improvement of individual morality. For Hume, this assumption is 
too simple to capture the complexity of motives in individual 
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 conduct. This static concept limits our theorizing about 
individual conduct. As we will see in his response to the free-
rider problem, Hume relies on his developmental notion of human 
nature.  
 
 
 
3.7 INDIVIDUAL PREFERENCE AND MORAL DEVELOPMENT 
 
The development of human nature has a significant impact on our 
preferences. As human nature develops, individual preference 
also develops; a shift of focus from material interest to non-
material interest is evident in Hume’s theory. In the savage 
condition, primarily material interest determines individual 
conduct in its relation to strangers. Individuals fight over 
scarce resources. The enlargement of the mind and the 
improvement of morality in parallel with the rise of a civilized 
society bring qualitative change in the individual’s 
understanding of his interests; emphasis is on more and more 
non-material gains and practices such as conversation with 
friends, reading, maintaining and improving one’s integrity, and 
even the pleasure of sight-seeing. As Hursthouse puts it, Hume 
believes that “we human beings can develop, through education 
and reflection, a second nature such that we take particular 
pleasure and pride in certain things, and come to regard certain 
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 things worth pursuing and having, which relate to our fellow 
human beings as much as to our individual selves- a point that 
Hume shows every sign of endorsing” (70). Yet these moral agents 
do not choose poverty. Rather, the change in their preference 
relies on the rise of prosperity in society as its material 
condition. Individuals must be able to meet their basic material 
needs relatively easily. And beyond that they must reach a 
convenient level of living conditions. Some sort of economic 
security and abundance are necessary for this change in persons’ 
preferences.  
The institutional interpretation assumes that material 
interest would be, in general, the primary object of individual 
preference. Social and economic development does not lead to any 
essential difference in human nature and conduct. As we will see 
in the next section, when Hume responds to the sensible knave, 
he appeals to certain goods that are non-material, which relies 
on his developmental concept of human nature and the improvement 
of individual preferences.  
 
 
 
3.8  MORAL THEORY AND COLLECTIVE ACTION 
 
As we saw above, the process of the improvement of morality 
refers to the process of the development of moral motives in 
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 self-interested agents. Hume assumes that both the efficiency of 
social cooperation and the quality of social life depend on this 
development. As we will see in this section, Hume thinks that 
even enlightened interest would not provide an adequate answer 
for the free-rider problem. That’s why his final response is to 
endorse moral improvement to overcome this problem. Some 
scholars argue that Hume’s moral theory cannot provide an 
adequate response to the free-rider problem. In other words, 
enlightened self-interest would discard Humean morality in the 
case of a conflict between self-interest and public good and 
choose to defect.  
In this section, I criticize this argument by claiming that 
Hume’s response to the free-rider provides a solution similar to 
Putnam’s social capital in the sense that given that self-
interested agents are transformed into better citizens, they 
choose not to defect when their self-interest and public good 
conflict. On the other hand, if individuals are not transformed, 
they would choose to defect in case of such a conflict between 
self-interest and public good. These two different groups 
resemble Putnam’s civic and uncivic communities in the sense 
that the decisive factor is whether individuals are transformed 
into better citizens. I take Hume’s sensible knave as 
representing those who are not transformed into better citizens, 
whose primary motive is narrow self-interest.  
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 Hume describes “the sensible knave problem” as follows: 
Treating vice with the greatest candour, and making it 
all possible concessions, we must acknowledge that 
there is not, in any instance, the smallest pretext for 
giving it the preference above virtue, with a view to 
self-interest; except, perhaps, in the case of justice, 
where a man, taking things in a certain light, may 
often seem to be a loser by his integrity. And though 
it is allowed that, without a regard to property, no 
society could subsist; yet according to the imperfect 
way in which human affairs are conducted, a sensible 
knave, in particular instances, may think that an act 
of iniquity or infidelity will make a considerable 
addition to his fortune, without causing any 
considerable breach in the social union and 
confederacy. The honesty is the best policy, may be a 
good general rule, but is liable to many exceptions; 
and he, it may perhaps be thought, conducts himself 
with most wisdom, who observes the general rule, and 
takes advantage of all exceptions. (En 122) 
 
The sensible knave problem refers to the individual who takes 
advantage of opportunities to defect, given that he can get away 
with his defection, although in other instances he complies with 
the rules of society. The significant factor in the sensible 
knave problem is that he has no genuine moral concern about his 
conduct; rather his only concern is whether he can avoid 
punishment and sanction when he cheats. In that respect the 
sensible knave represents the logic of collective action. He 
would cheat if he can get away with it. His only motive is self-
interest.  
From the standpoint of rational choice theory, the sensible 
knave is not naturally an evil or bad individual. He represents 
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 every single member of society, for it is assumed that all 
agents are self-interested by nature. Thus, we face a 
significant problem which could lead to endemic defection in 
especially prosperous large modern societies. Hume recognizes 
that both the size and the material conditions of a large 
commercial society provide ample opportunity for the sensible 
knave.  
Hume confesses that even after improvement on every front, 
if one chooses to be a sensible knave there would not be a 
satisfactory answer for that individual:  
I must confess that, if a man think that this reasoning 
much requires an answer, it would be a little difficult 
to find any which will to him appear satisfactory and 
convincing. If his heart rebel not against such 
pernicious maxims, if he feel no reluctance to the 
thoughts of villainy or baseness, he has indeed lost a 
considerable motive to virtue; and we may expect that 
this practice will be answerable to his speculation. (En 
123) 
 
Yet, legal punishment still is a possibility for the 
sensible knave and Hume argues that when he is caught, he would 
lose his reputation and be excluded from future cooperation.  
While they purpose to cheat with moderation and 
secrecy, a tempting incident occurs, nature is frail, 
and they give into snare; whence they can never 
extricate themselves, without a total loss of 
reputation, and the forfeiture of all future trust and 
confidence with mankind. (En 123) 
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 However, Hume also presents another sanction which is 
indeed denied by the sensible knave: 
 But in all ingenuous natures, the antipathy to 
treachery and roguery is too strong to be 
counterbalanced by any views of profit or pecuniary 
advantage. Inward peace of mind, consciousness of 
integrity, a satisfactory review of our own conduct; 
these are circumstances, very requisite to happiness, 
and will be cherished and cultivated by every honest 
man, who feels the importance of them. (En 123) 
 
And Hume’s conviction is that 
But were they ever so secret and successful, the honest 
man, if he has any tincture of philosophy, or even 
common observation and reflection, will discover that 
they themselves are, in the end, the greatest dupes, and 
have sacrificed the invaluable enjoyment of a character, 
with themselves at least, for the acquisition of 
worthless toys and gewgaws. How little is requisite to 
supply the necessities of nature? And in a view to 
pleasure, what comparison between the unbought 
satisfaction of conversation, society, study, even 
health and the common beauties of nature, but above all 
the peaceful reflection on one’s own conduct; what 
comparison, I say, between these and the feverish, empty 
amusements of luxury and expense? These natural 
pleasures, indeed are really without price; both because 
they are below all prices in their attainment, and above 
in their enjoyment. (En 124) 
 
Thus, Hume’s ultimate response to the sensible knave, as 
Gauthier argues, is to appeal to “the heart”. According to 
Gauthier, Hume’s politics lacks any moral foundation. Gauthier 
argues that Hume presents two different answers to the sensible 
knave problem. In the Treatise, Hume relies on enlightened self-
interest which requires the individual to comply with his long 
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 term interest. And even “as society increases, our short-
sightedness leads us not to see the interest we have in 
maintaining social order, but that the real interest remains” 
(417). In the second Enquiry, on the other hand, maintains 
Gauthier, “Hume does not accuse the sensible knave of mistaking 
his interest. He confesses that” his answer based on enlightened 
self-interest is not satisfactory for the sensible knave and 
“appeals to the heart, to the ‘consciousness of integrity … 
cherished and cultivated by every honest man’” (417). Therefore, 
“the sensible knave’s message is that human society … lacks any 
moral foundation” (422). 
R. G. Frey also presents a similar objection to Hume’s 
solution to the sensible knave problem. Hume thinks that the 
sensible knave loses “a good deal to obtain very little” (284). 
Hume appeals to integrity of character and turns away from 
interest to convince the sensible knave in the Enquiry. Yet, 
“for the present appeal to work, Hume must make realistic the 
losses he envisages. After all, we all know people who break 
their promises or lie, yet have neither incurred nor produced 
anything like the losses Hume cites” (Frey 284). Therefore, 
“unless it is true that our own advantage or happiness coincides 
with the advantage or happiness of others, we certainly have a 
motive to behave as a sensible knave would (Frey 286). According 
to Frey, the sensible knave is not “a special breed of man”, 
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 rather he is someone who finds himself in a situation in which 
his desire for his own interest conflicts with the interest of 
others. “And what is true of him is true of each of us” (284).  
Both Gauthier and Frey consider Hume’s appeal to a non-
material concept of integrity as a failure. The individual is a 
self-interested agent and in case of conflict between his 
interest and social order, he chooses his interest. In other 
words, the notion of self-interested human nature leaves no room 
for Humean moral language in such a conflict. Gauthier and 
Frey’s critiques deny that moral improvement is a realistic 
assumption about individual conduct. Yet, Hume’s response 
depends on the possibility of this moral improvement. Gauthier 
and Frey simply assume that we must take individuals as selfish 
agents. This assumption represents, in Hume’s terms, “love of 
simplicity” which, according to him, is a source of many 
philosophical errors. This assumption leads Gauthier and Frey 
necessarily to reach an unwarranted general conclusion about 
individual conduct. They think this assumption represents every 
individual’s conduct. Yet as we will see below, Hume discards 
this generalization about individual conduct. Rather, he thinks 
that even though individuals are self-interested by nature, they 
also are capable of developing a moral sense. The decisive 
factor, for Hume, then is not that individuals are self-
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 interested by nature but whether such self-interested agents can 
improve morally. As Stilz asserts  
self-interest is the driving force behind civilization 
and progress in Hume’s account. But such civilization 
could not exist for long if naked self-interest was 
allowed and acknowledged as its sole foundation, 
because there would be no obligation to abide by the 
rules of this wider society as soon as they are at 
odds with individual self-interest or the interest of 
our smaller group. (25) 
 
As Whelan argues, Hume’s final response to the free-rider 
problem depends on the moral education of citizens. According to 
Whelan, Hume’s theory of justice fails precisely because of the 
human nature that underlies it and leads to its growth: “The 
thesis of self-interest seems to fail in the first place, then, 
on a psychological ground internal to Hume’s science of nature. 
Reason, or simply the ability to engage systematically in Hume’s 
restricted conception of correct reasoning, is not counted on” 
(264).  Therefore, “a theory of moral education, it emerges, is 
essential to Hume’s doctrine of the artificial virtues and thus 
to his understanding of political life, although he does not 
develop such a theory quite as fully as he does the alternative 
doctrines of sympathy and self-interest” (Whelan 275). 
Hume’s notion of the development of moral sentiment from a 
primitive or uncultivated natural moral sentiment to an 
impartial and cultivated one refers to the moral education of 
people. This process, indeed, happens at two different levels: 
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 Social-historical and personal-individual. Hume’s account of 
moral progress in his works is primarily about the social-
historical level which refers to the transformation of society 
from the primitive stage to the civilized stage. The personal-
individual level refers to the moral education of individuals 
from childhood in a family to a moral being in social life. This 
second level, indeed, reveals the necessity of moral education 
of every single individual to achieve the moral perspective. The 
first level provides the environment in which the second process 
becomes a possibility for every individual. These two processes 
form the ground on which Hume envisions his catalog of virtues, 
impartial moral perspective as well as his moral agent. He 
believes that in spite of his optimism, degeneration of people 
also is a possibility. In other words, “training of this nature 
is essential to insure the continuation of the practice of 
justice” (Ponko 55). Family, schools, and politicians should 
educate people. Every child in a sense lives the process at the 
private level that human society historically has lived. And 
whether one chooses to be a free-rider or not depends on this 
education and training. Also, this moral education would 
determine whether Hume’s appeal to moral sense would work in 
society against the sensible knave problem. 
 Hume’s response to the sensible knave contains very 
significant normative assertions. Before presenting them, we 
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 should notice that the sensible knave’s notion of interest is 
essentially material. He seeks “luxury and expense” at the cost 
of his integrity. I think Hume’s assertion about the sensible 
knave’s notion of interest as essentially material captures the 
general notion of interest that game theory or institutional 
design holds about the individual. Hume presents almost 
exclusively non-material activities as higher or nobler or more 
humane interests one should pursue. These are “inward peace of 
mind, consciousness of integrity, the invaluable enjoyment of a 
character, conversation, society, study, even health and the 
common beauties of nature, but above all the peaceful reflection 
on one’s own conduct” (En 124). In Hume’s understanding these 
are goods and needs a civilized man should pursue in order to 
acquire them. Moreover they are more valuable than material 
goods. According to Miller, Hume “is more impressed by the 
political, social and intellectual results of commercial 
progress than by its material results” (180). Miller maintains 
that Hume does not regard “infinite desire as either rational or 
morally permissible” (174). And society, for Hume, is not “a 
series of market relations” (Miller 176). Although he recognizes 
“the desire for wealth and consumer goods” as a significant 
motive of human nature, he does not consider it “an ultimate 
desire” (Miller 170). He “clearly believes that the desire for 
society is intrinsic and omnipresent” (Miller 171). He expects 
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 individuals to see society as more than an instrument or market 
place for their material gains and appeal to more and more non-
material goods, such as refinement of their literary, 
intellectual, and moral taste. 
In other words, Hume assumes that some sort of hierarchy of 
goods and interests can be constructed. In this classification 
of goods, he relies on the improvement of human nature in 
general as he presents its development in parallel with the 
development of society. At the savage stage, individuals’ 
concerns are limited almost exclusively to providing bare 
minimum living conditions. Yet in civilized society, individual 
rationality, moral sense, and taste improve. Besides improvement 
of his faculties, the wealth created by commerce provides a more 
commodious living condition for the individual. Thus, the 
individual in such an intellectual, moral, and material 
condition, Hume assumes, would choose higher goods. Those higher 
goods reflect the needs for the nobler and more humane aspects 
of human nature.  
Theoretically, it is possible to argue that the sensible 
knave is a typical of every member of society. Given that it is 
rational to defect for self-interested calculating agents, we 
expect them to defect when they have the opportunity. Yet Hume 
tends to think that the sensible knave is not typical of every 
member of society. Rather, the sensible knave is someone whose 
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 moral sense is not improved as assumed by Hume. He is untouched 
by the improvements made possible by the development of 
civilization; he is still primarily interested in material 
gains. In his response to the sensible knave Hume appeals to 
aspirations of civilized-moral agents whose motive is different 
than that of the sensible knave.  
The consumption of these non-material goods by an 
individual depends on their consumption by more and more 
individuals. In other words, the more individuals who value 
these goods, the more these goods would be available. These 
goods are not scarce in nature, unlike material goods, and 
consumption of them by one does not exclude others. The more 
they are consumed, the more they are available. For example, 
conversation or our concern for our integrity does not require 
others to have less of either. On the contrary, if more and more 
individuals are concerned with their character and integrity, a 
more appropriate moral environment will be created for 
individuals to obtain these goods. In other words, the 
underlying logic of this conduct is the same as the underlying 
logic of legal trust: the more selfish agents cooperate, the 
more strategic trust they have among themselves. In regard to 
non-material goods, the more people pursue them, the more moral 
trust among such individuals would appear. Yet, there is also a 
significant difference between legal trust and moral trust: In 
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 the former, defection leads to defection. In the latter, 
defection of one agent would cause a different reaction in other 
agents given that they care about their integrity. They would 
think that those who defect indeed cheat themselves. As Martin 
puts it, “those who are secure in their sense of self-worth do 
not need constant reassurance of it from others” (386). 
The institutional solution (legal trust) and the moral 
solution (moral trust) both face the very same problem. Legal 
punishment would not detect every single defection in society, 
yet social order would be maintained if there are enough people 
who comply with the rules (Whelan 266). Similarly, moral trust 
would persist in society if enough people care about their 
character.  
According to Baier, Hume’s response to the sensible knave 
in the second Enquiry is “a perfectly satisfactory reply”, yet 
not for the sensible knave but for “the virtuous dues-paying 
member of the party of humankind’ ” (430). There are two 
different perspectives from which we could evaluate the sensible 
knave problem: the sensible knave’s perspective which values 
“material gains” over integrity of character and “the sensible 
non-knave” perspective which “dismisses the material rewards of 
judicious injustice as ‘worthless toys and gewgaws’”.  In other 
words, “there is not Archimedean ‘rational point of view’ from 
which judgment could be made between the knave’s version and the 
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 non-knave’s version of self-interest. So Hume’s reply [in the 
Enquiry] to the sensible knave is exactly what it should be” 
(Baier 431). 
 
 
 
3.9 HUME’S MORAL THEORY AND SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
As we have seen in chapter two, Putnam’s social capital leads to 
the development of a particular form of individual conduct which 
violates the logic of collective action. Indeed, the development 
of this conduct is the aim of social capital theory. Otherwise 
we are left with self-interest which, whether enlightened or 
instinctive, cannot be the source of efficient social 
cooperation in a large modern society. In this section, I argue 
that the thrust of Hume’s moral theory is the development of a 
cooperative tendency in individuals. Hume, as we have seen 
earlier, recognizes that enlightened interest cannot be the 
source of efficient cooperation in society. And the final 
response to the free rider depends on the transformation of 
individuals into better citizens. Otherwise we would have an 
“uncivic community” in Putnam’s terms.  
As we have seen before, Putnam’s social capital relies on 
social connectedness at its most basic level. For Hume, also, 
social connectedness is an intrinsic value for humans. He argues 
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 that “it is impossible but they must feel an encrease of 
humanity, from the very habit of conversing together, and 
contributing to each other’s pleasure and entertainment” (Es 
271). Thus, togetherness of individuals, for Hume, like Putnam, 
has a transformative impact on individuals. A feeling of 
humanity is the principle by which Hume, as we have seen, 
explains the initial development of morality in society.  
Also, Hume’s explanation of the development of general 
moral rules by using increasing sociability indicates that 
social connectedness or sociability leads to the development of 
generalized norms among individuals. He explains this 
development as follows: “the more we converse with mankind, and 
the greater social intercourse we maintain, the more we be 
familiarized to these general preferences and distinctions” (En 
63). “General preferences and distinctions” refers to the 
development of generalized reciprocity and norms; individuals 
extend the notion of just and unjust or virtue and vice to their 
own conduct as well as to others’ conduct.  
For Putnam, networks provide the medium in which 
individuals come together. Although Hume does not talk about 
associations, he talks about “clubs and societies” formed by 
people who “flock into cities” as a result of the development of 
commercial society. These “clubs and societies” provide the 
medium for individuals to come together. According to Hume, “the 
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 tempers of men, as well as their behavior, refine apace” (Es 
271) in these clubs and societies.  
Humean clubs and societies are not political; rather they 
are social and cultural. In order to have a transformative 
impact, associations do not have to be political as we saw in 
Putnam. Similarly, Hume’s associations perform the same function 
without being political.  
The transformation of selfish agents into better citizens 
does not require explicitly political virtues for Putnam. 
Rather, his virtues are essentially social ones. For Hume also, 
virtues or morals and manners are essentially social. Indeed, 
Hume was one of the theorists who advocate civility, politeness, 
sociability, refinement of taste and judgment, and improvement 
of morality against the political virtues of the classical 
republicans. The development of a virtuous body of citizenry 
does not require either political or military virtues.  
Humean virtues could be classified in terms of their 
relevance to public life. Qualities useful to oneself and 
qualities agreeable to oneself and others are essentially 
private qualities and do not have a direct impact on political 
life. They are not typically political virtues in the sense that 
they do not direct one’s political conduct. Rather, they promote 
one’s private interest and refine relations with others in the 
larger social life. On the other hand, qualities useful to 
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 others have a mixed character; some promote public order and are 
typically political, such as compliance with the rules of 
justice. Others, such as benevolence or generosity, are not 
necessarily political qualities though they promote others’ 
interest. The primary quality of Humean virtues is their social 
character.  
 However, these four categories of virtues, together, have 
another impact; they create a virtuous moral agent and this has 
significant implications for public life in general and 
political life in particular. In other words, the aim of Humean 
virtues is to form virtuous agent who has a different mode of 
thought and conduct in public life. Specifically, he has 
different concerns than that agent we see in institutional 
design. Theorizing with this moral agent about politics in 
particular and collective action in general would yield 
different results than theorizing with selfish agents. He would 
have different manners and reasoning as well as different 
priorities, incentives and preferences. The selfish agent would 
see social life as instrumental without any intrinsic value to 
his private interest. For the moral agent on the other hand, 
social life has an intrinsic value beyond its instrumental 
value. It certainly has an instrumental value that regulates and 
promotes the selfish side of an individual, yet beyond that 
society is the medium in which the individual realizes his 
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 higher or intimately humane nature. For example, society 
provides friendship, conversation, and learning. For Hume these 
represent the nobler sides of a human being. A fully developed 
human nature is what Hume’s moral theory advocates. Society is 
the medium in which the individual achieves happiness. 
Individual well-being includes material prosperity, yet it does 
not see seeking ever increasing amounts of material wealth as a 
part of well-being (Miller, 166). Hume does not require one to 
denounce material interest or wealth. Rather, he advocates the 
development or cultivation of human nature.  
 The significance of the moral agent, for Hume, is that he 
would not rely on legal force to perform his duty in society. 
Indeed, his understanding of a citizen’s duty is much broader 
than defined by institutional design. It involves manners and 
morals as one’s duty in addition to legal obligations. Moral 
concern would guide his conduct in both private and public life. 
Such agents would form a trust that would be moral in essence. 
Unlike strategic trust created by the state, moral trust does 
not require legal force. Every moral agent’s regard for his 
character would be his guide in his conduct. A moral agent’s 
regard for his character is inward-looking; it is not self-
interest-oriented. Rather one’s own judgment about him comes 
into play here. In institutional design, the reputation for 
trust would serve one’s interest even if one were indeed not 
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 honest at all, given that he has such a reputation. In Hume’s 
moral theory, one does not need judges external to him; he would 
be his own judge if he has such a regard for his character. It 
is not about acquiring a reputation for honesty, but being 
really honest. And such an agent cannot defect and consider 
himself honest.  
Hume’s catalog of virtues allows us to think that a 
virtuous society is an alternative to a simply institutionalist 
one. Indeed, Hume’s entire argument about the development of 
civilization is to explain “progress of the sentiments” (T 321). 
The “progress of the sentiments” is the story of an uncultivated 
selfish individual’s transformation into a moral agent, and 
Hume’s lesson is that civilized societies must be working with 
that moral agent, not with the one that leads to development of 
the rules of justice. Yet, the contemporary assumption widely 
held by rational choice theory does the opposite; it still sees 
agents as essentially amoral or selfish. Although this 
assumption is the safest assumption in dealing with the 
collective action problem, it ignores too much about human 
nature. The possibility of such moral improvement with its 
implication for social cooperation is significant.  Putnam’s 
idea of social capital can provide an outlet that allows us to 
go beyond that restricting assumption. Putnam observes that we 
do not find defection by individuals in common everyday life as 
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 often as game theory predicts. And he searches for the source of 
compliance of individuals with the rules. The result, argues 
Putnam, is the existence of a moral contract among agents 
produced by the existence of social capital. Hume makes the same 
assertion that we see many people practice those virtues in 
everyday life contrary to the selfish theory. 
The final outcome of Humean morality, like Putnam’s social 
capital, is the development of a cooperative tendency in 
individuals which violates the logic of collective action. Both 
Putnam and Hume make the observation that some people do not act 
as expected by the rational choice (selfish hypothesis) theory. 
Both explain this type of individual conduct by the development 
of a virtuous body of citizenry.  
 
 
 
3.10 CONCLUSION 
 
As we have seen in this chapter, Hume’s solution to the 
collective action problem is similar to Putnam’s social capital. 
Both theorists assert that the ultimate solution for efficient 
social cooperation depends on the development of particular 
individual conduct which violates the logic of collective 
action. Both make an observation about individual conduct in 
everyday life and claim that some people do not act as assumed 
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 by rational choice or “selfish hypothesis”. They explain this 
type of conduct by the improvement of individual judgment and 
morality.  
 Although Hume’s notion of virtue is social in essence, its 
function is not limited to social life. Rather, he thinks that 
virtuous agents would have a different way of doing politics. I 
will analyze Hume’s politics and the role virtue plays in it in 
the next chapter. Hume advocates a particular way of doing 
politics which is similar to Putnam’s “new way of doing 
politics” made possible by social capital.  
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4.0  HUME’S POLITICS 
 
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
It is a widely held conviction in Humean literature that, for 
Hume, institutions and good laws are primary in securing peace 
and order rather than morality or a virtuous body of citizenry. 
Although this conviction can be supported by many remarks on the 
significance of good laws and institutions in Hume’s works, it 
ignores too much of his theory on politics. It represents a 
selective reading of Hume’s arguments on politics rather than a 
comprehensive reading. This conviction, I think, partly relies 
on Hume’s rejection of the classical republican idea of virtue. 
The classical republican idea of politics considers institutions 
as well as a virtuous body of citizenry as essential for 
politics. Although Hume rejects the classical set of virtues as 
inhumane, this should not lead us to see Hume’s politics as 
wholly untouched by any idea of virtue. Rather, Hume advocates a 
new set of virtues that he thinks will suit the needs of the 
modern era. In other words, two issues are confused in this 
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 conviction which needs to be analyzed separately: the first is 
Hume’s critique of the classical republican idea of virtue and 
the second is the relation between institutions and morals and 
manners. A comprehensive analysis of Hume’s politics would 
reveal that Hume considers a virtuous body of citizenry as 
significant as institutions and good laws in politics.  
In this chapter, I argue that Hume’s politics has two 
fundamental components; institutions and virtues. Yet Humean 
virtues are different than those of the classical republicans. 
In the first section, I analyze Hume’s critique of the 
republican idea of politics and virtue. This will clear the 
confusion that since Hume rejects the classical idea of virtue, 
his politics is untouched by morals and manners. In the second 
section, I criticize the institutionalist interpretation of 
Hume’s politics as a reductionist reading of his theory which 
ignores too much of his arguments. In particular, Hume’s notion 
of factions reveals the role virtue (manners and morals) plays 
in his politics. This critique is necessary to have a more 
accurate and balanced view of Hume’s politics. It will also 
reveal that Hume’s politics has significant similarities to 
Putnam’s idea of “a new way of doing politics” made possible by 
the existence of social capital in society. In the third 
section, I analyze Hume’s notion of factions as an example of 
“bad social capital”. As we have seen in chapter two, Putnam’s 
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 social capital is commonly criticized as not discriminating 
between bad and good social capital. Hume’s notion of factions 
provides some significant insights on bad social capital in 
respect to its sources and how to deal with it.  
 
 
 
4.2 HUME’S CRITIQUE OF REPUBLICAN POLITICS 
 
Hume presents a new vision or way of doing politics for a new 
era. The newly emerging commercial modern society provides the 
setting for which he formulates a new way of doing politics. 
Hume believes that the rise of commercial modern society has 
changed the fundamental structures and culture of traditional 
society in such a way that a regular and humane vision and 
practice of politics would become possible. (Manzer 492). The 
very same process, asserts Hume, would make the classical 
republican vision of politics obsolete. As Moore puts it “Hume’s 
political science can best be understood as an elaborate 
response to the political science of the classical republicans” 
(810).  
 According to Robertson, classical republican politics 
assumes that the well-being of society depends on the existence 
of a constitution and public-spirited citizens in a particular 
social-economic setting. In other words, it focuses upon “the 
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 institutional, moral and material conditions of free citizenship 
in a political community”. The constitution provides the 
institutional framework in society. Moral condition refers to 
the existence of a public-spirited body of citizenry which 
depends on “the possession of material independence or 
autonomy”.  In this society, “only those – assumed to be few in 
number – in a position to satisfy their needs without making 
themselves dependent on others were capable of the requisite 
civic virtue. Conversely, failure to observe these material and 
moral conditions brought corruption” (Robertson 452). According 
to Moore, this vision believes that “the political virtue and a 
spirit of independence were most likely to be found in the ranks 
of country gentlemen, uncorrupted by the urban world of 
commerce, manufacturing and finance” (829).  
In “Of the Populousness of Ancient Nations”, Hume argues that 
in ancient states most people were not participants in political 
life. They were reduced to “slavery and subjection” to provide 
the material independence of citizens, which turned every 
citizen into “a petty tyrant” in his domestic life (Es 383-84). 
This classical practice as seen in ancient states, argues Hume, 
can be explained with their particular situations in that era. 
They were free states; they were small ones; and the age 
being martial, all their neighbors were continually in 
arms. Freedom naturally begets public spirit, especially 
in small states; and this public spirit … must encrease, 
when the public is almost in continual alarm, and men 
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 are obliged, every moment, to expose themselves to the 
greatest dangers for its defense. A continual succession 
of wars makes every citizen a soldier. (Es 259) 
 
The possibility of citizen-soldier depends on certain conditions 
both within society and among different states. The former 
requires an independent body of citizenry. The latter refers to 
almost constant wars among states. This kind of international 
relations led to the rise of a body of citizenry whose primary 
qualities were military virtues. They excelled in public spirit.  
Although ancient citizens had material independence, claims 
Hume, they were “unacquainted with gain and industry” (Es 259). 
Since military virtues were esteemed, commerce and industry were 
not developed. “The barbarity of the ancient tyrants, together 
with the extreme love of liberty, which animated those ages, 
must have banished every merchant and manufacturer” from society 
(Es 419). Since ancient politics contain “so little humanity and 
moderation” (Es 414), “their governments [were] more factious 
and unsettled” (Es 421). This form of societal regulation, 
asserts Hume, was “violent, and contrary to the more natural and 
usual course of things” (Es 259). 
 Against this vision and socio-economic structure Hume 
advocates commercial society and formulates his politics which, 
he believes, “would reflect more accurately the conditions of 
[commercial] society” (Moore 834). Hume asserts that the 
171 
 principles of ancient politics, such as exclusive public-spirit 
and the abstinence of citizens from commerce and industry, are 
not possible any more in commercial society; “these principles 
are too disinterested and too difficult to support”, for in a 
more peaceful environment the animating principle of human 
conduct is “a spirit of avarice and industry, art and luxury” 
(Es 263). And the strength of the state as well as the well-
being of citizens depends on commerce. 
The greatness of a state, and the happiness of its 
subjects, how independent so ever they may be supposed 
in some respects, are commonly allowed to be inseparable 
with regard to commerce; and as private men receive 
greater security, in the possession of their trade and 
riches, from the power of the public, so the public 
becomes powerful in proportion to the opulence and 
extensive commerce of private men. (Es 255). 
Hume’s politics advocates “foreign commerce” among states as 
opposed to ancient warlike international relations. 
International trade has a benevolent impact on domestic 
politics. First, the absence of war among states allows 
individuals to engage in commercial activities. Second, foreign 
trade provides both new goods and a market for society. Of 
special importance, international trade can lead to the rise of 
commerce and industry in a traditional society and becomes the 
source of subsequent developments. 
Thus men become acquainted with the pleasures of luxury 
and the profits of commerce; and the delicacy and 
industry, being once awakened, carry them on to farther 
improvements, in every branch of domestic as well as 
foreign trade. And this perhaps is the chief advantage 
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 that arises from commerce with strangers. It rouses men 
from their indolence. (Es 264) 
 
For Hume, commerce not only fits “the common bent of 
mankind” within society but also in international relations (Es 
260). Hume’s humane society, thus, is a commercial free society. 
As Moore puts it 
The society which underlies Hume’s model of republican 
government was quite explicitly a commercial society of 
manufacturers, merchants and financiers, and the laborers, porters 
and clerks who worked in their service. And the sources of military 
and political power in such a society no longer depended on the 
ability of the gentry to bear arms: it depended rather on the surplus 
of laborers made available for recruitment into military service in 
wartime, and on the wealth made available from commerce for 
subsidies to allies and for domestic political support. (834) 
 
For Hume, commercial society provides a much better 
environment than ancient republics for a nonviolent and humane 
form of politics; as we saw in chapter three, commerce increases 
and spreads wealth in society, which transforms all people into 
political agents. This contrasts with the republican model in 
which citizens represent just a small portion of society and 
their virtues made possible by their material independence which 
is maintained by extensive slave labor. Hume sees a tendency in 
commercial society that extends material as well as intellectual 
and moral requirements of citizenship to all individuals.  
 Hume’s critique of classical republican thought is limited 
to its notion of virtue and human excellence. He sees the 
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 republican virtues as creating inhumane dispositions in 
individuals. Yet he does not discard the institutional component 
of the republican system. Once Hume discards both desirability 
and the possibility of such republics in the modern era, he 
formulates a new model of politics that, he believes, fits “the 
common bent of mankind”.  
  
 
 
4.3 INSTITUTIONS, MORALITY, AND FACTIONS 
 
As we saw above, Hume denies that the classical republican 
virtues can be a viable alternative for modern society by 
claiming that they become possible only in certain national and 
international environments and are inhumane. Yet some scholars 
argue that Hume does not see any role for virtue in politics in 
general. Rather, he is an institutionalist who sees social order 
as depending solely on institutions and good laws.  
In this section, I introduce and criticize this 
interpretation of Hume’s politics. Then I argue that Hume’s 
politics has two essential foundations: institutions and 
morality. I also argue that Hume’s understanding of politics as 
having two foundations is similar to Putnam’s idea of politics 
as depending on both institutions and a virtuous body of 
citizenry. 
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 Indeed, in many places in his works, Hume endorses an 
institutionalist concept of politics that seems to discard any 
role for virtue in political life. In “Of the Independence of 
Parliament”, Hume asserts that in theorizing on politics or 
establishing a government “every man must be supposed a knave” 
who “has no other end, in all his actions, than private 
interest” (Es 42). In accordance with this belief, a mixed 
governmental system with check and balance and separation of 
powers is the most appropriate system to secure peace and order 
in society (Es 43). For Hume, lesson of this maxim is that an 
appropriate institutional framework is necessary to maintain 
peace and order and we cannot rely on the public spiritedness of 
man for this purpose.  
In his essays, Hume discusses whether manners, morals, and 
education of the rulers and the people or the institutions are 
more significant in the well functioning of the state. In “That 
Politics may be reduced to a Science”, he distinguishes 
“absolute governments” from “a free and republican government”; 
the former depend on manners, morals, and education of the 
rulers, whereas the latter primarily depends on well-formed 
institutions (check and balance system, separation of powers, 
and the rule of law). “The very same [absolute] government, in 
different hands, has varied suddenly into the opposite extremes 
of good and bad”.  On the other hand,  
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 a republican and free government would be an obvious 
absurdity, if the particular checks and controuls, 
provided by the constitution, had really no influence, 
and made it not the interest, even of bad men, to act 
for the public good. Such is the intention of these 
forms of government, and such is their real effect, 
where they are wisely constituted. (Es 15-16)  
  
He asserts that institutions’ impact in politics is 
independent of “the humours and tempers of men”. And, moreover, 
they direct individuals to act in certain ways in society.  
…  so little dependence has this affair on the humours 
and education of particular men, that one part of the 
same republic may be wisely conducted, and another 
weakly, by the very same men, merely on account of the 
difference of the forms and institutions, by which these 
parts are regulated. (Es 24)  
 
In a similar fashion, in “Of the Origin of Government”, Hume 
argues that private virtue is not related to public order; “a 
bad neighbor” does not necessarily mean “a bad citizen and 
subject”. Rather “experience … proves that there is a great 
difference between the cases. Order in society, we find, is much 
better maintained by means of government” (Es 38). Hume’s 
conviction is that the force of laws and institutions is so 
great that “consequences almost as general and certain may 
sometimes be deduced from them, as any which the mathematical 
sciences afford us” (Es 16). Therefore, “Legislators … ought to 
provide a system of laws to regulate the administration of 
public affairs to the latest posterity” (Es 24).  
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  Hume in these passages endorses a notion of politics that 
exclusively relies on the regulatory impact of institutions on 
political behavior and seems to discard any role for virtue in 
politics. As we will see below, the institutionalist 
interpretation of Hume’s politics mostly relies on these 
passages. And as Chabot puts it, “scholarly opinion leans toward 
the view that Hume looked rather to good laws and institutions 
than to morality or citizenship” to secure order in society 
(336).  
Cohen presents an institutionalist interpretation of the 
relation between morality and politics in Hume. He argues that 
Hume’s politics relies on institutions rather than manners and 
morals, although Hume believes that improvement in manners and 
morals is product of social development. The relation between 
institutions and manners and morals is one-sided. Institutions 
are primary and create the appropriate environment for the rise 
of civilized manners and morals. Yet manners and morals have no 
significant impact on the functioning of institutions. He 
asserts that  
thus if political institutions have a great effect in 
determining manners, manners do not have the same 
influence on the proper functioning of a constitution. 
Correctly modeled constitutions function independently 
of the manners of the people, making it the interest 
even of bad men to act for public good. (Cohen 123-24) 
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 In Cohen’s account, moral progress is a product of the 
improvement of society in general. Therefore, the morals of 
individuals do not have an “active role” in this social 
development. Rather, “politics, economics, sciences, and the 
arts are the main causes of the gradual progress of improvement” 
(Cohen 125). As a result, Cohen asserts “the political scientist 
is not concerned with manners and morals, but with the balancing 
of separate interest and skillful division of power in order to 
best secure the public interest… Therefore, Hume’s political 
scientist is not mainly concerned with the morality of people 
because the fate of nations depends on their institutions, not 
on their manners and morals” (124). 
Forbes also endorses an institutionalist interpretation of 
Hume’s politics. He argues that Hume’s constitutionalism reveals 
the importance of institutions in “determining human behavior in 
politics and national character” (224). He maintains that form 
of government determines manners and morals, yet “manners have 
not the same influence on the proper functioning … of 
constitution” (227).  Therefore “Hume’s political scientist is 
not concerned with the moral health of a people at all because 
the fate of nations depends on their institutions, not on 
manners and morals” (Forbes 229). Forbes’ conviction is that 
“Hume at any rate was wholly untouched by that Machiavellian 
moralism” (224). 
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 These scholars emphasize the regulatory significance of 
institutions on individual conduct. Yet this interpretation is 
reductionist for, at least, two reasons: First, it does not 
evaluate Hume’s many arguments which see morals and manners as 
having significant roles not just in politics but also in larger 
social life. Second, the remarks that Hume makes on the 
significance of institutions are related to mostly theoretical-
general reasoning on institutions. There are certain other 
issues for which Hume does not endorse institutions; rather he 
endorses the improvement of morality.  
Indeed, Hume’s endorsement of institutions as primary 
factors in politics is closely linked to general-theoretical 
statements about politics. When he compares absolute governments 
to free governments and different regions with different forms 
of governments in a country, he emphasizes the impact of 
institutions on individual conduct. In particular, the 
underlying assumption in Hume’s institutional argument is that 
he endorses the safest assumption to provide the minimal 
requirements of peace and order; individuals are supposed to be 
selfish agents and a well-balanced constitutional system backed 
by legal force directs self-interested agents to cooperate. Yet 
this is not the only major problem Hume deals with in politics. 
In addition to providing at least a minimum level of peace and 
order, he thinks that even a well-balanced institutional system 
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 could collapse due to a particular problem it faces. This 
problem is factionalism in politics. When it comes to factions 
Hume does not endorse institutions. Rather he endorses a 
particular way of doing politics which has nothing to do with 
institutions and also shows both the proper place and the limits 
of institutions and the role of manners and morals in political 
life.  
 In “Of Parties in General”, Hume classifies parties into 
two groups; “Personal” and “Real”. Personal factions depend on 
“friendship or animosity” among opposing groups. Real factions 
stem from “some real difference of sentiment or interest”. He 
cautions that these are not purely personal or real parties. In 
real life parties are mixed. Yet, depending on the dominance of 
principle, a party can be seen as real or personal. Personal 
parties, asserts Hume, appear mostly in small republics and 
almost anything can lead to the rise of such parties. He 
believes that individuals have a tendency to create such 
parties. 
Men have such propensity to divide into personal 
factions, that the smallest appearance of real 
difference will produce them. What can be imagined more 
trivial than the difference between one colour of livery 
and another in horse races? Yet this difference begat 
two most inveterate factions in the GREEK empire, the 
PRASINI and VENETI, who never suspended their 
animosities, till they ruined that unhappy government. 
(Es 57) 
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 Hume divides real factions into three groups: faction from 
interest, faction from principle, and faction from affection. 
Among these three, Hume finds the faction from interest “the 
most reasonable, and the most excusable”, for it stems from 
differences of interest among different groups. “The distinct 
orders of men, nobles and people, soldiers and merchants, have 
all a distinct interest” (Es 59-60). Parties from principle stem 
from “speculative” principles: “Parties from principle, 
especially abstract speculative principle, are known only to 
modern times, and are, perhaps, the most extraordinary and 
unaccountable phenomenon, that has yet appeared in human 
affairs” (Es 60). Parties from affection refer to those that 
stem from “the different attachments of men towards particular 
families and persons, whom they desire to rule over them” (Es 
63).  
 Although, Hume argues, parties can appear in any state, 
they appear and spread easily in free governments which provide 
the best environment for them (Es 55). In “Of the Coalition of 
Parties”, he maintains that to abolish parties is neither 
“practicable” nor “desirable, in a free government”. Yet he 
believes a particular type of party is very dangerous for social 
order and must be avoided: 
The only dangerous parties are such as entertain 
opposite views with regard to the essentials of 
government … where there is no room for any compromise 
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 or accommodation, and where the controversy may appear 
so momentous as to justify even an opposition by arms to 
the pretensions of antagonists. (Es 493) 
 
Here Hume refers to factions; although factions are parties, not 
all parties are factions. Parties are legitimate and inevitable, 
yet once a party turns itself into a faction it is dangerous for 
society. For Hume, parties from principles have the tendency to 
create factions. In particular, parties from principles refer to 
two types of principles; secular ideologies and religious 
principles. Both principles dispute the legitimacy of the 
fundamentals of a (liberal) system. Factions for Hume have the 
potential to override institutions. In other words, an 
institutional framework may not contain conflict created by 
factions in society. According to Hume, while institutions 
provide peace and order, factions have the contrary tendency: 
As much as legislators and founders of states ought to 
be honoured and respected among men, as much ought the 
founders of sects and factions to be detested and hated; 
because the influence of faction is directly contrary to 
that of laws. Factions subvert government, render laws 
impotent, and beget the fiercest animosities among men 
of the same nation, who ought to give mutual assistance 
and protection to each other. (Es 55) 
 
Thus, for Hume, factions have a contrary and destructive 
tendency to good laws and institutions; In other words, 
institutions and good laws are not the solution for factions. 
Contrary to the claim that Hume sees institutions and good laws 
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 as sufficient for political life, factions show that 
institutions are not sufficient. The regulatory impact of 
institutions mainly targets individual conduct. Yet factions 
represent groups of individuals. As we will see below, for Hume, 
factions have a transformative impact on individuals in a way 
that the regulatory impact of institutions and laws loses their 
influence on individuals. Rather, Hume looks to the improvement 
of morality among individuals to prevent parties turning 
themselves into factions.  
For Hume, although parties are inevitable in a free 
society, the kind of conflict that leads to the destruction of 
social order is not inevitable. In other words, political 
conflict is a fact of political life. It does not necessarily 
lead to animosity among parties or to the destruction of social 
order. What makes conflict destructive of social order is not 
necessarily related to the mere existence of parties or to 
conflict among parties. Rather, such destructive conflict stems 
from factions. First, factions dispute the fundamentals of the 
system; second, factions provide group-based moral 
justifications for their members’ conduct which leads them to 
deny that social order is public good; and third, factions 
create a particular disposition among their members.   
 According to Hume, when an individual acts alone, he is 
concerned with the results of his conduct from the standpoint of 
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 society. In other words, some common notion of appropriate form 
of conduct makes the individual consider his conduct within the 
requirements of social life; he is concerned with his 
reputation: “Honour is a great check upon mankind” (Es 43). Yet, 
when an individual acts as a member of a group, he may not be 
worried about such a sense of appropriate conduct. Rather, he 
may justify his conduct according to some principles or 
understanding provided by his party. Hume explains this as 
follows; “But where a considerable body of men act together, 
this check is, in a great measure, removed; since a man is sure 
to be approved of by his own party, for what promotes the common 
interest; and he soon learns to despise the clamours of 
adversaries” (Es 43). 
 Hume, here, seems to argue that even though individuals 
participate in different parties, larger society must provide 
some common understanding of appropriate conduct and sense of 
right and wrong. Differences in political approaches must not 
lead them to discard some shared mode of conduct among 
themselves and what public good means. Otherwise, if every 
single party endorses its own particular understanding of right 
and wrong for its members, political conflict would be a 
conflict among tribes which do not have any common language 
among them.  According to Phillipson, for Hume, factions provide 
individuals “with confined and partial views of the public 
184 
 interest” which leads them to forget that peace and order is 
public good (315).  
Conflict about fundamentals of the system by its nature 
creates a destructive conflict for Hume. According to Stewart, 
Hume’s notion of justice provides “the rule of game” in society 
(159). If individuals fight over “the rule of game”, they would 
not have any shared principle according to which to regulate 
their relations with each other. Similarly, the fundamentals of 
a system must provide such shared rules for parties which can 
act within certain limits and prevent destructive conflict among 
them (Stewart 159). For Hume, the rule of law, check and balance 
system, separation of powers, and individual freedom, in short, 
a constitutional system provides “the rule of game” for parties. 
As a result, both a shared sense of right and wrong and an 
institutional framework are necessary to prevent factions in 
politics.   
The third factor refers to a particular perception and 
disposition created by factions in individuals. In his Essays, 
Hume presents many cases of conflict among different parties 
that are not necessarily destructive for social order, yet how 
parties understand those conflicts transforms them into 
animosity.  
For Hume, speculative principles create uncompromising 
position in individuals, for individuals assume that their 
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 principles or positions on a subject reflect the truth. Once we 
assume certainty for our position and judgment, we necessarily 
see our opponents as completely wrong or even evil. Due to the 
certainty of our perception of our principles, we develop a 
radical disposition in our conduct. In other words, factions 
“translate political questions into moral crusades” (Letwin 
123). As a result, tension among opposing groups increases and 
conflict could lead to destruction of social order.  
According to Boyd, Hume is worried about the claim of 
certainty for one’s position that endorses “rational visions of 
society”. This vision posits “a world of universal and logical 
consistency-one abstracted from the ambiguities, tensions, and 
particular traditions of the real world” (115).  According to 
Boyd, this rationalistic vision that depends on the certainty of 
one’s principles shifts “the balance of society away from 
civility and toward what the modern world has come to call 
‘ideological politics’” (116).  
 In order to prevent this outcome, Hume endorses moderation: 
There is not a more effectual method of promoting so good an end, 
than to prevent all unreasonable insult and triumph of the one party 
over the other, to encourage moderate opinions, to find the proper 
medium in all disputes, to persuade each that its antagonist may 
possibly be sometimes in the right, and to keep a balance in the 
praise and blame, which we bestow on either side. (Es 494) 
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 According to Wulf, in order to prevent radicalization of political arguments, Hume endorses 
moderation in both “political discourse” and “dispositions of political actors”. Hume tries to 
prevent both “the unreflective sensibilities of common life” and “radical philosophy” from 
guiding politics (89). To accomplish this, Wulf maintains, Hume uses his political essays to 
show that political questions are “more complex and balanced” than opposing groups assume 
(91). According to Hume, a philosopher could teach people how to develop moderation in both 
judgment and conduct. In “Of the Protestant Succession”, he asserts that 
It belongs … to a philosopher alone, who is of neither 
party, to put all the circumstances in the scale, and 
assign to each of them its proper poise and influence. 
Such a one will readily, at first, acknowledge that all 
political questions are infinitely complicated, and that 
there scarcely ever occurs, in any deliberation, a 
choice, which is either purely good, or purely ill. 
Consequences, mixed and varied, may be foreseen to flow 
from every measure: And many consequences, unforeseen, 
do always, in fact, result from every one. Hesitation, 
and reserve, and suspence, are, therefore, the only 
sentiments he brings to this essay or trial. (Es 507) 
 
Factions provide perfect theoretical solutions to political 
problems by creating utopian visions which create uncompromising 
dispositions in individuals. For Hume both religious and secular 
principles are dangerous precisely for this reason; both types 
of principles advocate uncompromising positions in individuals, 
which makes them unaware of the complexity of political 
questions. That’s why Hume endorses “an undogmatic approach and 
counsels bargaining and compromise” for political practice 
(Letwin 394). 
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 Hume here endorses moderation in our judgment as well as in 
our conduct. Awareness that our opponents can be sometimes right 
is, according to Hume, an appropriate position in dealing with 
conflict in political life. It creates moderate conduct and 
eases the tension among groups. Thus, not just the mere 
existence of conflict but how we approach it is a critical 
factor that eases or increases tension in political life. How we 
react to conflict determines how we are responded to. Increase 
of tension may create a vicious circle: “One extreme produces 
another” (Es 415). Hume “pleads not for an end to conflict, but, 
for restraint in our language” (Conniff 387) by endorsing “a 
more skeptical civic mentality” in individuals by confronting 
them with the complexity of political questions as well as their 
inevitability (Chabot 337). Hume urges party-men to “detach 
themselves from their partisan commitments without surrendering 
them” in order to see the narrowness of their perspective 
(Chabot 339).  
Hume also assumes that social order is a common good for 
all parties. In other words, peace and order provide a shared 
ground for all parties, which would also moderate our 
perception, judgment, and conduct in political life. As Whelan 
puts it: 
His intention in his essays on parties and the 
prevailing party ideologies was to moderate partisan 
zeal by calling attention to plausible elements in the 
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 competing doctrines, and thus to confine partisan 
conflict to forms that were compatible with the survival 
of the constitutional regime as a whole. (327) 
 
Jones classifies Hume’s notion of moderation under four 
aspects: First, moderation as “a condition of understanding”. 
Second, moderation as “a rhetorical means to secure 
communication and conviction”. The third and the fourth aspects 
are linked to the role of moderation in moral and political 
life. Moderation as “a condition of understanding” refers to the 
necessity of obtaining some sort of “impartiality” to recognize 
the complexity of issues. Moderation as “a rhetorical means” 
refers to our attitude in relation to our opponents. 
Unreasonable insult and accusations would create tensions with 
our opponents. Rather, civilized language in presenting our 
position and considering our opponents as having a legitimate 
perspective though different than ours softens political 
discourse and ease the tension among parties (154-56). Jones 
argues that the recognition of complexity of political questions 
and necessity of a civilized argument among parties would lead 
to moderation in our judgment and conduct in political life, 
which is “integral to peace, stability, law and order” (157).  
Hume’s analysis of factions or partisanship as a problem in 
political life has a striking feature: He does not appeal to 
institutions or the state to solve this problem. Yet 
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 institutionalist interpretations of his theory ignore this fact. 
In regard to factions, Hume appeals neither to an appropriate 
form of institutional design nor to legal punishment. Moreover, 
he thinks that this type of conflict could destroy the 
institutional structure. Rather, he endorses moderation in 
judgment and conduct in political life. Letwin asserts that Hume 
was “committed to a particular style of politics. For it was not 
any political principle or doctrine, but his preference for a 
disposition that gave form to his politics” (94). In other 
words, Hume endorses a new way of doing politics to overcome 
partisanship in political life: “He … attempts to counteract the 
polarization” of politics (Schmidt 291).  
Wulf asserts that Hume’s strategy to teach party men 
moderation relies on the improved culture in civilized society 
and the beneficial impact of activities associated with 
civilized life style (92). According to Wulf, the Humean notion 
of civilized society, or “liberal commercial republics” provides 
the best environment for the rise of moderate judgment and 
disposition in political agents (94). As Phillipson noted, Hume 
believes “that the future of liberty and prosperity … depended 
on cultural not constitutional reform” (23). This development 
provides the ground on which Hume constructs his new way of 
doing politics.  
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 4.4 FACTIONS AS BAD SOCIAL CAPITAL 
 
Humean factions are similar to Putnam’s associations which 
create bad social capital for two reasons: First, as we saw in 
chapter two, bad social capital refers to norms, solidarity, and 
trust created among members yet not extended to non-members. The 
reason that these associations limit social capital to their 
members is that they dispute the essentials of the liberal 
system. In other words, such associations advocate alternative 
visions of society to a liberal system by relying on some 
speculative principles. For example, the Ku Klux Klan is a 
racist association. Religious fundamentalist groups also use 
their principles as a blueprint for an alternative society. 
Since these types of associations oppose the essentials of 
liberalism they limit social capital to their members.  
Hume’s claim that factions provide group-based moral 
justification is also related to their rejection of the 
essentials of liberalism. Since they deny the legitimacy of 
societal regulations based on liberal principles, factions use 
their own principles to justify their claims and conduct.  
As we saw in chapter two, in less civic regions of Italy, 
political actors had utopian visions with messianic expectations 
which led those actors to have uncompromising positions on 
political issues. Hume’s worry about factions refers to 
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 development of this type of disposition in individuals. Factions 
instill uncompromising dispositions in individuals, for they 
advocate utopian visions of society by using speculative 
principles. Either religious principles or ideological 
principles are used to transform society in accordance with 
utopian models.  
Hume’s solution to prevent parties from becoming factions 
is similar to Putnam’s “new way of doing politics”. In his 
politics, Putnam also endorses toleration, compromise, and 
pragmatism as appropriate skills and techniques by claiming that 
political questions are very complex and solutions lie in the 
middle in general. Hume endorses a similar pragmatic approach to 
political conflict by arguing that such conflicts are very 
complicated and cannot be solved on the basis of speculative or 
dogmatic principles.  
 
 
 
4.5  CONCLUSION 
 
Contrary to the institutionalist interpretation of Hume’s 
politics, Hume endorses certain skills, understanding, and 
dispositions to advocate a new way of doing politics. Factions 
reveal the necessity and the role virtue plays in his politics. 
As we have seen in this chapter, the institutionalist 
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 interpretation does not analyze Hume’s notion of factions. The 
regulatory significance of institutions cannot perform its role 
against factions which create alternative visions of society 
against liberal system. 
Hume rather endorses a new way of doing politics which 
relies on moderation, compromise, and sensitivity to social 
peace and order as public good. This shows that Hume advocates 
both institutions and a virtuous body of citizenry as necessary 
to achieve efficient cooperation not only in the larger social 
life but also in political life. 
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5.0 CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
 
In this study, I attempted to show that the application of 
rational choice theory to Hume distorts his theory. Unlike 
Hobbesian liberalism, the Humean problem cannot be reduced to a 
coordination problem and security in society. Hume’s project 
relies on a conviction that the individual is a progressive 
being with a wide array of needs, preferences, and faculties. 
Hume assumes that besides material needs and interest, 
individuals have characteristically human needs such as 
sociability, learning, friendship, and integrity which need to 
be satisfied. Social coordination problem is one of the issues 
Hume analyzes in his theory.  
Hume seems to classify individual needs into two groups: 
Material needs and non-material needs. Each group of needs 
creates interpersonal relations in society which are 
qualitatively different from each other. Material needs put 
individuals against each other as competitors, for such goods 
are scarce in nature and individuals are self-interested agents. 
The basic individual motive activated by material needs is self-
interest. This leads to a coordination problem in society. The 
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 most Hume hopes for from such agents is to develop enlightened 
interest and act in accordance with it. Yet, he is not very 
optimistic about the power of enlightened interest to affect 
individual conduct for two reasons. First, individuals are 
short-sighted agents who forget their enlightened interest. 
Thus, they need the state to force them to pursue their 
enlightened interest. The second reason concerns the free-rider 
problem to which enlightened interest leads. Enlightened 
interest requires individuals to defect as a rational strategy 
to increase their interest if they have the opportunity to get 
away with their defections. Within the logic of material needs, 
Hume accepts that there is no solution to the free-rider 
problem; that is, enlightened interest simply fails.  
In regard to material needs Humean agents are similar to 
Hobbesian agents. The essential quality of interpersonal 
relations is instrumental and “the market metaphor” or the game 
theoretical analysis provides some insights here. Self-interest 
has a significant function as the driving force of economic 
development in society. Yet, to see Hume’s theory as limited to 
this aspect of individual needs and human nature is misleading.  
Although Hume assumes that individuals by nature seek 
commodious living conditions, human needs cannot be reduced to 
material gains. For Hume there are other characteristically 
human needs required by characteristically human faculties. The 
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 development of these capacities and the satisfaction of these 
needs create interpersonal relations among individuals different 
from those of material needs. They do not lead to competition 
among individuals or a coordination problem, because Unlike 
material ones, satisfaction of these needs does not depend on 
scarce resources. Rather, sociability, friendship, conversation, 
and integrity assume that the more individuals consume these, 
the more these would be present in society. One’s integrity or 
sociability does not require the rest to have less of these. 
Hume assumes that these are inherently human needs required by 
our nature. He assumes that there are higher pleasures worthy of 
humans to follow in life.   
While the material needs lead to the development of the 
rules of justice and the state or the development of an 
institutional-structural environment, the non-material needs 
require the development of a cultural-moral environment in 
society. While the former manipulate self-interest to overcome 
the destructive tendencies of individuals, the logic and the 
essence of the non-material needs cannot be captured by “the 
market metaphor” or the game theoretical assumptions. The 
individual is not only an economic being but also a moral one. 
Yet, the interest of the individual as economic being conflicts 
with its interest as moral being. The former sees defection as 
rational in some cases, whereas the latter sees gains due to 
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 such deception as “worthless toys”. Hume assumes that this 
tension can be overcome by the moral education of individuals. 
Thus, the lesson of Hume’s moral theory is that training and 
education of individuals are necessary to prevent the whole 
sphere of social life from becoming a market place.  
This study reveals that Hume’s theory is not limited to a 
narrow view of politics. Rather, he is interested in the full-
fledged development of humans in the newly emerging commercial 
societies. He thought that commercial society could have both 
the necessary material conditions and moral-cultural-
intellectual requirements of an alternative life to classical 
and Christian models. That’s why we find so much emphasis on 
sociability, friendship, conversation, integrity or learning 
besides the more technical analysis of institutions and the 
rules in society in regard to politics. Politics is not isolated 
from the social, cultural, moral, or of economic spheres of 
society. This larger framework is consistent with Hume’s 
perception of human nature as located in a web of interpersonal 
relations in daily life and different institutional, economic, 
cultural, and moral contexts as stages of history. Hume’s theory 
is not only about the securing of peace and order but also the 
development of better citizens. Within this general framework, 
his response to the free-rider problem, as Baier puts it, is 
“perfectly intelligible”.  
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 This study reveals that liberal thought cannot be reduced 
to its Hobbesian version. The significance of this conclusion is 
that in dealing with the coordination problem as well as the 
quality of social life, Hume provides significant insights that 
could enrich our understanding of these issues in contemporary 
society. As Berkowitz puts it “FOR SOME TIME NOW, the conviction 
has been growing among both politicians and professors that the 
fate of liberal democracy … is bound up with the quality of 
citizens’ characters” (ix). Hume’s response to the “sensible 
knave” depends on this conviction about the role of virtue in 
politics in particular and in society in general. 
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